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A considerable part of the ﬁnancial literature aims at understanding the forma-
tion of asset prices and the numerous anomalies that have been found in the
past, such as excess volatility (see Shiller (2003)), and stylized facts of asset
returns, such as excess kurtosis and volatility clustering. This thesis contributes
to this literature. It collects four studies on the beneﬁts and consequences of
data-driven investment decisions. The thesis can be divided into two parts. The
ﬁrst part, consisting of chapters 2 and 3 is mainly of an analytical nature. Chap-
ter 2 is dealing with ﬁnancial markets where investors make fully data-driven
beliefs about future asset payoffs through econometric models (inspired on
Heckman (2000)), and the consequences of ambiguity about the future in this
belief formation. Chapter 3 investigates belief formation in the CAPM model,
a cornerstone model in the ﬁnancial literature. We argue in that setting that
beliefs cannot be fully data-driven if we impose the hypothesis of no potential
arbitrage opportunities1 with beliefs in line with the CAPM equilibrium. We
present a version of the CAPM with endogenous CAPM-consistent beliefs and
derive and apply a testing procedure for this model using actual data. The
second part, consisting of chapters 4 and 5, presents and analyzes several
versions of an artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market model in which individual economic
agents interact that form beliefs over the future using past information about
prices, dividends, and returns, and trade assets based on these beliefs. Using
the model, we establish insights in how well known stylized facts in assets
1These include ordinary arbitrage opportunities but also other opportunities and will be
deﬁned later.2 Introduction Chapter 1
returns can be generated. Chapter 6 presents a discussion about how the
chapters of this thesis are related.
Chapter 2 questions the behavioral ﬁnance interpretation that ﬁnancial
anomalies are caused by noise traders due to limits to arbitrage. Traditional
asset pricing models have as maintained hypothesis that investors have ra-
tional expectations. This is combined with the assumption that there are no
arbitrage opportunities, leading to many interesting implications (see Delbaen
and Schachermayer (2006)). Observed anomalies indicate a violation of this
traditional approach (see, for instance Barberis and Thaler (2003), Campbell
et al. (1997), Hommes (2006), and Schwert (2003)). The behavioral ﬁnance
approach combines the existence of so-called noise traders without rational ex-
pectations with limited possibilities to exploit arbitrage opportunities for agents
with rational expectations, such that the noise traders can generate deviations
from the fundamental price. However, very weak assumptions already imply
that prices equal their fundamental value plus a bubble term (see Loewenstein
and Willard (2006)). Any set of assumptions that makes this bubble term
disappear, also takes away the room for noise traders to affect asset prices,
limiting noise traders as a channel to explain anomalies.
We propose a different understanding of the anomalies that are found.
We consider as maintained hypothesis the absence of arbitrage opportunities
and allow that there might be limits to rational expectations. This allows for
different views of agents on the future, which is quite natural2 as long as the
data generating process for asset returns that reﬂects full rationality has not
yet been found. We model beliefs about future payoffs as the output of an
econometric model (see Heckman (2000)), in our case probability distributions,
and allow for the possibility that agents do not want to describe the future by
a single probability distribution, in which case there is ambiguity. We deﬁne
well-performing beliefs as beliefs for which it is ex ante known that these
cannot be falsiﬁed ex post by the actual outcome and argue that economic
agents should aim at well-performing beliefs because they might simply not
be ﬁt enough to survive otherwise. Moreover, we argue that the existence of
unforeseen contingencies effectively leads to one period planning to achieve
2This is in the spirit of Muth (1961) and Hansen and Sargent (2001a) who argue that
underlying rational expectations is the inspiration that model builders and economic agents
have the same understanding of the data generating process.3
well-performing beliefs (even if there are more periods to follow). Furthermore,
we reformulate the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of asset pricing in this context.
Given our maintained hypothesis of no arbitrage, we consider as hypothesis
to be tested that expectations are rational, whereas behavioral ﬁnance takes
rational expectations as maintained hypothesis combined with the null hypoth-
esis that there are no limits to arbitrage. In both cases the combined hypotheses
yield the traditional ﬁnance approach. When rejecting the joint hypotheses
on the basis of anomalies, the maintained hypothesis matters and, instead of
concluding that noise traders push asset prices away from their fundamental
value, we conclude that there are limits to rational expectations, which implies
that asset prices might not reﬂect a long term fundamental value. Markets
will be (informationally) efﬁcient, but only given a short horizon point of view.
We use existing empirical evidence to argue that our maintained hypothesis
makes more sense than the behavioral ﬁnance one. We conclude that the
long-term inefﬁciency might not be due to noise traders and limits to arbitrage,
but, instead, due to ambiguity about fundamental values, for example, caused
by continuing unforeseen contingencies introduced by innovations.
In chapter 3, we present a version of the CAPM (see Sharpe (1964) and
Lintner (1965)) in which the beliefs of the mean-variance investors are deter-
mined endogenously, in line with the CAPM equilibrium. We call this model
the Endogenous Beliefs CAPM (EBCAPM). The CAPM itself has been heavily
criticized, both from an empirical point of view (see for a recent overview, for
instance, Fama and French (2004)) as well as from a theoretical point of view
(see, for instance, Levy (2007)). Traditionally, when testing the CAPM, the
assumption is added that the assets’ return distribution is known or that, at
least, the means, variances, and covariances of this distribution can be retrieved
empirically. When rejecting the CAPM, one typically rejects mean-variance
preferences instead of considering that the investors might use other beliefs.
The assumption is also driving the criticism of Levy (2007) and by allowing the
beliefs to be determined endogenously, this criticism can be circumvented.
The EBCAPM has as maintained hypothesis mean-variance behavior which
we combine with endogenously determined beliefs that are consistent with
this behavior. A ﬁnding that empirically based beliefs are inconsistent with
the CAPM then only implies that investors do not use these beliefs, rather
than a rejection of the CAPM. Instead, we take as maintained hypothesis the4 Introduction Chapter 1
absence of potential arbitrage opportunities. We say that potential arbitrage
opportunities exist if the stochastic discount factor as implied by the CAPM is
negative. These potential arbitrage opportunities include ordinary arbitrage
opportunities as well as non-tradable arbitrage opportunities. However, these
latter could easily be turned into ordinary ones using simple ﬁnancial deriva-
tives like digital options. As a consequence, the assumption of no potential
arbitrage opportunities is a natural one. Using this assumption, we derive
one-period ahead belief-speciﬁc predictions in terms of the market portfolio.
These predictions are the basis for a testing procedure of the EBCAPM. We
test the EBCAPM using the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks and ﬁnd that the model performs very well. We further study
the traditional alternatives to the CAPM, namely, the multi-factor models such
as the Fama and French (1993) three factor and the Carhart (1997) four factor
models, using fully empirically based beliefs. We show that there is a trade-off
between model consistency of fully empirically based beliefs and the likelihood
of potential arbitrage opportunities. We show that these multi-factor models in-
duce violations of the hypothesis of no potential arbitrage opportunities. Since
the exclusion of potential arbitrage opportunities is also a natural requirement
in these models, we prefer the EBCAPM.
Chapters 4 and 5 concretize investment decisions based on data-driven
beliefs. They propose a computational way of explaining stylized facts of
asset returns based on agents making data-driven investment decisions (see
Cont (2001) for an overview of these stylized facts). This research belongs
to the Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) stream of literature (see
Judd and Tesfatsion (2006) for an overview). Chapter 4 ﬁrst introduces the
individual components of the multi-asset ﬁnancial market, such as ﬁrms that
issue stocks and pay dividends and economic agents that trade the available
assets. There are two types of agents in the model that make data-driven
investment decisions. The ﬁrst type is the fundamentalist who performs a
fundamental analysis of the assets using past data on asset prices and dividends
to decide upon the portfolio. The other type is the mean-variance agent
who uses past data on asset returns to forecast the expected returns and the
covariance matrix of returns to compute the optimal portfolio. These agents
trade with each other and equilibrium asset prices are determined using a
temporary Walrasian equilibrium. We study the sensitivity of properties of5
resulting return series to changes in characteristics of the agents and establish
a benchmark multi-asset artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market model.
Chapter 5 further analyzes and extends the benchmark model of chapter 4.
It investigates the effects of additional heterogeneity in agent properties to the
outcomes of the model. We also extend the model by allowing the agents to
use different rules for forecasting the future and to switch between these rules.
This is inspired on, for instance, LeBaron (1999). Such an economy reproduces
some of the well known stylized facts of asset returns, such as volatility cluster-
ing. We will also study the effects of allowing some agents to switch between
types, which is a usual ingredient in the more analytically based literature in
this area, see, for instance, Brock and Hommes (1998). The chapter concludes
with analyzing the output of some of the models presented in chapters 4 and 5,
and discusses the ability of these models to reproduce the stylized facts as listed
by Cont (2001). We conclude that several models presented in this chapter can
reproduce a number of stylized facts of asset returns such as heavy tailed return
distributions, volatility clustering, and volume/volatility correlation, revealing
that this type of models might be a relevant and promising alternative to the tra-
ditional ﬁnance models, also taking into account the results of chapters 2 and 3.
The ﬁnal chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis and discusses how
the chapters are related by comparing and relating the implications of all
chapters. We verify, for instance, whether the beliefs used in chapters 4 and 5
exhibit the property of well-performance as discussed in chapter 2 and whether
the hypothesis of no potential arbitrage opportunities as discussed in chapter 3
can be rejected in the artiﬁcial ﬁnancial markets of chapters 4 and 5. The
chapter concludes with some suggestions for future research.2
Ambiguity, No Arbitrage,
Transmutability, and the Limits
to Rational Expectations
In the traditional asset pricing approach investors are assumed to have rational
expectations. In addition, the traditional approach assumes that asset prices
are set such that there are no arbitrage opportunities. This combination of the
rational expectation hypothesis and the absence of arbitrage assumption allows
a powerful analysis, see Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006). Many interesting
implications follow, including, for instance, the result that arbitrage free asset
prices represent the so-called fundamental value of the assets (at least, in the
absence of bubbles). However, empirical testing reveals numerous ﬁndings that
are classiﬁed as anomalies or puzzles,1 indicating violation of the traditional
approach.
The behavioral ﬁnance approach deals with these empirical ﬁndings by
maintaining the rational expectations hypothesis.2 However, actual asset prices
might deviate from their fundamental values due to the presence of “noise
traders” without rational expectations. A limits to arbitrage argument, prevent-
ing economic agents with rational expectations from exploiting the potential
arbitrage opportunities generated by the noise traders, then allows the noise
traders to affect market prices. Typically, as in DeLong et al. (1990), arbi-
trageurs are assumed to have (effectively) short term horizons, so that at best
short-term, but not long-term arbitrage opportunities will be exploited. Shleifer
1See, for instance, Barberis and Thaler (2003), Campbell et al. (1997), Hommes (2006),
and Schwert (2003), who discuss these anomalies and puzzles from different perspectives.
2Thus, when arbitrage opportunities would be absent, asset prices will reﬂect their funda-
mental value. Typically, based on theoretical and empirical arguments, one assumes that the
bubble term is zero in this benchmark case.8 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
and Vishny (1997) motivate why longer term arbitrage opportunities might
not be exploited. They consider arbitrageurs investing the capital of outside
investors. Both arbitrageurs and investors are assumed to be rational, but the
outside investors lack full understanding of the actual asset pricing process. Ef-
fectively, this results in short term planning horizons of these investors, making
them unwilling to fully commit to the (rational expectations-based) arbitrage
trading strategies that require a longer term, in particular, when these trading
strategies might have short term losses.
However, as noticed by Loewenstein and Willard (2006), the combination
of absence of single-period arbitrage opportunities together with rational ex-
pectations implies that asset prices will equal their fundamental value plus a
bubble term. Given this set-up, any set of assumptions that makes the bubble
term vanish also rules out deviations between the asset price and its funda-
mental value, irrespective whether irrational investors are present or not. In a
world with rational expectations, this seriously limits the possible inﬂuence of
noise traders generating prices that do not reﬂect their fundamental value. Of
course, one could argue that there are even limits to arbitrage in a single-period
context. But then one would expect to observe serious limitations to trading
possibilities, such as short selling constraints. However, there is only sparse
evidence for such constraints, and then only in a limited number of cases.3
Thus, the question arises whether the combination of rational expectations and
limits to arbitrage provides the appropriate understanding of the anomalies
found.
This chapter proposes an alternative natural understanding of these anoma-
lies.4 Instead of combining the rational expectations hypothesis with limits to
arbitrage, we maintain the hypothesis that there are no arbitrage opportunities,
but allow for the possibility that there are limits to rational expectations. As
discussed by Muth (1961) and more recently by Hansen and Sargent (2001a),
the inspiration underlying the rational expectations hypothesis is that model
3For instance, Shiller (2003), favoring the behavioral ﬁnance approach, presents as example
the 3Com sale of Palm in March 2000, but adds that this example is an unusual anomaly. On
the other hand, Hens et al. (2006) argue that for “limits to arbitrage” trading constraints are
not really required: it sufﬁces when all traders would limit their trade to a restricted subset
of assets available. However, very likely the resulting arbitrage opportunities will generate
incentives for arbitrageurs to try to exploit these. Given today’s computing, information, and
communication technologies, and without trading constraints, this seems to be quite possible.
4For an alternative, see Bossaerts (2002).9
builders and the economic agents in their models have the same understanding
of the data generating process. It seems that econometricians, despite many
attempts, are still unable to detect a data generating process that reﬂects full
rational expectations.5 So, in the spirit of Hansen and Sargent (2001a), we
postulate that also economic agents might allow for the possibility that their
expectations do not exclusively reﬂect long-term rational expectations.
A main reason as to why investors might have beliefs that need not represent
rational expectations is due to new discoveries in the sciences or innovations
(cf. Arrow and Hahn (1999)). For instance, consider the continuous stream of
innovations. As Baumol (2002) puts it (see page viii; italics are in original):
“free-market pressures (...) force ﬁrms into a continuing process of innova-
tions, because it becomes a matter of life and death for many of them.” Since
innovation is to bring into existence something new, not all future changes due
to innovations might be fully anticipated, resulting in unforeseen contingen-
cies,6 potentially prohibiting rational expectations. In particular, learning from
the past about the exact characteristics of future innovations might be quite
difﬁcult.7 In addition, innovations may not only happen in the underlying real
economy, but also in the ﬁnancial markets directly, see, for example, Tufano
(2003) or Levine (2005). When planning present and future ﬁnancial invest-
ments, investors might want to allow for the possibility that at future dates new
(innovative) ﬁnancial products will be introduced, whose exact characteristics
might not be fully anticipated today. In particular, investors might want to take
this lack of knowledge into account when forming their beliefs.
To deal with this potential lack of understanding about the world surround-
ing us, we model beliefs as output of an econometric model (inspired on
Heckman (2000)), where available data on past and present asset returns and
other information serves as input. Such data-dependent beliefs might underlie
the disappearance of phenomena reported as anomalies after their publication
in the scientiﬁc literature, as documented by Schwert (2003). By using an
econometric model as intermediation between available data and future beliefs
5This inability is exempliﬁed by the difﬁculty of ﬁnding a single stochastic process able to
describe all stylized facts of asset returns, see, for instance, Cont (2001).
6For an overview on unforeseen contingencies, see, for example, Kreps (1992) or Dekel
et al. (1998). General equilibrium models with unawareness due to unforeseen contingencies
include, among others, Modica et al. (1998) and Kawamura (2005).
7See Gilboa et al. (2008) for an elusive discussion what one might (not) learn from the
past.10 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
we will be able to allow for investors applying technical or fundamental analysis,
as well as (possibly the same) economic agents aiming at rational expectations.
We shall focus on beliefs that can be represented by one or more probability
distributions. In particular, we shall consider the possibility of a future that
investors do not want to describe by just a single probability distribution. When
the representation of beliefs requires more than one probability distribution,
we are dealing with ambiguity.
Econometric models might generate ambiguity for several reasons. First,
due to lack of sufﬁcient data (the usual case), one might not be able to estimate
the data-generating process without sampling error. This generates ambiguity.
Second, investors might want to consider alternative econometric speciﬁcations
to predict the future, in particular, if they lack a sufﬁcient understanding of the
economic process. Again, this generates ambiguity. There is already a substan-
tial literature on modeling ambiguous beliefs.8 In this literature, the multiple
probability distributions are typically part of the economic agents’ preferences,
and, as such, are given exogenously. However, in a world characterized by
market-driven innovations and data-driven empirical ﬁnancial research, prob-
ability distributions might not be exogenous. Therefore, we consider beliefs
that might be determined endogenously, via econometric models, as part of the
economic outcomes.
Following Kurz (1994a) and Kurz (1994b) (see also Kurz and Motolese
(2001)), we qualify the economic agent’s beliefs as rational in case the generat-
ing econometric model provides a data description consistent with the observed
past and present data, i.e., the economic agents should not be able to reject the
hypothesis of correct model speciﬁcation when using, for instance, standard
econometric speciﬁcation tests. We shall assume that economic agents aim at
rational beliefs: an econometric model resulting in non-rational beliefs is not
likely to be able to generate a correct description of the future.
We shall distinguish between a future that is immutable or transmutable
with respect to the beliefs of an economic agent.9 We say that the future is
transmutable with respect to a belief set when the future realization happens
to be an unforeseen contingency or when it is an event assigned probability
8See, for instance, Chen and Epstein (2002), Epstein and Wang (1994), Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989), Hansen and Sargent (2001a,b, 2008), Klibanoff et al. (2005), Rigotti and Shannon
(2005), Uppal and Wang (2003), and Maccheroni et al. (2006).
9The terminology immutability versus transmutability is borrowed from Davidson (2002).11
zero according to all considered beliefs (where we assume a ﬁnite outcome
space). Otherwise, we say that the future is immutable with respect to the
beliefs, and we classify the beliefs as well-performing. Agents faced with
transmutability might be poorly equipped for such a situation, since in this case
beliefs do not provide an appropriate description of the future. Hence, without
well-performing beliefs they might simply not be ﬁt enough to survive in the
struggle for economic life. As a consequence, we shall assume that economic
agents facing ambiguity aim at rational beliefs that are also well-performing.
When looking more than one period ahead, it might become quite difﬁcult,
or even impossible, to determine already today the possible future payoffs
of all ﬁnancial products, including those not yet available today, but that
might be introduced at intermediate periods. To avoid transmutability, for
example, because of the possibility of unforeseen contingencies at later periods,
economic agents might effectively reduce their time horizon in order to obtain
well-performing beliefs, just like the outside investors of Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) do. Of course, economic agents might (and typically will) plan over
a longer time horizon, but due to transmutability of longer term beliefs, they
likely will reconsider their plans every period, so that their plans are effectively
based on one period ahead beliefs.10
Even with such limits to rational expectations, absence of arbitrage opportu-
nities remains a basic assumption.11 In this chapter we maintain the assumption
of absence of arbitrage opportunities even when the investors employ (effec-
tively) single period beliefs, possibly not representing rational expectations.
Arbitrage opportunities are typically deﬁned given a single probability distribu-
tion. We extend the deﬁnition of an arbitrage opportunity when beliefs might
be ambiguous and we reformulate the ﬁrst theorem of asset pricing in terms
of absence of such arbitrage opportunities under ambiguity. As maintained
hypothesis we postulate that asset prices are set such that there are no arbitrage
10Without transmutability Epstein and Schneider (2007) and Epstein and Schneider (2008)
provide recent approaches how to deal with ambiguity in a multi-period context.
11For instance, Ross (2002) states, when discussing the traditional neoclassical ﬁnance and, in
particular, the exclusion of arbitrage opportunities assumption in light of the limits to arbitrage
discussion: “Neoclassical ﬁnance is a theory of sharks and not a theory of rational homo
economicus, and that is the principal distinction between ﬁnance and traditional economics.
(...) Rational ﬁnance has stripped the assumptions down to only those required to support
efﬁcient markets and the absence of arbitrage, and it has worked very hard to rid the ﬁeld of
its sensitivity to the psychological vagaries of investors.” In this chapter we further strip down
the required assumptions.12 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
opportunities according to the investors’ beliefs, which we assume to include
at least the rational and well-performing beliefs, since such beliefs cannot be
rejected on the basis of empirical evidence, and do not exclude outcomes that
might be possible.
Given our maintained hypothesis we consider as hypothesis to be tested
that expectations are rational. This is to be compared with the behavioral
ﬁnance approach which takes as maintained hypothesis the rational expec-
tations hypothesis and as hypothesis to be tested that there are no limits to
arbitrage. The joint hypotheses in both cases result in the traditional ﬁnance
approach where asset prices reﬂect their fundamental value (with or without a
bubble term) and, thus, where asset prices reﬂect a long term view. However,
when rejecting the joint hypotheses, for instance, on the basis of anomalies, the
maintained hypothesis matters for the interpretation of observed asset prices.
Whereas Loewenstein and Willard (2006) provided theoretical arguments to
why limits to arbitrage are unlikely to be the full explanation, we use existing
empirical evidence to argue that our maintained hypothesis makes more sense.
Thus, instead of concluding from the anomalous ﬁndings that asset prices
deviate from their fundamental value due to the effects of non-rational noise
traders, we draw an other conclusion: due to ambiguity, particularly caused
by transmutability of long-term beliefs, asset prices do not reﬂect a long term
fundamental value, but, instead, only reﬂect a short horizon point of view. As a
consequence, markets will be (informationally) efﬁcient, but only given a short
horizon point of view, not given a long horizon point of view. This might have
serious consequences for long-term investments.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section
we introduce beliefs, modeled as probability distributions that are output of an
econometric model. In Section 2.2 we introduce well-performing beliefs, and
discuss that such beliefs can be achieved by effectively forcing agents to use
a short term planning horizon. In Section 2.3 we investigate the exclusion of
arbitrage opportunities in case beliefs also reﬂect ambiguity, and we present
our maintained hypothesis. Section 2.4 discusses some of the existing empirical
evidence on anomalies typically reported in the ﬁnancial literature to make a
selection between the traditional ﬁnance approach and the behavioral ﬁnance
view. We use these to motivate our alternative approach. In particular, we
discuss as examples excess volatility and twin shares. Section 2.5 concludes.Section 2.1 Belief Formation through Econometric Models 13
Belief Formation through Econometric Models 2.1
In this section we shall consider data-dependent beliefs, that might be a single
probability distribution, but generally will be represented by more than one
probability distribution. We model these probability distributions as output
of an econometric model. Such econometric models —inspired on Heckman
(2000)— describe in some parameterized way both the available data and the
target of interest that one aims to quantify using the data. In our case the target
of interest is the set of probability distributions describing the future outcomes
of the economic process, in particular, the asset return process, while the data
available are past and present observations on returns and other variables, like
book-to-market ratios, earnings, and so on.
We consider a particular period t where economic agents have available
information represented by a vector zt and where the economic agents aim
at forming beliefs over a vector Xt+1. In the typical case, zt contains as com-
ponents the subvectors zt,t j, representing past and present information, for
j = 1,...,t0 and j = 0, respectively. The subvectors zt,t j include in our case, in
particular, past and present asset prices. Similarly, Xt+1 contains as components
the subvectors Xt+1,t+k, k = 1,...,T, where in our application Xt+1,t+k will rep-
resent the vector of asset payoffs at the future period t +k, as perceived at time
t. We shall assume that the economic agents are “current information takers”:
they consider the present information in zt,t, which, for instance, includes the
vector of the present asset prices at time t, as unaffected by their own actions
at time t. However, from the point of view of the economy as a whole, some of
the components of zt,t, including in particular the present asset prices, will be
endogenous at time t.
In the next subsection we describe econometric models and in subsection
2.1.2 we discuss how such econometric models can be used to classify different
ways of modeling uncertainty. In subsection 2.1.3 we introduce rational beliefs.
Econometric Models 2.1.1
In this subsection we introduce econometric models that we assume are em-
ployed by the economic agents in the formation of their beliefs. Economic
agents might use technical or fundamental analysis, and they might also aim at14 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
forming rational expectations. Each of these cases can be modeled by means of
an econometric model.
The input of an econometric model consists of zt, the information available
at time t. The economic agents consider zt as a realization of a random vector
Zt, where Zt  Pa
t. Thus, by assumption, the observations are considered to
be generated by a data generating process, i.e., a probability distribution Pa
t,
where the superscript a stands for actual. This probability distribution Pa
t might
be unknown to the economic agents.





. Here, M t denotes the model class containing various models m. These
models describe potential data generating processes, included in the set Dt.
This set Dt consists of all probability distributions of Zt that the economic agent
considers. We shall assume that the set Dt contains Pa
t. This means that when
Pa
t is unknown, an economic agent might have to choose Dt quite large. The
data transformation dt : M t 7! Dt captures the description of potential data
generating processes in Dt by means of the models m in M t. In addition, the
models m in M t describe “targets”, as captured by the target transformation
tt : M t 7! T t. Here, T t is called the target set. In our case the targets are
probability distributions PX
t of the vector Xt+1 (conditional upon the (model
speciﬁc) available information at time t), to be used in the formation of beliefs.
Finally, t is a (model class M t-speciﬁc) data selection procedure, based on





 dt(M)  Dt.
Given an econometric model with input zt we investigate the formation of
beliefs as output of such an econometric model. Thus, the way the input zt is
transformed into the output, being probability distributions over Xt+1 that will
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, the economic agent selects as target



























of selected target values consists of just one
probability distribution, by assumption this will be the belief of the economic









contains more than one probability distribu-
tion, the econometric model does not generate a single “objective” probability
distribution, that could be used as belief. Instead, the economic agent can
construct many beliefs in a “subjective” way, by combining the probability dis-







—typically induced by a prior deﬁned over M t—, “subjective”







using the prior t. We shall indicate a probability distribution, constructed




, and we denote the set of priors t by t.
Given this set-up, we deﬁne the set of beliefs constructed from the econo-





, with t 2 t, and we denote this set of beliefs





Sources of Strong Uncertainty in Beliefs 2.1.2
In this subsection we distinguish different forms of uncertainty.12 First, we





at least one non-degenerated probability distribution or at least more than one
probability distribution.
When the set of beliefs B t contains one element only, by assumption this
single element is the economic agent’s unique belief (probability distribution)
over Xt+1. In this case we say that the economic agent has an unambiguous
belief, and the uncertainty is called weak uncertainty or risk. Such beliefs are
consistent with the rational expectations assumption and hence underly the
traditional ﬁnance approach. When, on the other hand, the set of beliefs B t
contains more than one belief concerning the future outcome of the economic
process as represented by Xt+1, the economic agent has ambiguous beliefs on
Xt+1, and the uncertainty is referred to as Knightian or as strong uncertainty.
Strong uncertainty is called strong data uncertainty when the ambiguity
of the beliefs arises from the fact that the data selection procedure t con-
12Cf. the classiﬁcation used by, for example, Dequech (2006).16 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
tains more than one element. This might reﬂect a lack of empirical evidence,
for instance, because the economic agent allows for estimation inaccuracy.
Additional empirical evidence, for example, resulting from a more accurate esti-
mation procedure, might then result in a reduced t (i.e., of lower cardinality),
possibly, but not necessarily, resulting ultimately in a t with only one element,
in which case the strong data uncertainty would disappear. However, in case Pa
t
happens to be non-discoverable for all t,13 then strong data uncertainty might
persist, even when many observations are available.
Strong uncertainty is called strong model uncertainty when the transforma-






, is not injective, so that the









This means that on the basis of the data selection procedure t alone, the eco-
nomic agent is not able to distinguish between models m1 and m2. Such strong
uncertainty will typically arise due to underidentiﬁcation. An econometric








is not one-to-one, so that different models m 2 M t might correspond to the











might contain different models m, potentially resulting in
different target values tt(m), causing ambiguous beliefs. Underidentiﬁcation
seems plausible when the economic agents have insufﬁcient understanding of
the economic process, prohibiting a fully understood description of the data
which would be reﬂected by a one-to-one transformation dt : M t 7! Dt.
Thus, strong data uncertainty reﬂects lack of empirical knowledge, which
might disappear when more observations become available, but which might
also persist in case the observations are generated by a non-discoverable proba-
bility distribution. Strong model uncertainty reﬂects a lack of understanding
of the economic system, which will remain, irrespective of how accurate the
data selection procedure might be, but which might disappear due to a better
understanding of the economic process.
2.1.3 Rational Beliefs





(and set of priors t) rational, in case the hypothesis Hr : Pa
t 2 t cannot
13See Bewley (1988) for a discussion of processes having discoverable or non-discoverable
probability laws.Section 2.2 Well-Performing Beliefs 17
be rejected on the basis of the observations zt, where Pa
t is the probability
distribution of Zt.14 When the hypothesis Hr can be rejected on the basis of
the available observations, there are two possible reasons. First, this may be
because Pa





. This case will be
referred to as irrationality: the economic agent might be rational, since the
choice Pa
t 2 t would be possible, but he or she chooses not to do so. Secondly,
we might be able to reject the hypothesis Hr because Pa





, so that it also cannot belong to t. This case will be referred to as
bounded rationality: the economic agent cannot be rational since he or she is
lacking a complete description of all possible data. We use non-rationality to
indicate both irrationality and bounded rationality.
Bounded rationality of beliefs typically occurs due to misspeciﬁcation of the
econometric model. Misspeciﬁcation might happen due to overidentiﬁcation. We









Dt.15 In this case, the model does not describe all possible data. In case a
description of Pa
t is missing, so Pa




, and it is possible to detect
this using the observations zt,16 the agent will be boundedly rational.
Well-Performing Beliefs 2.2
When new information arrives, economic agents will update their data-based
beliefs, so the belief formation process will repeat itself every time period.
As a result economic agents also experience the performance of their beliefs.
In particular, they will learn that their beliefs were incorrect, whenever an
event occurs that they did not consider to be possible. We assume agents
aim at avoiding this to happen and, hence, only use beliefs about which they
know ex ante that these will not be falsiﬁed ex post. We ﬁrst characterize such
well-performing beliefs and then discuss what agents might do to ensure their
beliefs are well-performing.
14More precisely, this deﬁnition of rationality requires a set S t of speciﬁcation tests, with
corresponding conﬁdence levels. Rationality then means that the null hypothesis Hr cannot be
rejected on the basis of the tests included in S t, using the corresponding conﬁdence levels. In
the sequel, when talking about rationality, we have this formalization in mind.




is not one-to-one), while an econometric model is overidentiﬁed when dt is not surjective.
16 Detection is likely to be possible when consistent tests are available and the number of
observations in zt is sufﬁciently large.18 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
2.2.1 Characterizing Well-Performing Beliefs
In this subsection we shall ﬁrst make a distinction between immutable and
transmutable beliefs, based on Davidson (2002). This distinction enables
us to deﬁne well-performing beliefs. Let Xt+1 take its values in X t+1, the
set of all potentially possible outcomes. We shall assume that this is a ﬁnite
set.17 For a probability distribution PX






, possibly a strict subset of X t+1, consisting of x 2 X t+1 for which
the probability PX
t (fxg) is deﬁned. According to the probability distribution
PX





are considered possible, while the outcomes





are unforeseen contingencies, not considered as possi-




as the union of A t+1(P), over













are unforeseen contingencies. The investor employing belief set B t is unaware




. We shall assume that in
case of a belief set B t all beliefs P 2 B t share the same sample space, i.e.,




, for all P 2 B t.18
Under repetitive circumstances, probabilities might be given a frequency
interpretation. However, such repetitive circumstances might not be present.
To deal with the possibility that probability statements might lack a frequency
interpretation, we impose Cournot’s bridge between probabilities and the
physical world: events that are assigned probability zero by all probability
distributions in a set of beliefs are believed to be impossible.19 We call such an
event a zero probability event.
Given a belief set B t and using Cournot’s bridge, we classify the possible











(the zero probability set) in case the event fxg







in case the event fxg has a positive probability, strictly larger than
17Since in our application the set X t+1 consists of the future assets’ payoffs, this assumption
does not seem to be very restrictive.
18In case we would start with two beliefs Pa and Pb, such that A t+1(Pa) 6= A t+1(Pb), then
we would deﬁne Pa(x) = 0 for x 2 A t+1(Pb)nA t+1(Pa), and similarly in terms of Pb. This
makes sense, since the economic agent is aware of x 2 A t+1(Pb)nA t+1(Pa).
19 See, for instance, Shafer and Vovk (2001) for a further discussion on Cournot’s bridge,
also linking it to Kolmogorov’s interpretation of probabilities.Section 2.2 Well-Performing Beliefs 19






in case the event fxg has probability zero according to some P 2 B t and
probability strictly larger than zero according to the other P 2 B t. The set
E0
t+1 contains the considered outcomes x 2 A t+1 that have probability zero
with respect to all beliefs in B t, and, in that sense, are believed impossible. The
set E+
t+1 contains the outcomes x 2 A t+1 that have strictly positive probability
according to all beliefs in B t, and, in that sense, are believed possible. Finally,
the set Ea
t+1 contains the outcomes x 2 A t+1 about which there is ambiguity
whether they are possible (corresponding to a positive probability) or not
(probability zero), thus, it is the set of outcomes that are believed to be possibly
possible.
We say that the economic system, as represented by Xt+1, is strongly trans-
mutable with respect to the set of beliefs B t, when the realization of Xt+1




, since U t+1 is the set of unforeseen contingen-
cies, considered impossible. When the realization of Xt+1 belongs to the zero
probability set E0
t+1 we say that the economic system, as represented by Xt+1,
is weakly transmutable with respect to the set of beliefs B t, since in case of
E0
t+1 the realization belongs to a set that ex ante was considered as potentially
possible, but that was believed to be impossible. We say that the economic
system, as represented by Xt+1, is strongly immutable with respect to the set of
beliefs B t, when the realization of Xt+1 belongs to E+
t+1, since E+
t+1 is the set
of outcomes that are believed to be possible (and without ambiguity). Finally,
when the realization of Xt+1 belongs to Ea
t+1, we say that the economic system,
as represented by Xt+1, is weakly immutable with respect to the set of beliefs
B t, since in case of Ea
t+1 the realization belongs to a set that ex ante was
only believed to be possible according to some probability distributions in the
belief set and was believed to be impossible according to the other probability
distributions in the belief set.
Given the sets U t+1, E0
t+1, E+
t+1, and Ea
t+1 we can straightforwardly test ex
post the hypothesis of (weak or strong) immutability against the alternative of
(weak or strong) transmutability: the hypothesis of immutability will be rejected
in case the future outcome happens to belong to U t+1 or E0
t+1. In case we
would know in advance that we will not reject the hypothesis of immutability,
we will refer to the corresponding beliefs as well-performing. Without any
further information on the set X t+1 of potentially possible outcomes, the only20 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
way to obtain well-performing beliefs is when U t+1 = ? and E0
t+1 = ?. With
extra information on X t+1 (such that at least U t+1 = ?) also a nonempty set
E0
t+1 might generate well-performing beliefs.
2.2.2 Achieving Well-Performance of Beliefs
In this section, we discuss how economic agents can achieve the goal of having
well-performing beliefs about asset payoffs. Let St denote the vector of asset
prices at time t, and let Dt be the corresponding vector of dividend payoffs at
time t. We take Xt+1, = St+1,+Dt+1,, the vector representing the asset payoffs







X t+1. We shall assume Xt+1, 2 X t+1,.
We ﬁrst describe a possible way to arrive at the traditional (i.e., rational
expectations-based) way of belief formation. Suppose there exist future states
of the world that can be described at time t by the set 
t+1. This set 
t+1
is assumed to be known, without unforeseen contingencies. In addition, the
possible future outcomes are fully described by a random variable !t+1 2 
t+1
with an exogenously given probability distribution P!
t (given the available
information at time t). Next, the economic agents are assumed to understand
the future economic process, in the sense that they are able to determine the
vector of asset prices and dividends at time  (as viewed from period t) as
transformations
Xt+1, = St+1, + Dt+1, : 
t+1 7! X t+1,.
This induces probability distributions on the future stock prices and dividends,
and, thus, a probability distribution PX
t of Xt+1, known to the economic agents.
However, even if an exogenously given probability distribution P!
t would
generate the future outcomes,20 possibly only a very deep and full understand-
ing of our world will make it possible to retrieve this probability distribution.
As postulated by, for instance, Baumol (2002) the current economic system
might be characterized by a continuous stream of innovations. Such innova-
tions can be seen as the creation of new, unforeseen contingencies in 
t+1
20A reason why the outcomes of economic processes always look like being generated by a
probability distribution is given by Vovk and Shafer (2005).Section 2.2 Well-Performing Beliefs 21
(corresponding to new products, new production processes, etc.). From the
point of view of an economic agent, who is planning to invest in assets, this
might imply that the set of future states of the world 
t+1 becomes hard, or
even impossible to determine in all of its details, let alone the transforma-
tions St+1, + Dt+1, : 
t+1 7! X t+1,. Ambiguity of beliefs seems a natural
consequence.
The difﬁculty of modeling future payoffs in an economy characterized by
innovations becomes even more apparent once we allow for the possibility
of ﬁnancial innovations. The assets available in period t are typical for this
period: in later periods some of the currently existing assets might disappear,
while new products might be created. In addition to St
t+1,t+1, the price vector
in period t +1 of the assets existing in period t, denote the price vector of the
new, innovative ﬁnancial products21 to be introduced at time t +1 by St+1
t+1,t+1.
The set of potentially possible payoffs at time t +1 is X t+1,t+1, consisting of
all potentially possible values of St
t+1,t+1 + Dt
t+1,t+1. Since the assets included
in St+1
t+1,t+1 do not yet exist at time t, they also will not generate a payoff at
time t +1. We assume that the investors are aware of the possible values of
St
t+1,t+1 (and the corresponding dividend Dt
t+1,t+1), i.e., the set X t+1,t+1 does
not contain unforeseen contingencies, but we allow for the possibility that the
investors are unaware of St+1
t+1,t+1, or components of it.
Next, consider future period t +2. The set X t+1,t+2 of potentially possible


















We assume that at time t the investors are aware of the possible values of
X t
t+1,t+2, but we allow for the possibility that they are unaware of X t+1
t+1,t+2
(just like they might be unaware of St+1
t+1,t+1). This means that only at time
t +1 the investors might become aware of the set X t+1,t+2. If so, imposing as
requirement that the investment decisions are based on well-performing beliefs,
forces investors to reconsider their investments plans at time t +1, resulting
in an effective planning horizon that only reaches a single period into the
21These new ﬁnancial products can of course also include claims on the revenues generated
by non-ﬁnancial innovations.22 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
future, so that the relevant beliefs only pertain to next-period payoffs. Indeed,
the presence of unforeseen contingencies creates a preference for ﬂexibility
(Kreps (1992)), making investors unwilling to commit to long-term investment
strategies, cf. Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
In the sequel we shall focus on this “worst case scenario”, where investors
effectively look only one period ahead. In line with this, we shall take from now
on Xt+1 = Xt+1,t+1 and X t+1 = X t+1,t+1, where we assume that the belief sets




= X t+1, i.e.,
there are no unforeseen outcomes in tomorrow’s payoffs of today’s ﬁnancial
assets, so that beliefs (by construction) are well-performing.
2.3 Arbitrage Free Pricing
Arbitrage opportunities are usually considered in the risky context only. In
this section we ﬁrst deﬁne arbitrage opportunities when there is ambiguity
and derive the analogue of the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of asset pricing in
our single period context with a ﬁnite set of possible future outcomes X t+1,
but allowing for ambiguity. Next, we present our hypothesis on arbitrage free
pricing that will be our maintained hypothesis when dealing with the anomalies
that seem to reject the standard approach.
2.3.1 On the First Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
From now on Xt+1 = St+1 + Dt+1, denoting the vector of total payoff of the
assets at time t +1, will be deﬁned as
Xt+1 : X t+1 3 x 7! x 2 X t+1.
Since 
t+1 might be unknown, we simply take Xt+1 as the random vector
being the identity transformation on X t+1, avoiding in this way a speciﬁcation
of 
t+1.22 Let there be J + 1 assets available, numbered from 0 to J, with
asset 0 the numéraire, whose price is normalized to one. We assume that the
numéraire pays off zero dividend. A portfolio at time t is given by a vector
22Compare Ahn (2008).Section 2.3 Arbitrage Free Pricing 23
ht 2 RJ+1, with time t price ht St and with total payoff at time t +1 given by




(where a  means taking an inner product). Given
the zero probability set E0
t+1, the payoffs that are believed possible or possibly
possible are given by ht x, for x 2 X t+1nE0
t+1. Portfolio ht is a zero investment
portfolio in case its price is equal to zero, i.e., ht  St = 0. Given the zero
probability set E0
t+1, a zero investment portfolio ht is an arbitrage opportunity
in case ht  x  0, for x 2 X t+1nE0
t+1, with at least one strict inequality. Thus,
an arbitrage opportunity is a portfolio payoff, requiring zero initial investment,
such that it generates a nonnegative payoff, unequal to zero, but only in case of
outcomes that are believed to be possible or possibly possible. This deﬁnition
is the usual one in case E0
t+1 = ?.
Next, we present the analogue of the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of asset
pricing given an econometric model E t, with set of priors t, yielding as











. The support of a probability distribution P will be denoted by
supp(P). For some given P with supp(P)  X t+1, we write the expectation
of some transformation f of the vector of payoffs Xt+1 with respect to this






. Then the First Theorem of Asset
Pricing becomes:
Theorem 2.1
Given St, X t+1, and the zero probability set E0
t+1 ( X t+1, there are no arbitrage






t+1, such that for all portfolios ht we have











determined by the support of the single belief. As in the
standard case, the probability measure Qt is a martingale probability measure
in our more general case: prices are the expected values of their payoffs under




is determined by the set of beliefs. Indeed, with more than one belief this
martingale probability measure need not be equivalent to any individual belief,24 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
so that according to individual beliefs there might be arbitrage opportunities.
However, different arbitrage opportunities correspond to different beliefs, and
it is the presence of ambiguity about these separate beliefs that prevents the
possibility to exploit the belief speciﬁc arbitrage opportunities.23
2.3.2 Maintained Hypothesis
As maintained hypothesis we shall impose that the asset prices are set such
that according to the beliefs employed by the investors, interacting on the asset
markets, there are no arbitrage opportunities. In general, different investors
might have different beliefs, and there is no reason to exclude, for instance,
non-rational beliefs. However, it makes sense to postulate that prices are
set such that there are no arbitrage opportunities given at least rational and
well-performing beliefs, since such beliefs cannot be rejected on the basis of
empirical evidence, and also never exclude what might be possible. To deal with
the “worst case scenario” of the previous section (to achieve well-performing
beliefs), we shall restrict attention to rational and well-performing single-period
beliefs. Thus, we postulate that the asset prices are set such that there are
no arbitrage opportunities given rational and well-performing single-period
beliefs. This hypothesis substantially extends the traditional hypothesis that
prices are set such that there are no arbitrage opportunities given rational
expectation-based single- and multi-period beliefs.
Our version of the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of asset pricing shows that
the assumption that asset prices exclude arbitrage is a characteristic of the















. This means that, given
St, X t+1, and some E0















, such that the resulting zero probability set is equal to the given E0
t+1,
23A typical case is the term structure of interest rates. For instance, the Nelson-Siegel
parametrization of the term structure might allow for arbitrage opportunities, when the
uncertainty is generated by a single probability distribution P, see, for example, Björk and
Christensen (1999) or Filipovi´ c (1999). However, when using the Nelson-Siegel speciﬁcation
in applied work, such as Diebold and Li (2006), estimation inaccuracy (or even allowing for
model misspeciﬁcation) might generate ambiguity, potentially avoiding arbitrage opportunities.Section 2.4 The Limits to Rational Expectations 25
excludes arbitrage opportunities. As a consequence, given observed prices St,
such that arbitrage opportunities can be excluded (with corresponding X t+1
and E0
t+1),24 guaranteeing arbitrage free asset pricing with respect to rational









that is not imposing any restrictions on the




= Dt), but at the same time imposes restrictions on
the beliefs such that the zero probability set equals E0
t+1.25 Next, investors only
knowing the set of potentially possible outcomes X t+1, and aiming at well-
performing beliefs, will have to take E0
t+1 = ?. Thus, we have the following
hypothesis as our maintained hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2.1 (HMain, Maintained Hypothesis)







the set of potentially possible outcomes, we can ﬁnd q1
t,...,qA











Whenever the number of potentially possible future outcomes in X t+1 is
larger than the number of assets, i.e., A > J +1, arbitrage free asset pricing
with respect to well-performing beliefs requires beliefs according to which
the market is considered incomplete. Whether the market is complete or
incomplete is thus not exogenously given, but is just a matter of belief choice,
compare the concluding remarks by Blume and Easley (2006).26
The Limits to Rational Expectations 2.4
The traditional ﬁnance approach combines rational expectations with the
assumption of no arbitrage opportunities. Anomalous ﬁndings then suggest
limits to arbitrage, limits to rational expectations, or both. Behavioral ﬁnance
24Thus, in case of term structure modeling, this requires an exact ﬁt of the current term
structure.
25Investors generally will not make this speciﬁc choice. However, the point is that the
assumption of rational arbitrage free asset pricing essentially only requires that the observed
asset prices are set such that arbitrage opportunities are excluded.
26Of course, investors might also choose a larger set E0
t+1, possibly even resulting in a
complete market view. In particular, if such investors happen to be better informed mutual
fund managers it might become attractive for the other market participants to invest in these
funds, at least when the analysis of Blume and Easley (2006) or Sandroni (2000) also applies
to the current case.26 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
typically concludes limits to arbitrage, allowing noise traders to affect the
market outcomes, resulting in asset prices deviating from their corresponding
fundamental values. Different types of noise traders, usually motivated by
psychological insights, might explain different anomalies. This behavioral
ﬁnance approach via a limits to arbitrage argument strongly hinges on the
(implicit) maintained hypothesis of rational expectations. Indeed, violations of
the rational expectations hypothesis might also be a potential channel through
which to explain the anomalous ﬁndings. But, without the rational expectations
hypothesis the concept of fundamental value no longer exists, so that price
deviations from fundamental values cannot really be studied, and noise traders
can no longer be “blamed” for mispricings.
The aim of this section is to argue that existing empirical evidence seems
to favor as maintained hypothesis absence of arbitrage opportunities (at least,
given rational and well-performing beliefs), implying that anomalous ﬁndings
might better be interpreted as limits to rational expectations instead of limits
to arbitrage.27 As a consequence, anomalies might simply be an artefact of
models imposing rational expectations as (too strong an) assumption.
In the next subsection, we ﬁrst formulate the rational expectations hypoth-
esis and the hypothesis that prices are set such that arbitrage opportunities
are excluded, but reformulated in terms of fundamental values (and corre-
sponding bubble terms). In subsection 2.4.2 we confront the behavioral ﬁnance
approach with our alternative approach. In subsection 2.4.3 we illustrate this
by discussing two famous anomalies, namely excess volatility and twin shares.
2.4.1 Rational Expectations and Fundamental Values
Just like the investors i 2 f1,...,I g have belief sets Bit consisting of beliefs
Pt over the set X t+1  X t+1,t+1, they might use their econometric models
with sets of priors to construct belief sets over X t+1,,  = t +2,...,T, given




be a belief over X t+1,+1, given
the perceived information available at time , as viewed from time t, repre-
sented by the information set F t,. We assume that the sequence of beliefs
Pt,Pt,t+1,...,Pt,T 1 is induced by a probability distribution Pt,T. Let Bit,T be
27Recall that these limits to arbitrage should hold even for single-period arbitrage opportuni-
ties (cf. Loewenstein and Willard (2006)).Section 2.4 The Limits to Rational Expectations 27
the set of all such probability distributions Pt,T considered by investor i at time
t (with Pt,t+1 = Pt and Bit,t+1 = Bit). In addition, let P
a
t,T denote the corre-
sponding actual probability distribution. We formulate as rational expectations




Hypothesis 2.2 (HRE, Rational Expectations)







Given HRE for some time horizon T, we also assume HRE for   T, particularly
for  = t +1.
Next, we consider the hypothesis that asset prices are set such that arbitrage
opportunities are excluded, where we shall reformulate this hypothesis in terms
of perceived fundamental values and bubble terms. First, consider a belief
Pt, (with Pt,t = Pt). According to our version of the fundamental theorem of
asset pricing, a (perceived) price vector St+1, 2 F t, is set such that in period
 arbitrage opportunities are excluded if and only if we have for all possible
portfolios ht,





























is usually referred to as a stochastic
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the covariance with respect to Pt, (denoted by CovPt,) between the stochastic
discount factor and the gross return on the portfolio ht,.
Since Xt+1,+1 = St+1,+1 + Dt+1,+1, we might combine these no arbitrage
relationships in case we have a single perceived ﬁnancial product. Given
the time horizon T, and setting ht,t = ht, we deﬁne a portfolio path repre-







ht, St+1,+1 = ht,+1 St+1,+1,   t.
This results in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2.3 (HFV(Pt,T), Fundamental Value)
Given the time horizon T and probability distribution Pt,T (inducing the prob-






































In case we take the limit T ! 1, we ﬁnd (assuming convergence) as ﬁrst
term at the right hand side the perceived fundamental value, while the second
term represents the perceived bubble. Of course, different Pt,T might result in
different perceived fundamental values with different values of the bubble term.
Thus, in case of the rational expectations hypothesis HRE the fundamental value
is uniquely deﬁned, but not so in case of ambiguity.
Acknowledging investors’ short effective horizons, our maintained hypoth-














= X t+1. Such a Pt might be induced by
many different Pt,T, corresponding to many different fundamental values and
bubble terms, particularly so when there is ambiguity in terms of Pt,T.
Limits to Arbitrage versus Limits to Rational Expectations 2.4.2
In this subsection we confront the behavioral ﬁnance approach to our approach,
and motivate why our approach is to be preferred.
The behavioral ﬁnance approach takes the rational expectations hypothesis







, for   T, thus, combining the maintained hypothesis
of rational expectations with the hypothesis of no arbitrage opportunities,
which is the traditional ﬁnance approach. In case the null hypothesis is rejected,
then, under the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations, there still exist
investors i 2 f1,...,I g able to ﬁgure out the actual probability distribution,






, for   T. The implication is that there must
be limits to arbitrage, even in a single period context.29 With such limits to
arbitrage, noise traders might affect the market outcomes, where different
noise traders might cause different anomalies to appear.
The conclusion of limits to arbitrage requires the validity of the maintained
hypothesis of rational expectations. However, testing this maintained hypoth-
esis, given that there are limits to arbitrage, might be quite difﬁcult, if not
impossible, since it is not clear which restrictions the actual probability distri-
bution P
a
t,T should satisfy in this case. Limits to arbitrage allow noise traders to
affect the outcomes in the ﬁnancial markets in many different ways, resulting in
many different possible probability distributions P
a
t,T, implying many possible
different restrictions on P
a
t,T.
When testing the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations is difﬁcult
or even impossible, rejection of the null hypothesis of no arbitrage under
rational expectations does not necessarily mean limits to arbitrage, unless
limits to rational expectations can be excluded. Indeed, limits to rational
expectations particularly becomes a relevant alternative in case the limits to
arbitrage conclusion cannot be supported by empirical evidence. In fact, there
29As also discussed by Loewenstein and Willard (2006), the combination of rational expecta-
tions and no arbitrage in a single period context already implies the null hypothesis.30 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
does not seem to exist much overwhelming direct evidence in favor of limits to
arbitrage, due to, for instance, short selling constraints. For instance, Shiller
(2003), favoring the behavioral ﬁnance approach, presents as example the
3Com sale of Palm in March 2000, where short selling constraints cause limits
to arbitrage, but notices that this example is an unusual anomaly.
Instead of providing direct evidence, one typically interprets market cir-
cumstances as evidence in favor of limits to arbitrage; for instance, Shiller
(2003) concludes his analysis of the search for limits to arbitrage as follows:
“Remarkably few shares are in fact sold short. According to New York Stock
Exchange data, from 1977 to 2000 year-end short interest ranged from 0.14
percent to 1.91 percent of all shares. (...) Given the obviously large difference
of opinion about and difference of public attention to different stocks, it is
hard to see how such a small amount of short selling could offset the effect on
stock price of the extra demand of investors who develop an irrational ﬁxation
on certain stocks.” We feel many more assets would be available for short
selling, in case desired. However, under our maintained hypothesis with only
single-period well-performing beliefs, trading strategies do not qualify easily
as exploiting arbitrage opportunities. The limited amount of short selling that
is observed, could well be sufﬁcient to achieve exclusion of these arbitrage
opportunities.
Without clear direct evidence in favor of limits to arbitrage, we expect that
the sharks of Ross (2002) will be able to do their job. As a consequence, we
consider it more appropriate to have HMain as maintained hypothesis, thus,
that asset prices are set such that arbitrage opportunities are absent with
respect to rational and well performing beliefs, or, in terms of fundamental




= X t+1. The null hypothesis is again
the traditional ﬁnance approach, now obtained by combining our maintained








Testing our maintained hypothesis seems to be rather straightforward,
irrespective whether beliefs represent rational expectations or not. Indeed, our
maintained hypothesis seems to be conﬁrmed by a study like Malkiel (2003),
who actually tests the Efﬁcient Market Hypothesis (EMH)30 by investigating
30Malkiel (2003) deﬁnes an efﬁcient ﬁnancial market as one that does not allow investors to
earn above-average returns without accepting above-average risks.Section 2.4 The Limits to Rational Expectations 31
the performance of professional investors in the market. On the basis of his
investigation, he concludes that the EMH cannot be rejected. Combined with
the absence of trading restrictions, such as short selling constraints, this is
also empirical evidence in favor of our maintained hypothesis of no arbitrage
opportunities.






is not satisﬁed, as seems to follow
from the anomalies, one might take in case of our alternative hypothesis for
Pt,T any perceived probability distribution, as long as at least Pt induced by





yields many possible different fundamental values with also many different
corresponding bubble terms (in case T ! 1). As a consequence, when taking
the anomalous empirical ﬁndings as evidence for our alternative hypothesis,
a different view of ﬁnancial markets emerges. First, as long as there is no
clear evidence in favor of limits to arbitrage, our maintained hypothesis is that
markets are efﬁcient with respect to the information presently available, in the
sense that it is impossible to make (short-term) economic proﬁts by trading on
the basis of this information set.31
However, the anomalous ﬁndings are now interpreted as limits to rational
expectations, implying that the ﬁnancial markets might not be allocationally
efﬁcient given a longer term time horizon, since prices might no longer reﬂect
a unique fundamental value with corresponding bubble term. This longer term
allocational inefﬁciency is not caused by noise traders, but is due to ambiguity.
In particular transmutability might result in ambiguity about fundamental
values from a long-term perspective. This transmutability might be inherent to
our economic system, since it is likely part of the continuous cycle innovation
– transmutability – incompleteness – innovation, a perpetuum mobile due to
evolutionary forces. Creating innovations is crucial to survive in the economy
(cf. Baumol (2002)). These innovations generate transmutability, forcing
investors to consider ﬁnancial markets as incomplete. In turn, this incomplete
market view creates new possibilities for suppliers of ﬁnancial products to
come up with innovative ﬁnancial products that might help “complete” the
perceived incomplete market. These new ﬁnancial products, in their turn, cause
additional transmutability, and so on.
31Using the terminology of Jensen (1978), see also Timmermann and Granger (2004).32 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
In the behavioral ﬁnance approach, limits to arbitrage are the abnormal
situation, which will disappear as soon as arbitrageurs can do their job. So,
given the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations, the null hypothesis of
the combination of rational expectations and no arbitrage opportunities is the
relevant benchmark to which the market outcome should be compared. Empir-
ical ﬁndings deviating from this benchmark are really anomalies. However, in
our case the same null hypothesis is just a very special situation, whose realiza-
tion might require exceptional investors’ skills, needed to fully understand the
ﬁnancial markets, likely beyond the capabilities of most, if not all, investors.
But with the null hypothesis as special case, the alternative of limits to rational
expectations (given our maintained hypothesis) is the normal or benchmark
situation. Consequently, the anomalous ﬁndings rejecting the null hypothesis
cannot really be classiﬁed as anomalies, but are essentially only an artefact of
models imposing as unrealistically strong assumption rational expectations.
In fact, the traditional ﬁnance point of view is to consider the anomalies,
at least to some extent, to be more apparent than real, see Schwert (2003).
However, Schwert (2003) concludes his paper on anomalies as follows: “But
even if the anomalies existed in the sample period in which they were ﬁrst
identiﬁed, the activities of practitioners who implement strategies to take
advantage of anomalous behavior can cause the anomalies to disappear (as
research ﬁndings cause the market to become more efﬁcient).” Such a view ﬁts
perfectly in a world where limits to rational expectations encourage investors
(and researchers) to search for “anomalies”, and then, as soon as these are
identiﬁed, to try to exploit them.32 It also suggests that anomalies persist over
prolonged periods of time, not because of a limited ability to exploit them,
but because of a limited understanding of them. As soon as an anomaly is
sufﬁciently well understood, it tends to disappear.
2.4.3 Illustration: Excess Volatility and Twin Shares
In this subsection we compare the behavioral ﬁnance approach and our ap-
proach using the excess volatility-anomaly and the twin shares-anomaly as
illustrations.
32Investors in terms of money, researchers in terms of publications.Section 2.4 The Limits to Rational Expectations 33
According to Shiller (2003) the most basic anomaly is that of excess volatil-
ity.33 Shiller (2003) compares the volatility in the S&P500 stock index and its
corresponding postulated fundamental value. More precisely, he compares the
volatility of the S&P500 stock index (St) and approximations of the correspond-
ing fundamental value S








the null of no arbitrage and the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations
and with a zero bubble term.34 Since the volatility in the observed stock prices
is much larger than the volatility in the various ex post fundamental values







Under the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations this excess volatil-
ity implies that there should be limits to arbitrage, motivating the behavioral
ﬁnance approach. However, under our maintained hypothesis, we conclude
from the ﬁndings of Shiller (2003) that beliefs do not represent rational ex-
pectations. Indeed, as soon as longer-term beliefs turn out to be transmutable
and economic agents (effectively) restrict their time horizon to obtain well-
performing beliefs, asset prices will only reﬂect a short-term horizon point of
view. Such a short-term horizon does not exclude excess volatility. In fact, since
short-term planning requires frequent revisions, excess volatility of asset prices
compared to their “fundamental values” (where both are calculated ex post)
seems to be a natural consequence.35 Thus, under our maintained hypothesis
excess volatility should be considered as the normal situation. Only validity of
the (special) null hypothesis of rational expectations implies no excess volatility.
Actual data simply indicates rejection of this special null hypothesis.
As second anomaly, we consider the case typically used in the literature
when discussing limits to arbitrage, namely twin shares (see Barberis and
Thaler (2003) or Lamont and Thaler (2003)). A standard twin shares example
33Shiller (2003) formulates this as follows: “The anomaly represented by the notion of excess
volatility seems to be much more troubling for efﬁciency markets theory than some other
ﬁnancial anomalies (...). The evidence regarding excess volatility seems, to some observers at
least, to imply that changes in prices occur for no fundamental reason at all, that they occur
because of such things as “sunspots” or “animal spirits” or just mass psychology.”
34Under the null hypothesis theoretical and empirical arguments imply a zero bubble term.
But see LeRoy (2004) for a recent review on bubbles. Notice that LeRoy (2004) considers the
version of the null hypothesis with a zero bubble term as pushing the assumption of rational
expectations too far. But he concludes not to know where to break off the traditional approach.
This chapter just aims at offering a plausible possibility for this.
35For instance, dividends might be determined by only a limited number of economic agents,
possibly aiming at a smoothed series of dividends, while asset prices are the result of many
interacting suppliers of ﬁnancial products and investors interested in these products.34 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
is Royal Dutch and Shell Transport, that merged their interests in 1907 on a
60:40 basis. Royal Dutch shares are a claim to 60% of the two companies’
cash ﬂows, while Shell Transport shares are a claim to the other 40%. The
analysis by Froot and Dabora (1999) shows that over long time intervals the
price ratio of Royal Dutch and Shell Transport used to be substantially different
from 1.5, with Royal Dutch mainly traded in Amsterdam and New York, and
Shell Transport in London.
Let S1
t and S2
t be the two prices of the two twin shares at time t, and
assume, for simplicity only, that both shares represent equal claims on the
total cash ﬂows. We observe S1
t 6= S2
t. Under the maintained hypothesis of
rational expectations together with the null of no arbitrage opportunities (with
similar bubbles) this is impossible, since S1
t and S2
t should represent the same
fundamental value, which cannot be combined with the observed S1
t 6= S2
t.
Stracca (2004) concludes from this: “At times, the evidence seems compelling
that market prices are irrational.”
However, many investors (including Long Term Capital Management (LTCM)
as a famous example36) tried to exploit the price difference between Royal
Dutch and Shell Transport, shorting the more expensive one and buying the
cheapest one, indicating that there were no clear limits to arbitrage. Indeed, it
seems more appropriate to start with our maintained hypothesis. Under our
maintained hypothesis, we can easily allow for the inequality S1
t 6= S2
t in case of
our alternative hypothesis. In fact, rationality of beliefs requires that investors



















or, by subtracting S1
t from S2
t and using that the dividend payment at time t +1














This will be possible under our maintained hypothesis HMain. Thus, contrary to
the conclusion by Stracca (2004) that in this case market prices are irrational,37
36See, for instance, Scruggs (2007) for a recent discussion of the LTCM-case.
37In the sense of not representing their fundamental value.Section 2.5 Conclusions 35
we conclude that the empirical evidence seems to reveal that the standard
approach (the null hypothesis of rational expectations and hence equal prices)
should be interpreted as representing an irrational view on the real world!38
Indeed, rational beliefs should allow for price differences, as the past has
proven this to be the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, with beliefs not
representing rational expectations it should be no surprise that Royal Dutch
and Shell Transport could have different prices at different markets. Instead,
without rational expectations, such trading strategies become speculative, with
a lot of uncertainty involved, as is clearly illustrated by the LTCM-case.
Conclusions 2.5
In this chapter we investigate asset pricing, using as maintained hypothesis that
prices are set such that there are no arbitrage opportunities given the investors’
beliefs. We do this in a context where belief formation is a data-dependent
process with econometric models mediating between data and beliefs. We
argue that the resulting investors’ beliefs will often not be uniquely determined,
either through strong data or through strong model uncertainty. We use the
resulting sets of beliefs as the alternative to the null hypothesis of rational
expectations. We focus in particular on rational and well performing beliefs.
Our maintained hypothesis still results in a ﬁrst fundamental theorem of
asset pricing. Combining this maintained hypothesis with the hypothesis of
beliefs representing rational expectations results in the null hypothesis being the
traditional ﬁnance approach. Anomalous empirical ﬁndings seem to indicate
rejection of this null hypothesis. On the other hand, the combination of the
maintained hypothesis with the alternative hypothesis of beliefs allowing for
ambiguity seems to reﬂect the empirical evidence much better. Since there only
seems to be very limited evidence in favor of trading constraints, like short
selling constraints, our alternative approach might also be preferred to the
behavioral ﬁnance approach, that concludes the existence of limits to arbitrage
from the anomalous empirical ﬁndings.
Thus, this chapter presents an alternative view to understand the anomalous
ﬁndings in the empirical ﬁnance literature, different from both the traditional
38Of course, irrational according to our deﬁnition in terms of beliefs.36 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
and the behavioral point of view. As a very weak assumption, only requiring
some economic agents to reveal shark-type behavior, we have as maintained hy-
pothesis absence of arbitrage opportunities, given rational and well-performing
beliefs. This is in line with the traditional point of view. However, due to
transmutability of longer-term beliefs, asset prices might not reﬂect their long
term fundamental value, but, instead, might only reﬂect a short horizon point
of view. As a consequence, the ﬁnancial markets are efﬁcient with respect
to the information presently available, in the sense that it is impossible to
make (short-term) economic proﬁts by trading on the basis of this information
set. But ﬁnancial markets might not be allocationally efﬁcient given a long
run time horizon, since prices might not reﬂect their long term fundamental
value. However, contrary to the behavioral ﬁnance point of view, this long-term
allocational inefﬁciency is not a consequence of noise traders who might affect
the market outcomes due to limits to arbitrage, but, instead, might arise as a
consequence of transmutability, inherent to our economic system, resulting in
ambiguity about fundamental values from a long-term perspective.
Our analysis builds on effective single-period beliefs. In special market
situations, like options in combination with their underlying, the effects of
transmutability might be limited, making no arbitrage under well-performing
beliefs with longer time horizons plausible. If so, the traditional ﬁnance
approach might provide more accurate outcomes. It would be worthwhile to
extend our analysis to deal with multi-period ambiguity in case there is no
transmutability, building on the ideas of Epstein and Schneider (2007) and
Epstein and Schneider (2008).
From a policy point of view, the lack of long run allocational efﬁciency
has serious implications. For instance, requiring pension funds to value their
assets and liabilities at market value might make sense when markets are
allocationally efﬁcient, also given a long run time horizon. But with limits to
rational expectations funding ratios calculated on the basis of market values
might only reﬂect a short term view, not the relevant long term view. Requiring
pension funds to act on the basis of such funding ratios might then become
quite questionable.39
39For instance, instead of requiring that the funding ratio FRt at time t satisﬁes a lower bound,
like FRt  1+ b, with b some buffer, one might require, for instance, FRt  Volt  1+e b,
with Volt a measure of the volatility in the funding ratio (using past data), with  quantifyingSection 2.A Appendix 37
Appendix 2.A
Theorem 2.1
Given St, X t+1, and the zero probability set E0
t+1 ( X t+1, there are no arbitrage






t+1, such that for all portfolios ht we have





Proof. We apply Jaschke and Küchler (2001), in particular, their reformulation
of the First Theorem of Asset Pricing presented in their Corollary 8. Introduce
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where vector addition and scalar multiplication are deﬁned point-wise. Then
the payoff of a portfolio belongs to the marketed subspace L m
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t+1. Consider
now a zero probability set E0
t+1 ( X t+1. Then the marketed subspace of payoffs


























Thus, now we only sum over states not belonging to the zero-probability set.
The set of marketed payoffs that can be generated with zero initial investments,
the importance of a stable funding ratio, and with e b again some buffer. Moreover, it makes
sense to to apply stress tests to simulate the consequences of unforeseen contingencies and
ambiguity. The outcome of such tests might then result in additional buffer requirements.38 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
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Given St, X t+1, and the zero probability set E0
t+1 ( X t+1, the zero investment
payoff `t+1 2 L 0
t+1 represents an arbitrage opportunity in case `t+1 2 L a
t+1
and `t+1 6= 0.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1
Given St, X t+1, and the zero probability set E0
t+1 ( X t+1, there are no arbitrage
opportunities, i.e., `t+1 2 L 0
t+1 ) `t+1 = 2 L a
t+1nf0g if and only if `t+1 2 L 0
t+1 )
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Proof. Obviously, in case `t+1 2 L 0
t+1 ) `t+1 = 2 L b
t+1nf0g, we also have `t+1 2
L 0
t+1 ) `t+1 = 2 L a
t+1nf0g, since L a
t+1  L b
t+1. Conversely, in case `t+1 2
L 0
t+1 ) `t+1 = 2 L a









t+1, in case some y 6= 0. Thus, also `t+1 = 2 L b
t+1nf0g.
Referring to Jaschke and Küchler (2001), we now take L = L t+1, M = L 0
t+1
and A = L b
t+1. The set A deﬁned this way satisﬁes the requirements of a
coherence acceptance set. Jaschke and Küchler (2001) distinguish between
good deals of the ﬁrst and of the second kind. Our way of excluding arbitrage
opportunities corresponds to excluding good deals of the ﬁrst kind. Since, by
our construction of A = L b
t+1, we have  1 = 2 A, and, thus, we also have, as
reported by Jaschke and Küchler (2001), that the exclusion of good deals of
the ﬁrst kind implies the exclusion of good deals of the second kind.Section 2.A Appendix 39
Suppose now that arbitrage opportunities are excluded, and, thus, also good
deals of the second kind. Then, using that in our setting A  M is (L0)-closed,
it follows that the set of price systems (using the notation by Jaschke and
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is nonempty, where A
is the right polar cone of A deﬁned by A = f 2 L0 j (x)  0, 8x 2 Ag and
( M) is deﬁned similarly. In our setting such price systems are equivalent to
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By choosing x 2 M and  = 0, we ﬁnd
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Then, in terms of our setting, and using the characteristics of the spaces we
employ, we can ﬁnd some x = `t+1 2 L 0
t+1, such that `t+1 `x
t+1 = at+1 2 L b
t+1.
Since `x
t+1 and at+1 both belong to L b
t+1, this means `t+1 = `x
t+1 +at+1 2 L b
t+1.
Notice that `t+1 cannot be zero: this would only be possible for at+1 =  `x
t+1 = 240 The Limits to Rational Expectations Chapter 2
L b
t+1. But then we have an arbitrage opportunity, implying 0 < sup2DM (z).
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Conversely, assume that, given St, X t+1, and the zero probability set
E0











To show that arbitrage opportunities are excluded, we have to show that
`t+1 2 L 0
t+1 implies `t+1 = 2 L b
t+1nf0g. Let `t+1 2 L 0
t+1. Then there exists some
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> 0), or `t+1 = 2 L b
t+1nf0g.3
The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs
The Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) CAPM is one of the basic models in
ﬁnance. In its early days, the CAPM was empirically supported by studies like
Black et al. (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973). However, later studies
like Banz (1981) or Reinganum (1981) and, in particular, Fama and French
(1992) started to seriously challenge the CAPM from an empirical point of
view. For a recent overview, see Fama and French (2004).1 In addition to
empirical challenges, there are also objections from a theoretical point of view.
For instance, Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) and Jarrow and Madan (1997) show
that in the CAPM arbitrage opportunities are possible as long as the payoff
probability distribution of the market portfolio has unbounded support and call
options written on the market portfolio having high strikes are traded. More
recently, and in relation to this, Levy (2007) argues that a CAPM equilibrium
with positive prices might require serious constraints on the equity premium
and the expected return on the market portfolio, making the CAPM already
theoretically implausible.
To deal with these empirical and theoretical criticisms, we modify the
traditional CAPM. We postulate that the beliefs (represented by probability
distributions) used by the investors to calculate their expected returns and the
corresponding variances and covariances are determined endogenously as part
1As alternative, studies like Dybvig and Ross (1985), Jensen (1968), and Jagannathan and
Wang (1996) suggest that the conditional version of the CAPM might do a better job than the
unconditional CAPM. However, the recent study by Lewellen and Nagel (2006) indicates that
from an empirical point of view the conditional version of the CAPM might perform hardly
better than the unconditional one.42 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3
of the CAPM equilibrium, jointly with the asset prices and portfolio choices.2
Allowing for endogenous beliefs seems reasonable from the point of view of a
researcher investigating the CAPM. Typically, the researcher does not observe
the investors’ beliefs, but only the equilibrium prices and perhaps the portfolio
holdings. Given these, the researcher might investigate possible corresponding
investors’ beliefs, which are then —by construction— endogenous.
The traditional approach of testing the CAPM effectively consists of test-
ing whether exogenously given beliefs —namely, the means, variances, and
covariances of the asset returns estimated by using sample analogues on the
basis of past data— are consistent, i.e., in line with the CAPM-equilibrium im-
plications. These exogenous beliefs are typically found to be inconsistent with
the CAPM. However, maintaining the assumption of mean-variance behavior,
and assuming that the endogenously determined beliefs are consistent with the
implications of mean-variance behavior, this inconsistency of the empirically
based beliefs with the CAPM does not imply a rejection of the CAPM, but
only that such beliefs might not be employed by mean-variance investors. In
fact, when beliefs are determined endogenously, consistent with the CAPM
equilibrium, the traditional way of testing the CAPM does not apply anymore.
Instead, we take the hypothesis of no potential arbitrage opportunities as
the relevant way of testing the CAPM. The CAPM implies a speciﬁc stochastic
discount factor that is an afﬁne transformation of the market portfolio payoff.
We say that potential arbitrage opportunities exist in case of negative realiza-
tions of this stochastic discount factor. Potential arbitrage opportunities then
not only consist of ordinary arbitrage opportunities, but possibly also of non-
tradeable arbitrage opportunities in an incomplete market setting. Obviously,
the presence of ordinary arbitrage opportunities would make the CAPM implau-
sible. However, simple ﬁnancial derivative products, like digital options (or
the call options of Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) or Jarrow and Madan (1997)),
already sufﬁce to turn potential (but not ordinary) arbitrage opportunities into
ordinary ones. Thus, when we would like the CAPM to be a plausible asset
pricing model, there should not only be no ordinary arbitrage opportunities,
but also no potential ones.3
2Herings and Kubler (2006) show that the CAPM is robust for changes to agents’ preferences.
It is to be expected that their results also apply to our modiﬁed CAPM.
3Typically, equilibrium asset pricing models with non-satiated economic agents generate
equilibrium prices such that arbitrage opportunities will be excluded. However, economic43
The requirement of no potential arbitrage opportunities results in one-
period ahead support restrictions in terms of the payoff probability distribution
of the market portfolio.4 We test the support restrictions, using the value-
weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks as representing the
market portfolio. We quantify the corresponding beliefs in a CAPM-consistent
way. Such beliefs cannot be fully empirically based, but there are natural ways
to construct CAPM-consistent beliefs that are partially empirically based. Using
a rolling windows approach we test the hypothesis of no potential arbitrage
opportunities for different planning horizons and different sampling periods.
As long as the sampling inaccuracy is not too large, we cannot reject this
hypothesis. In case of substantial sampling inaccuracy, beliefs might vary quite a
lot over time, leading to occasional potential arbitrage opportunities. However,
when investors would deal with the sampling inaccuracy in a robust way (see,
for instance, Garlappi et al. (2007)), no potential arbitrage opportunities can
be found anymore.
At ﬁrst sight, the requirement of CAPM-consistent beliefs that are only partly
empirically based might be seen as a serious disadvantage of our version of the
CAPM. When rejecting the one-factor CAPM following the traditional approach,
namely because the empirical beliefs are CAPM-inconsistent, it is typically
replaced by a multi-factor model, like the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model or the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. From our perspective,
these models have fully empirically based beliefs that are also consistent with
the implications of these factor models. This consistency is possible due to
the inclusion of the additional factors. However, we show that in case of
factor models there exists a trade-off between consistency of fully empirically
based beliefs and the likelihood of potential arbitrage opportunities: with
more factors, also the likelihood of potential arbitrage opportunities increases.
Our empirical analysis conﬁrms this trade-off, revealing a rejection of the
hypothesis of no potential arbitrage opportunities, particularly in case of the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Since these potential arbitrage opportunities
are easily converted into ordinary ones, just like in the CAPM, their presence
agents having mean-variance preferences with exogenously given beliefs are not necessarily
non-satiated, as discussed by Jarrow and Madan (1997) or Maccheroni et al. (2008). Thus,
absence of arbitrage opportunities is not automatically satisﬁed in an equilibrium with mean-
variance investors, but, obviously, it can be imposed in case of endogenous beliefs.
4When these support restrictions are satisﬁed, the (potential) arbitrage opportunities
identiﬁed by Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) and Jarrow and Madan (1997) do not exist.44 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3
makes these multi-factor models implausible. Instead, we prefer the one-factor
CAPM with endogenous beliefs.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we
present and test our version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model with endogenous
beliefs, which we shall call the Endogenous Beliefs CAPM (EBCAPM). In section
3.2 we discuss factor models. Section 3.3 concludes.
3.1 The EBCAPM
In this section we introduce the CAPM with endogenous beliefs (EBCAPM). Af-
ter introducing some notation and terminology in subsection 3.1.1, we present
the EBCAPM with homogeneous beliefs in subsection 3.1.2. Next, this will be
generalized to heterogeneous beliefs in subsection 3.1.3. In subsection 3.1.4 we
test the EBCAPM, focusing on homogeneous beliefs, Finally, in subsection 3.1.5
we present an interpretation of the outcomes.
3.1.1 Set-up
We follow an economy during the periods t = 1,2,...,. At a particular time
period t, there are Jt +1 assets in this economy, numbered from 0 to Jt, with
asset 0 the numéraire, whose price is normalized to one and whose payoff at
time t +1 also equals one. Let St denote the vector of asset prices at time t,















where e St and e Xt+1 represent the Jt-dimensional subvectors of the risky assets’
prices and payoffs, respectively. The set of all potentially possible outcomes





the set of probability distributions over the set of possible
outcomes X t+1, and we shall denote the support of a probability distribution
P by supp(P). A portfolio at time t is given by a vector ht 2 RJt+1, with time
t price ht St and with total payoff at time t +1 given by ht  Xt+1 (where a Section 3.1 The EBCAPM 45
means taking an inner product). The decomposition of ht, corresponding to








We consider I interacting economic agents or investors, who for every time pe-
riod t have access to information represented by a vector zt. In the typical case,
zt contains as components variables representing past and present information,
in particular, past and present asset prices. We shall assume that the economic
agents are “current information takers”: they consider the present information
contained in zt as unaffected by their own actions at time t. However, from
the point of view of the economy as a whole, some of the components of zt,
including in particular the present time t asset prices, will be endogenous at
time t.
Each investor i, i = 1,...,I is characterized by a belief about the future





dependent on zt. In addition, he is characterized by initial endowments hit
and a utility function Uit
 .;Pit

, representing his belief-dependent preference
ordering over the portfolios ht 2 RJt+1. We assume that the investors’ preference
orderings can be described by mean-variance preferences.
Assumption 3.1









, i.e., given zt the utility function Uit of






















with it symmetric and positive deﬁnite, and such that fit is strictly concave
and twice continuously differentiable, with fit(x, y) increasing in x for all
y  0 and fit(x, y) decreasing in y for all x.
Obviously, this is an assumption in line with the traditional CAPM. In the










tite ht,46 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3
with it the risk aversion parameter of economic agent i 2 f1,...,I g. Assump-
tion 3.1 corresponds to the case it > 0, i = 1,...,I.




denote the set of all employed beliefs. Since we




. We say that the belief




















, as given by assumption 3.1, subject to ht St  hit St,





This is a standard equilibrium deﬁnition with an important modiﬁcation,
namely that the determination of the belief set B t is part of the equilibrium,
and thus endogenous.
We shall distinguish between homogeneous and heterogeneous beliefs in
terms of the mean vector and covariance matrix of the vector of payoffs Xt+1.
We start with the case of homogeneous beliefs, closest to the original CAPM.
3.1.2 Homogeneous Beliefs
In this section we consider the EBCAPM with homogeneous endogenous beliefs










, there exist some t and








, for all Pit 2 B t.
Notice that this homogeneity assumption weakens the (implicit) assumption
of the standard CAPM that the vector Xt+1 of future payoffs is characterized by
an exogenously given probability distribution Pt and that the economic agents
know at least its corresponding vector of expected values and its covariance
matrix. Here, we only impose that the economic agents have endogenouslySection 3.1 The EBCAPM 47
determined beliefs agreeing at least on the vector of expected values and the
covariance matrix.
We can easily link the EBCAPM with the CAPM as presented in Dana (1999),
who derives as necessary condition for a CAPM-equilibrium that there should
exist a stochastic discount factor that is an afﬁne transformation of the payoff




denote the market portfolio. Then we have as necessary condition for an













Thus, we have as necessary condition for an equilibrium that









e St = e t   citte h
M
t . (3.1)















Thus, due to homogeneity, the constants cit are the same for all i = 1,...,I. We









(3.1) is satisﬁed (with cit = ct) as an EBCAPM-consistent belief.
The traditional way of testing the CAPM is based on testing restriction (3.1),
assuming that the investors’ beliefs are fully empirically based, i.e., one takes
for Pit the exogenously given empirical distribution function b Pt,T (given the
sample length T). Usually, condition (3.1) is ﬁrst reformulated in terms of
excess returns. Denote the return of portfolio hM
t in excess of the return R
r f
t+1










t+1.48 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3




in excess of the
risk free return. Consider the following linear regression equation for some
Pt 2 B t:





































Using Pt = b Pt,T, restriction (3.3) is typically rejected for a number of portfolios,
see, for instance, Fama and French (2004). However, from our perspective,
rejection of restriction (3.3), with Pt = b Pt,T, does not lead to the conclusion
that portfolio hM
t is not mean-variance efﬁcient (the usual conclusion, leading
to a rejection of the CAPM), but only that the fully empirically based belief
b Pt,T is not EBCAPM-consistent. Indeed, given endogenous beliefs, portfolio hM
t
will be mean-variance efﬁcient, simply by replacing the fully empirically based
belief b Pt,T by EBCAPM-consistent beliefs, satisfying restriction (3.3). Stated
otherwise, restriction (3.3) cannot be used to test the EBCAPM, since it only
imposes constraints to determine EBCAPM-consistent beliefs.
To obtain a testable restriction for the EBCAPM, we complete the EBCAPM,
by imposing the assumption of no potential arbitrage opportunities. We say
that there are potential arbitrage opportunities at time t and from the point of
view of investor i in case the stochastic discount factor can take negative values,
i.e., Pit(x)  0 for some x 2 X t+1 (the set of possible outcomes). From
the perspective of investor i, such potential arbitrage opportunities are just
ordinary arbitrage opportunities in case the market would be complete, or when

















6= 0 would be tradeable, the EBCAPM would allow
for arbitrage opportunities, making it an implausible model. The potentialSection 3.1 The EBCAPM 49









is non-tradeable. In this case, the introduction of simple
derivative products, like digital options, are already sufﬁcient to turn the
potential arbitrage opportunities into ordinary ones. The introduction of such
derivatives, being in zero net supply, would not affect the market portfolio.
Assuming in addition that the marginal distribution of the payoff vector Xt+1
of the Jt + 1 original assets (according to Pit) is unaffected, so that also ct








6= 0 becomes tradeable
with a nonnegative price, making also in this case the EBCAPM implausible.
So, we shall require the absence of potential arbitrage opportunities in the
EBCAPM, and use this requirement as the relevant hypothesis to test.
Assumption 3.3








, the beliefs Pt 2 B t
exclude potential arbitrage opportunities, i.e., Pt(x) > 0 for x 2 supp(Pt).
Let PM
t denote the distribution of RM
t+1, the excess return of the portfolio
hM
t , as induced by some Pt 2 B t. With r a possible realization of RM
t+1, the























































 A t+1 from another perspective. Consider the special
mean-variance utility function as a function of variables of the form Gt+1 =
5As excess return RM










= 0 yields the






























. Then straightforward calculations show
(see, for instance, Maccheroni et al. (2008)) that the mean-variance utility










The set A t+1 is exactly the set where the mean-variance utility function of





hit  Xt+1 in this latter equation and rewrite it in terms of returns, with hit the
optimal portfolio choice by economic agent i. To verify this, decompose t, hit,












































































i=1hit, we also ﬁnd
1 
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identifying the constant ct as 
t. Hence, the domain of monotonicity of the
mean-variance preferences corresponds to the set A t+1 (when reformulated in
terms of returns). Thus in the equilibria we consider a mean-variance investor,
who only assigns positive probability to events corresponding to monotonicity
of his or her preference, will avoid (potential) arbitrage opportunities.
To conclude this subsection, we shall illustrate an EBCAPM equilibrium
satisfying assumptions 3.1–3.3 in case of the special mean-variance prefer-




























 C t+1 
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, for Pt 2
B t;
(A4) e St = e t   ctte hM
t .





































A, i = 1,...,I.















































Once we have such a set X t+1 and probability distributions Pt satisfying this
restriction, then t is determined, t follows from (A2) (where different Pt-s
should of course generate the same t and t), St follows from (A4), and hit,
i = 1,...,I follow from (A6), and we have an EBCAPM-equilibrium satisfying
assumptions 3.1–3.3.
6For the general case one could proceed by following, for instance, Balasko (2003).52 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3
The restrictions (3.5) or (3.6) mean that if we have a x`,t+1 such that
hM






t  x`,t+1 small enough, or, when it has a small probability,
there should be sufﬁciently many other xk,t+1 such that hM
t xk,t+1 are also large
as compensation. Thus, an EBCAPM-equilibrium supported by homogeneous
beliefs requires that according to these beliefs the market portfolio payoff
should not have (high positive) outliers as possible outcomes. In this sense, the
beliefs should reﬂect limited heterogeneity in risk.7
The restrictions (3.5) or (3.6) become easier to satisfy as soon as there
are investors whose risk aversion parameter it is close to zero. To see what
happens when some it-s get close to zero, notice that the optimal portfolio






























Thus, if it > 0 for i 2 A and it # 0 for i 2 B (with A
T
B = ? and A
S
B =
f1,...,I g), then we ﬁnd an EBCAPM-equilibrium with e St = e t, hit = 0 for i 2 A,
and
P
i2B hit = hM
t .8 In the limiting case ct = 
t = 0, and we have A t+1 = X t+1.
Thus, in the limit, when some it-s become zero, the equilibrium beliefs reﬂect
risk-neutrality, so that only risk neutral investors invest in the markets of risky
assets, while the risk averse investors withdraw from these markets, and only
invest in the risk free asset. As a consequence, the constraint on the support of
the beliefs disappears.
3.1.3 Heterogeneous Beliefs
The assumption of homogeneous beliefs is a rather strong one. However, the
analysis of the previous subsection can easily be extended to the heterogeneous
7This is to be compared with Levy (2007), who argues, assuming exogenously given and
empirically determined t and t, that in a world with heterogeneous risk the CAPM is
already theoretically infeasible, since, given t and t corresponding to heterogeneity, it
cannot generate a non-degenerate equilibrium with positive prices. Obviously, Levy (2007)’s
conclusion does not apply to the EBCAPM with endogenously determined beliefs, deviating
from the fully empirically based one.
8The decomposition of the market portfolio among the investors in the set B depends on
how the limit it # 0 for i 2 B is taken.Section 3.1 The EBCAPM 53
case, where it and it may differ across economic agents i 2 f1,...,I g. For
simplicity we shall focus on the special mean-variance utility function. Then
we have an EBCAPM-equilibrium without potential arbitrage opportunities
when






















 C i,t+1 









, for Pit 2














(B5) cit = it =
e hit 
































These restrictions follow straightforwardly from the analysis of the previous
subsection. Conditions (B1), (B2), and (B6) are obvious. Condition (B3)





hit  x  hit it

1supp(Pit)(x),
corresponding to the belief Pit. This stochastic discount factor follows from
equation (B6), where the part related to e hit can be rewritten as








Condition (B4) relates the asset prices (e St), the expected values (e it, i =
1,...,I), and covariance matrices (it, i = 1,...,I) in the heterogeneous be-
liefs EBCAPM-equilibrium. One way to use this condition is to determine e St




, i = 1,...,I, in case these are assumed to be given
exogenously (at time t), compare, for instance, Boehm and Chiarella (2005).
However, we leave the exact determination of the equilibrium unspeciﬁed,










, i = 1,...,I, is determined endogenously. Finally, condition (B5)
9The second equality can now be obtained from (B6), when calculating the price of the
risky part of the market portfolio e hM
t  e St, using e St = e it  itite hit.54 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3
expresses how the asset prices (e St), the expected value it, and covariance
matrix it will be linked to the risk aversion parameter of investor i.
Under homogeneous beliefs the conditions (B1)–(B6) specialize to the
conditions (A1)–(A6) as presented in the previous subsection. Thus, the
discussion on the existence of an EBCAPM equilibrium supported by the beliefs
Pit, i = 1,...,I, of the previous subsection also applies to the current case, but
of course an EBCAPM-equilibrium supported by the Pit, i = 1,...,I, might also
exist under weaker conditions.
Contrary to the traditional CAPM and the EBCAPM with homogeneous
beliefs, the EBCAPM with heterogeneous beliefs also easily allows for non-
participation of economic agents in the markets of risky assets. For instance,
risk averse investors whose beliefs are such that e it = e St will not invest
in the risky assets. More generally, investors who employ a block diago-
nal it and believe that in some blocks the expected payoffs equal the cor-
responding asset prices, will not invest in risky assets belonging to these
blocks.
Finally, notice that the EBCAPM also allows for beliefs possibly reﬂect-
ing limits to rational expectations. For instance, as discussed by Arrow and
Hahn (1999), new scientiﬁc discoveries or innovations might result in limits
to rational expectations. In particular, ﬁnancial innovations,10 consisting of
a continuous stream of new ﬁnancial products, might complicate a longer
term planning, due to the creation of unforeseen contingencies.11 This might
force investors to effectively employ a short term planning horizon, in line
with the one period horizon of the CAPM. The corresponding limited learning
opportunities make the assumption of exogenously given rational expectations
unrealistic, potentially resulting in heterogeneous beliefs. Since these hetero-
geneous beliefs might depend on present market outcomes, these beliefs will
be endogenous, as modeled in our version of the CAPM.12 Moreover, these
endogenous beliefs need not be fully empirically based, since past observations
10See, for example, Tufano (2003), or Levine (2005).
11For an overview on unforeseen contingencies, see, for example, Dekel et al. (1998). General
equilibrium models with unawareness due to unforeseen contingencies include, for instance,
Modica et al. (1998) and Kawamura (2005).
12For instance, investors might employ econometric models, linking past and present data to
(estimated) expected returns, and variances and covariances of returns. Since the estimation
results might also depend on present data, beliefs based on the use of such econometric models
are endogenous.Section 3.1 The EBCAPM 55
may not always be representative for the future, particularly not so, in case of
unforeseen contingencies.
Testing the EBCAPM 3.1.4
In this section we test the EBCAPM, focusing on the homogeneous case cor-
responding to assumptions 3.1–3.3. We shall test restriction (3.4), using as
market portfolio hM
t all value-weighted NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks.13
We assume that Pt 2 B t belongs to the set P t of probability distributions that
ﬁt the sample mean and sample variance of the excess return of portfolio hM
t ,


































As before, b Pt,T represents the empirical distribution function at time t using
the T most recent observations.14 We focus on the one month horizon case,
using monthly data, and a rolling window approach, but we also brieﬂy report
results for other horizons with data at the corresponding frequency. The data
is taken from the website of Kenneth R. French.15 The monthly data spans
the time period from January 1927 until December 2007.16 We shall refer to
testing restriction (3.4) as testing our null hypothesis (H0).









equation (3.4). The belief Pt 2 B t allows for potential arbitrage opportunities
in case the realization of Zt+1 is larger than one. The expectation of Zt+1
13With heterogeneous beliefs different portfolios might be perceived to be mean-variance
efﬁcient, depending upon the belief employed. In this case the value-weight return on the
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks represents the return on a potential mean-variance optimal
portfolio, and our tests becomes a test for mean-variance spanning, cf. Huberman and Kandel
(1987) or de Roon and Nijman (2001).
14Of course, b Pt,T belongs to P t, but many other beliefs are included as well.
15See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. This
data also allows us to consider the three factor Fama and French (1993) and the four factor
Carhart (1997), but the latter only at a daily and monthly frequency.
16The daily data, used in case of a one-day planning horizon, spans the time period from
July 1, 1963 to December 31, 2007, the weekly data for the one-week horizon case runs from
July 5, 1963 to December 28, 2007, the quarterly data for the one-quarter horizon runs from
the third quarter of 1926 to the ﬁnal quarter of 2007, while the annual data for the one-year
horizon runs from 1927 to 2007.56 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3


























with Pt the Sharpe ratio according to the belief Pt. Thus, the Sharpe ratio
(calculated using the empirical belief b Pt,T) quantiﬁes the variability in Zt+1,
and, therefore, can be seen as an indication of the severeness of the restriction











Thus, using the Sharpe ratio one can determine the maximum probability
(according to Pt) of failure of H0.
Figure 3.1 shows the Sharpe ratios (b Pt,T) for the one-month horizon case,
where we use the sample mean and sample variance of RM
t+1 for rolling windows
(corresponding to different t-s), with samples of length T = 60 and T = 360
months.18 The sample length of 60 months (ﬁve years) represents an investor
who only uses recent information to determine Pt (or its moments), while the
sample length of 360 months (30 years) reﬂects an investor who prefers more
stable estimates following from the use of a longer sample period. The Sharpe
ratios resulting from the 360 month samples range from slightly above 0.1
at the beginning of the sample period to around 0.20 during the 1960-s and
early 1970-s, with peaks reaching 0.25, back to values below 0.1 up to around
0.15 at the end of the sample period. This implies that when the one-sided
Chebyshev inequality would be binding, violation of H0 has probability ranging
from at most 0.0099 (corresponding to a Sharpe ratio of 0.1) to at most 0.06
(corresponding to a Sharpe value of 0.25), with as most recent probability value
0.022 (corresponding to a Sharpe ratio of 0.15). The Sharpe ratios resulting
from the 60 month sample periods show much more variability, ranging from
around  0.2 to around 0.5. In the binding case this would imply a probability
of rejecting H0 up to at most 0.2.
When changing to a higher frequency, like a weekly or daily frequency,
with a one-week or one-day horizon, respectively, the average level of the
17The one-sided Chebyshev inequality states for a random variable Z with mean  and
standard deviation  (both according to the probability distribution P): P

Z    k
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Figure 3.1: Sharpe ratios CAPM, one month horizon, using rolling
window, with sample size 60 months (dashed curve),
and 360 months (solid curve)
Sharpe ratios decreases.19 As a consequence, a violation of H0 in the binding
case becomes even less likely (of course, depending on the variability in the
Sharpe ratios due to the sample lengths employed). On the other hand, when
decreasing the frequency to, for instance, quarterly or annual data, with a
one-quarter or one-year horizon, respectively, the average level of the Sharpe
ratios increases. But even at the annual frequency the average level of the
Sharpe ratio is only around 0.45, so that in the binding case a rejection of H0 is
still having probability at most 0.168.
Next, we calculate the realizations of Zt+1, where we use rolling windows,
with samples of length T = 12, 24, 36, 48, 60 months, and so on. Values larger
than one imply rejection of H0. For the sample length of 12 months, we reject
H0 ten times, in case of 24 months this drops to six times, and in case of 36
months we only reject H0 twice. In case of the 48 and 60 months samples we
only reject H0 once. In the 60 month case this happens, not unexpectedly, in




. We apply this inequality with k = 1=. For an early reference, see Uspensky
(1937).
18Thus, investors are assumed to apply inductive reasoning, as considered by Arthur (1994).
19Approximately by the factor 1=
p
, with  the number of weeks or trading days per month.58 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3
length of 72 months or more, H0 is no longer rejected. Thus, when the sample
size increases, the sampling inaccuracy decreases, leading to less variability
in the beliefs. The resulting more or less stable beliefs turn out to be free of
potential arbitrage opportunities.
A shorter sample length corresponds to a higher inaccuracy about the










. Investors might deal with






than estimated. Next, in case of a positive Sharpe value
(corresponding to a long position in the optimal portfolio), they might use a





than estimated. Finally, in case of a negative Sharpe
ratio (corresponding to a short position), they might use a higher, i.e., less















































































< 0. The transformation f
 
,2
= +2= is increasing
in  for  > 0 and increasing in   for  < 0, while it is decreasing in  for
0 <  < , and increasing in  for   <  < 0. Thus, when investors deal with
the sampling inaccuracy in a robust way as described, a rejection of H0 becomes
more unlikely, and beliefs might exclude potential arbitrage opportunities, also
in cases with higher sampling inaccuracy. Indeed, when using the (appropriate)
boundaries of the 95% conﬁdence intervals (following the robust approach just











, we ﬁnd that the hypothesis of no potential arbitrage opportunities
cannot be rejected anymore, not even in case of a sample length of only twelve
months.
At other frequencies we ﬁnd the same patterns. When the sampling inac-
curacy is high, the hypothesis of no potential arbitrage opportunities can be
20Compare, for example, Garlappi et al. (2007).Section 3.1 The EBCAPM 59
rejected, but typically only now and then, while a robust approach implies that
the beliefs will be free of potential arbitrage opportunities. So, we conclude
from our analysis that there is no reason to reject the EBCAPM on the basis of
the criterion of no potential arbitrage opportunities.
Interpreting EBCAPM-Consistent Beliefs 3.1.5











are estimated on the basis of past
data, possibly in a robust way. The use of EBCAPM-consistent beliefs implies























to be estimated on the basis of






is estimated without constraints on the basis of





restriction jt = 0. This particular choice of determining the model parameters
results in an alternative interpretation of the OLS estimate of jt, used in the
traditional approach. Let b jt denote this OLS estimate of jt (usually referred









, where a hat
represents the sample analogue of the quantity involved. By construction,





represents the CAPM-consistent beliefs concerning the expected





estimated expected excess return of asset j. Thus, b jt quantiﬁes the difference
between the empirically based average past observed excess return and the
predicted (or believed) future expected excess return according to the EBCAPM.
In case the beliefs would be fully empirically determined we should ﬁnd values
of b jt close to zero. Values of b jt different from zero are then an indication
that EBCAPM-consistent beliefs are not fully data-driven.
In Figure 3.2 we plot Jensen’s alpha-s of the Fama-French factors Small-
Minus-Big (SMB) and High-Minus-Low (HML) and Carhart’s momentum factor
for the monthly horizon case, for rolling samples of length 360 months (to
exclude too much sampling inaccuracy). We see that the values of the alpha-s
are most of the times substantially different from zero, indicating that EBCAPM-
consistent beliefs are not exclusively data-driven. Moreover, the values of60 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3
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Figure 3.2: From top to bottom: Alpha-s of the Fama-French factors
Small-Minus-Big (SMB) and High-Minus-Low (HML),
and Carhart Momentum factor; monthly horizon, using
rolling windows with sample length 360 months.
the alpha-s are most of the time positive, in line with the ﬁnding that these
portfolios are typically found to show outperformance in the traditional CAPM,





is estimated without constraints on the basis of





(and thus jt) via the restriction jt = 0. In Figure 3.3 we plot the traditional
beta-s of the Fama-French factors Small-Minus-Big (SMB) and High-Minus-Low
(HML) and Carhart’s momentum factor, while in Figure 3.4 we plot the cor-
responding beta-s implied by the assumption of EBCAPM-consistent beliefs,
in both cases for the monthly horizon case, for rolling windows with sample
sizes of length 360 months. The fully empirically based beta-s result in a low
systematic risk of the Fama-French and Carhart factors, corresponding to their
outperformance in the traditional CAPM. On the other hand, the EBCAPM-
consistent beliefs reﬂect a substantially higher systematic risk, corresponding
to the (imposed) normal performance (jt = 0). Thus, according to these
EBCAPM-consistent beliefs the traditional way of estimating the beta-s reﬂects
a serious underestimation of the systematic risks involved.Section 3.1 The EBCAPM 61
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Figure 3.3: From top to bottom: Traditional beta-s of the Fama-
French factors Small-Minus-Big (SMB) and High-Minus-
Low (HML), and Carhart Momentum factor; monthly
horizon, using rolling windows with sample length 360
months.
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Figure 3.4: From top to bottom: EBCAPM-consistent beliefs-based
beta-s of the Fama-French factors Small-Minus-Big
(SMB) and High-Minus-Low (HML), and Carhart Mo-
mentum factor; monthly horizon, using rolling win-
dows with sample length 360 months.62 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3










mined only partly empirically based. In fact, for consistency with the EBCAPM









is possible as long as jt = 0.
This allows many possible beliefs, but also excludes beliefs, in particular, the
fully empirically based one.
3.2 Multi-Factor Models
When rejecting the traditional CAPM, because the fully empirically based beliefs
are not CAPM-consistent, it is often replaced by a multi-factor model like the
Fama-French three factor (see Fama and French (1993) and Fama and French
(1996)) or by the Carhart four factor model (see Carhart (1997)). From
our perspective these models, with their extra factors, have model-consistent
beliefs that, at the same time, are also fully empirically based. Due to the
fully empirically based beliefs, these multi-factor models might be preferred
alternatives to the EBCAPM with only at most partly empirically based beliefs.
However, in this section we shall show that the inclusion of extra factors
increases the variability in the stochastic discount factor corresponding to these
multi-factor models. This means that in case of the traditional factor models
there will be a trade-off between model consistency and the likelihood of
excluding potential arbitrage opportunities, applying in particular to empirically
based beliefs: if more factors are required to achieve model consistency of
beliefs, potential arbitrage opportunities might be the implication, while, on
the other hand, if the aim is to avoid potential arbitrage opportunities, one
might have to sacriﬁce model consistency of beliefs.
The CAPM is a one factor model, where the single factor is the payoff or
excess return of the market portfolio in case of homogeneous beliefs. This
factor appears in the stochastic discount factor that is an afﬁne transformation
of the single factor. Let R
f
t+1 denote the K-dimensional vector of excess returns
representing the K factors in a K-factor model, with induced probability dis-
tribution P
f
t (induced by Pt). Let r now denote a possible realization of R
f
t+1.


















































valid in terms of the excess returns of the assets j = 1,...,Jt. This can be refor-

































(3.8) then corresponds to 
f
jt = 0, j = 1,...,Jt.
As in the one-factor EBCAPM-case, given St and Pt, there are no potential
arbitrage opportunities if and only if the stochastic discount factor satisﬁes































Using similar arguments as in the single-factor EBCAPM, it makes sense to
require the exclusion of potential arbitrage opportunities in factor models
like the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model or the Carhart (1997)
four-factor model,21 making this requirement the appropriate way to test these
factor models.
A Trade-oﬀ 3.2.1
In this subsection we discuss the trade-off between model consistency and
the likelihood of potential arbitrage opportunities that applies to beliefs when








, where the vector of excess returns corresponding to g` has
21Indeed, the introduction of simple digital options, not affecting the factors, will sufﬁce,
assuming that the marginal probability distribution of the payoffs or returns on the original
assets remains the same.64 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3
` components, such that, ﬁrst, for k > ` the vector corresponding to gk is an
extension of the vector corresponding to g`, i.e., R
g`
t+1 is a subvector of R
gk
t+1,
and, secondly, the vector of excess returns corresponding to gJt spans the same
payoff space as the available risky assets j = 1,...,Jt. By construction, gJt then
corresponds to a factor model.











. By extending the number of components in the








one will obtain a factor model (possibly only the one corresponding to gJt).
Moreover, as soon as a factor model is found, say, corresponding to g`, then all
gk, k > `, also correspond to factor models. This follows from the following
(easily proven) theorem.
Theorem 3.1
Assume that in case of regression model (3.9) for f = g` we have 
g`
jt = 0 for all
j = 1,...,Jt, then we also have 
gk
jt = 0 for all j = 1,...,Jt for k > `.
Proof. See section 3.A.2 in the appendix.
Next, introduce Z
g
















g would correspond to a factor model, Z
g
t+1 is part of the related stochastic
discount factor, see (3.7). We have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2












with equality in case g` (and then
also gk) corresponds to a factor model.
Proof. See section 3.A.2 in the appendix.








, the variance of Z
g
t+1 might increase, until a
factor model is found. In case g corresponds to a factor model, the variance of
Z
g
t+1 quantiﬁes the variability in the corresponding stochastic discount factor
(3.7).
Thus, given beliefs Pt, there exists a trade-off between model consistency
and the likelihood of potential arbitrage opportunities: we might have to








, to ﬁnd a factor model such that the given beliefs PtSection 3.2 Multi-Factor Models 65
are model consistent. But by increasing the number of excess returns, one also
increases the variability in Z
g
t+1. The variability in the resulting factor model
might then be so large that it leads to potential arbitrage opportunities. In
the next subsection we investigate this trade-off for the fully empirically based
beliefs b Pt,T, using for the excess returns the Fama-French and Carhart factors.
Empirical Analysis 3.2.2
In this subsection we investigate whether the fully empirically based and
(aimed to be) model consistent beliefs b Pt,T also exclude potential arbitrage
opportunities in case of the Fama and French (1993)-three factor and Carhart
(1997)-four factor models.
First, in Figure 3.5 we plot the values of the standard deviations of Z
f
t+1
in case of these two multi-factor models, with a one month horizon, using a
rolling window approach, and with sample lengths 360 months. As reference
we also include the corresponding values of the standard deviations of the
Sharpe ratio, i.e., Z
f
t+1 in case of the one factor (EB)CAPM. During the late
1950-s and 1960-s the standard deviations are rather low, but since the 1970-s
these increased to values around 0.25 in case of the Fama-French three factor
model and around 0.4 in case of the Carhart four factor model. This behavior is
different from the behavior of the (EB)CAPM Sharpe ratios. This Sharpe ratio
also increased during the later 1960-s, but then dropped during the 1970-s
to end up at a level around 0.15 at the end of the sample period. Moreover,
up to around 1970, the values of the standard deviations of Z
f
t+1 in case of
the Fama-French three factor model and the one factor CAPM are quite close,
suggesting that the additional two factors of the Fama-French three factor
model only became important since the 1970s. This is conﬁrmed by the values
of Jensen’s alpha-s in Figure 3.2, particularly, in case of the HML-factor.
The difference between the standard deviations of Z
f
t+1 for the CAPM and
the three and four factor model is a clear indication that on the basis of the
fully empirically based beliefs the model consistency of these beliefs in terms
of the CAPM has to be rejected, in particular since the 1970-s. Moreover, when
comparing the standard deviations of Z
f
t+1 for the Fama-French three factor
model and the Carhart four factor model, we see that the standard deviations
of the latter are substantially higher than the former, suggesting that the Fama-66 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3










Figure 3.5: Standard deviations of Z
f
t+1 for f equal to the one-
factor CAPM (solid), Fama-French three-factor model
(dashed/dotted), and the Carhart four-factor model
(dashed); monthly horizon, using rolling windows,
with sample length 360 months.
French three factor model might have to be rejected against the Carhart four
factor model as alternative, when the selection criterion is model consistency
of fully empirically based beliefs.
A formal test can be based on calculating Jensen’s  for the Carhart mo-
mentum factor using the Fama-French three factor model. Figure 3.6 shows the
values of these Jensen’s -s as well as the corresponding t-values, in case of
the one month horizon case, using the rolling window approach, with sample
lengths 360 months. The momentum factor shows clear outperformance with
values of the t-test statistic above 4, indicating that on the basis of these results
the Carhart four factor model is to be preferred when the selection is based on
model consistency of beliefs and the beliefs are fully empirically based. Since
at least four factor seem to be needed to guarantee that the fully empirically
based beliefs are model consistent, we shall focus in the sequel on the Carhart
four factor model.
In case of the Carhart four factor model the values of the standard de-
viations of Z
f
t+1 reach values up to around 0.4. This implies that when the
one-sided Chebyshev inequality would be binding, a violation of no potentialSection 3.2 Multi-Factor Models 67
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Figure 3.6: From top to bottom: Jensen’s  for the Carhart-
momentum factor in case of the Fama-French-three
factor model and corresponding t-value; monthly hori-
zon, using rolling windows, with sample length 360
months.
arbitrage opportunities has probability around 0.137, much higher than the
corresponding probability of 0.022 calculated in case of the EBCAPM, with
beliefs belonging to P t. This suggests that, contrary to the EBCAPM, absence
of potential arbitrage free opportunities in case of the Carhart four factor model
is far less likely.
To investigate the presence of potential arbitrage opportunities in the
Carhart four-factor model, we plot in Figure 3.7 the realizations of 1  Z
f
t+1, for
the one month horizon case, using the rolling window approach, with sample
lengths T = 360 months. Values below zero imply a violation of the hypothesis
of no potential arbitrage opportunities. We see that violations appear to happen
after the substantial increase in the standard deviations of Z
f
t+1 in the 1970-s,
cf. Figure 3.5.
The results so far are based on the one month horizon case using a rolling
window approach with sample length equal to 360 months, corresponding to
substantial estimation accuracy. With smaller sample sizes the estimation inac-
curacy will increase, resulting in more variability in beliefs, so that violation of
absence of potential arbitrage opportunities might happen more often. In Table68 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3












Figure 3.7: Realizations of 1   Z
f
t+1, for the one month horizon
case, using rolling windows, with sample length 360
months.
3.1 we present the number of violations of no potential arbitrage opportunities
in case of the Carhart four factor for some different sample sizes in comparison
with the EBCAPM. In case of the EBCAPM the selected sample sizes (almost) suf-
ﬁce to avoid potential arbitrage opportunities. For the sake of completeness, we
also include the corresponding results for the Fama-French three factor model.
Sample length CAPM Fama-French Carhart
60 1 3 35
72 0 3 29
84 0 2 24
Table 3.1: Number of rejections of the CAPM, Fama-French three
factor, and Carhart four factor models for monthly
horizon, using rolling windows, with different sample
lengths (in months).
In case of sample sizes with ﬁve years of monthly data the EBCAPM belief
Pt 2 P t allows for potential arbitrage opportunities only once. However, in
case of the Carhart four factor model, the belief b Pt,T, with T = 60, violates
the hypothesis of no potential arbitrage opportunities 35 times. By increasing
the sample size to seven years of monthly data, this number decreases to 24Section 3.3 Conclusions 69
times, which is still quite substantial. Thus, with smaller sample sizes, relevant
in case one aims at beliefs sufﬁciently reﬂecting the most recent information,
the likelihood of violations of no potential arbitrage opportunities increases
substantially, making the use of shorter samples to construct b Pt,T unattractive.
In fact, to avoid potential arbitrage opportunities in case of the Carhart four
factor model, we need sample sizes with at least around 75 years of monthly
data (but then there are only six years left for applying our rolling window
approach).
Instead of a one month horizon, one might also consider other horizons.
With longer time horizons, the values of the standard deviations of Z
f
t+1 will
increase. For instance, in case of a one year horizon, the monthly value of
the standard deviation of Z
f
t+1 around 0.4 at a monthly basis will increase up
to around 1.38 (=
p
12  0.4). This would imply that when the one-sided
Chebyshev inequality would be binding, a violation of the hypothesis of no
potential arbitrage opportunities has probability around 0.657. Under such
circumstances absence of potential arbitrage opportunities according to the
belief b Pt,T is no longer to be expected.
Thus, based on the criterion that potential arbitrage opportunities should
not be found, we have to reject the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Instead,
when the aim is to use a factor model, the one-factor EBCAPM might be a
better choice.
Conclusions 3.3
In this chapter we review the classical Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
The original version of the CAPM has been criticized, both from a theoretical
and from an empirical point of view. However, most of this critique is based on
the maintained hypothesis that there exists an exogenously given probability
distribution on the basis of which the expected assets’ payoffs and their vari-
ances and covariances can be calculated, and that this probability distribution
can be retrieved from past observations.
We consider the EBCAPM as a variant of the well known CAPM, but without
beliefs that are necessarily given exogenously. Instead, we model beliefs as
endogenous, determined jointly with equilibrium prices and optimal portfolio70 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3
holdings. We consider an equilibrium with mean-variance investors whose
beliefs are not only determined endogenously in line with the equilibrium
outcomes, but also such that according to these beliefs potential arbitrage
opportunities will be excluded. We consider homogeneous and heterogeneous
beliefs. Both cases result in clear one period ahead, belief-speciﬁc predictions
in terms of mean-variance optimal portfolios that particular events will not
happen. We focus on homogeneous beliefs, partly estimated on the basis of
past data, but also such that these beliefs are EBCAPM-consistent. Given such
beliefs and taking as market portfolio the value-weighted return on all NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks, we test whether the events predicted impossible,
also do not happen, i.e., we test whether the beliefs exclude potential arbitrage
opportunities. We do not ﬁnd potential arbitrage opportunities, at least not with
sufﬁcient sampling accuracy. With substantial sampling inaccuracy potential
arbitrage opportunities also do not exist when investors form their beliefs,
using past data, in a robust way. The ﬁnding that the EBCAPM can only be
partly empirically based, results in beta-s and Jensen’s alpha-s different from
the traditional ones. Corresponding to Jensen’s alpha-s equal to zero, we ﬁnd
in case of the Fama-French factors Small-Minus-Big (SMB) and High-Minus-
Low (HML) and in case of the Carhart Momentum factor beta-s that imply
much larger systematic risks than typically found, replacing the traditional
outperformance of these factors in case of fully empirically based beliefs.
The traditional alternatives to the CAPM are the multi-factor models. These
models are constructed by including extra risk factors to generate model con-
sistent beliefs, given that these beliefs are fully empirically based. We show
that there is a trade-off between model consistency and the likelihood of poten-
tial arbitrage opportunities. When more factors are needed to achieve model
consistency, beliefs might allow for potential arbitrage opportunities. We illus-
trate that potential arbitrage opportunities do exist in case of the traditionally
applied multi-factor models. Such factor models have to be rejected in a world
where potential arbitrage opportunities can easily be converted into ordinary
arbitrage opportunities. On the other hand, the one factor EBCAPM, with
endogenous beliefs that are not fully empirically based, cannot be rejected on
the basis of the criterion of no potential arbitrage opportunities. This suggests
that when one would like to use a factor model, and the selection criterion is
no potential arbitrage opportunities, this one factor EBCAPM is to be preferred.Section 3.A Appendix 71
Appendix 3.A
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the pricing kernel belonging to the space of marketed payoffs.
Given the belief Pt a CAPM-equilibrium with equilibrium price vector St and





































and markets clear, i.e.,
PI
i=1hi,t  Xt+1 =
PI
i=1hi,t  Xt+1.72 The CAPM with Endogenous Beliefs Chapter 3
In this way we have reformulated the CAPM-equilibrium according to Dana
(1999). Using our assumptions, the relevant part of assumption A1 of Dana
(1999) will be satisﬁed.22 Applying now Proposition 2.2 of Dana (1999), we














Assume that in case of regression model (3.9) for f = g` we have 
g`
jt = 0 for all
j = 1,...,Jt, then we also have 
gk
jt = 0 for all j = 1,...,Jt for k > `.











with 0,t following from the auxiliary regression
R
g`















= 0. In case g` corresponds to a
factor model, then we have 
g`
jt = 0, for all j = 1,...,Jt, so that also 0,t = 0.
But then 
g`
jt = 0, for all j = 1,...,Jt, implies 
gk
jt = 0, for all j = 1,...,Jt.
Theorem 3.2












with equality in case g` (and then
also gk) corresponds to a factor model.
Proof. Assume that R
g`
t+1 corresponds to the ﬁrst ` components of R
gk
t+1. Intro-













































needed to prove existence of a CAPM-equilibrium.










slightly, also using our normalizations.Section 3.A Appendix 73





































































where I11 denotes the identity matrix of the same dimension as 11 and 021 a









































































































This completes the proof.4
A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial
Market Model
In recent years, the ﬁeld of Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), in
which many heterogeneous interacting economic agents are studied, has grown
rapidly. The recent handbook of computational economics (Judd and Tesfatsion
(2006)) gives a good overview on the history and the developments in this
area. An important stream within the ACE domain deals with the modeling
of ﬁnancial markets, see Hommes (2006), Levy et al. (2000), and LeBaron
(2006). Researchers in this ﬁeld have extended traditional ﬁnance models,
which often build on representative agents, by investigating the interactions
among heterogeneous agents. These interactions might include learning from
as well as trading with each other. As analytical solutions of the resulting
market dynamics are typically hard to ﬁnd, researchers rely on computing
power and numerical analysis to analyze the complex economies that arise
from the interaction between many, mostly boundedly rational agents.
The detailed analysis of agents’ behavior in these artiﬁcial ﬁnancial markets
opens up many opportunities to study some of the most prominent puzzles of
traditional ﬁnance models, including the equity premium puzzle and the well-
known stylized facts of asset returns. Traditional ﬁnance models have a hard
time explaining the joint occurrence of several stylized facts of assets return,
such as excess kurtosis of unconditional asset returns at frequencies smaller
than one month (described already by Mandelbrot (1963)), persistence of
volatility (also called volatility clustering), and slow decay of autocorrelations
in absolute returns. Cont (2001) provides a comprehensive overview of these
and other stylized facts of asset returns. The aim of this and the next chapter is76 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
to investigate whether an artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market with realistic settings for
the economic agents, as we will detail below, is capable of generating a number
of the stylized facts simultaneously.
The current ACE studies on ﬁnancial markets can be subdivided into two
major streams. The ﬁrst uses rather simple models that are analytically tractable
and allow for an analytical study of properties of asset prices and returns.
This stream is mainly inspired by the work of Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998). Research in this stream traditionally considers only a few types of
agents in the market, often fundamentalists (who believe in the existence of
a fundamental value) and trend chasers (who try to exploit the most recent
trends in prices). These agents can and usually will sometimes switch their
type based on performance measures in terms of proﬁt. As a consequence,
the resulting economies exhibit what is known as herding behavior, which can
explain some of the stylized facts.
The second stream follows mainly the work of Arthur et al. (1997) and
LeBaron et al. (1999). These authors study ﬁnancial markets as models in
which economic agents live that differ in multiple aspects, for example in
their information set, their ways of processing the information, their attitudes
towards risks, and so on. The resulting interactions at the artiﬁcial markets
are too complex to be studied analytically and Microscopic Simulations (MS)
techniques are applied instead to analyze the properties of such ﬁnancial market
models. The microscopic simulation method has its origins in physics where it
was ﬁrst used to simulate the interaction between particles (see, for instance,
Levy et al. (2000)). Other researchers that have applied MS techniques to solve
for the complex interactions between heterogeneous agents include, among
others, Arthur et al. (1997), LeBaron (1999, 2001a, 2002a), LeBaron et al.
(1999), Levy et al. (2000), and LeBaron and Yamamoto (2007).
As we observe many different types of agents, with many different beliefs
and different views on the world, active in the ﬁnancial markets, we will
introduce a model that belongs to the second stream of this literature. The
economy will be a pure exchange economy in which ﬁrms pay dividends,
agents determine their demand for the available assets, the market maker
sets temporary equilibrium prices (see Grandmont (1988)), and a regulator
guarantees orderly trading between the agents. In our economy, we have
a fundamentalist type of agent and a type that applies mean-variance (MV)77
optimization to determine their demand for risky assets. The agents use
econometric models to forecast prices or returns, on which they will base their
investment decisions for the next period on.
The economy will contain multiple risky assets, which is obviously more
realistic than the single asset market of most currently existing agent-based
models. As such, the model in this chapter can be compared with, for instance,
Boehm and Chiarella (2005) and Chiarella et al. (2007). However, we allow for
the direct estimation of the covariance matrix of returns by the economic agents
instead of using a constant covariance matrix or a much smoother update-rule
for the covariance matrix like, for instance, exponential smoothing. Given the
level of statistical training most ﬁnancial advisors nowadays have, we feel that
our approach provides a more accurate description of the agents that interact
in the actual ﬁnancial markets. The economy we present in this chapter will
serve as a benchmark economy which will be used to analyze the impact of
parameter changes and the introduction of new features in the model.
To obtain our benchmark economy this chapter will ﬁrst describe how agents
form their beliefs about the performance of the available assets. As in chapter 2,
the agents will use econometric models to describe the past and forecast the
future. This chapter will use simple models, whereas in chapter 5, we will
enrich the benchmark model and allow, for instance, the agents to use more
advanced econometric models for modeling prices or returns. There, we will
also allow them to use different econometric models over time and to switch
between being a fundamentalist and being an MV agent. These concepts are
inspired on, for instance, Alfarano and Lux (2007), Brock and Hommes (1998),
Hommes et al. (2005), LeBaron (1999, 2002a,b), Lux and Marchesi (1999), and
Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007). The choice between different econometric
models and between types will be driven by their predictive performance as
in, for instance, Hommes (2002), LeBaron et al. (1999), and Hommes et al.
(2005). This set-up provides us with a realistic set-up for the behavior of
economic agents and permits us to study the extent to which their interactions
result in market behavior that is similar to that observed in the real world.
In particular, we will study whether the resulting return process matches the
stylized facts already discussed above.
The ﬁrst part of this chapter will describe the agents present in our economy
and the mechanism through which prices are established. In the second part,78 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
we experiment with the settings of the economy to illustrate and understand
the effects of various parameter settings. We then select a set of parameters
that produces an asset return process with some realistic features to establish
our benchmark economy.
4.1 Set-up
This section introduces the characteristics of the benchmark artiﬁcial ﬁnancial
market model. It will describe the simulation model in detail. We model a
pure exchange economy in which agents determine their demand for assets,
issued by ﬁrms, in every period in time. The equilibrium in every period will
be set by a market maker who computes a Walrasian temporary equilibrium
(see Grandmont (1988)) and a regulator who controls the orderly functioning
of the ﬁnancial market.








for any vector q 2 Rn (n > 1) to denote the ﬁrst (q0 2 R) and remaining entries
(e q 2 Rn 1) in a vector, separately.
4.1.1 Assets and Firms
We start with the economy at time t. The economy contains J + 1 assets.
Asset 0 is the numéraire asset, “money” (or the “riskfree asset”), whose price
(S0t) in all periods equals 1, and whose dividend payoffs (D0t) always equal
0. The other J assets represent ownership rights to one of J ﬁrms. Asset j is
characterized by its dividend payoff Djt. The J ﬁrms in the economy decide on
the dividend payoffs, where ﬁrm j decides on Djt in period t. The price Sjt of
asset j in period t is set by the market.
In modeling the dividend process, we follow, among others, He and Li
(2008), LeBaron (2001b), Levy et al. (2000), and He and Li (2007), and
assume it is exogenously given. In particular, we follow LeBaron (2002a) inSection 4.1 Set-up 79











with j = 1,...,J, cDj the growth rate of log dividends of asset j and "D,j,t+1 the
noise term. These dividend processes are assumed to be independent across





and the net return by Rjt  rjt  1. We assume that Djt only will be observed
after trading at time t has been completed, in order to avoid informational
differences between the different agents that will be introduced in the following
subsection.
Agents 4.1.2
There are I agents in this economy. They hold and trade the available assets.






where hi,j,t denotes the portfolio holding, measured in numbers of assets, of
agent i in asset j at the end of period t. The initial endowments for agent i in
period t are given by hi,t 1.
We shall use u to denote the vector consisting of the value of each of the
asset holdings in a portfolio in terms of the numéraire, so
uit = hit St,
where  denotes the component-wise Hadamard-Schur product.2 We denote
1Notice that innovation might be a source of uncertainty driving the dividend process, see
also chapter 2.
2The Hadamard-Schur product A B of two matrices A 2 RNK and B 2 RNK is deﬁned
as the N  K matrix whose (n,k)-th element is An,kBn,k (see Abadir and Magnus (2005), page
340).80 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
the wealth of agent i at the beginning of time t by Wit which is given by
Wit = St hi,t 1.
There are two types of agents in the benchmark model. The ﬁrst is a
fundamentalist type (see, for instance, Brock and Hommes (1998), Chiarella
and He (2002), He and Li (2007), and Hommes et al. (2005)) who believes that
there is a process underlying the asset prices that contains information about
the fundamental value of the assets. The second type is the Mean-Variance
(MV) investor (see, for instance, Chiarella and He (2002) and Chiarella et al.
(2007)) who invests in mean-variance efﬁcient portfolios. The two agent types
will be discussed in this section.
In this chapter, we will not model the complete beliefs of the agents (as
in chapter 3), but only some summary statistics. We specialize chapter 3
to the case of Boehm and Chiarella (2005) in which beliefs are modeled
exogenously. Endogenous beliefs of the agents over the assets’ returns at each
period, namely including the return of the current period, would imply solving
J highly nonlinear equations which depend also on the forecasting rules used
(see section 3.1.3), possibly having multiple equilibria. To implement the
exogenous beliefs of the agents, we assume that they use some (econometric)
model for prices, dividends, or returns and base their investment decision on
that model. To estimate the model, they may use the available data in their
memory, which excludes current period information. The number of periods of
data in the memory of agent i is denoted by Mi.
Fundamentalists
A frequently used type of agent is the fundamentalist. The fundamentalist
trades according to the price difference between the past period prices and the
perceived3 fundamental price of the corresponding period. We assume that
fundamentalists increase their demand when it is underpriced (the past period
price is lower than the perceived fundamental price) and reduce their demand
in the opposite case. This is based on the idea that they believe that prices
will, in the end, return to the perceived fundamental price. See Brock and
3Each agent might use a different econometric model to model the fundamental price.Section 4.1 Set-up 81
Hommes (1998), Chiarella and He (2002), Chiarella et al. (2006a), Hommes
et al. (2005), and Chiarella et al. (2006b) for similar implementations.
To decide on their demand for assets, fundamentalists ﬁrst have to form an
idea about the fundamental price. As in Levy et al. (2000), we assume that
fundamentalists use a discounted dividend model to model the fundamental
price. They discount expected dividends (over future periods) of each asset j
independently using the discount rate r










where Eit(.) denotes the expectations operator according to the model that
agent i uses for asset j and using all information to her available up to and













, with gj the expected growth rate of the dividend of asset
j and r
Dj the expected return on the asset, in line with the dividend model of
Gordon (1962). Note also that with rDj =
1 
 , and  the fraction of wealth
invested in stocks at every time period, this fundamental price is equivalent
with the homogeneous agent equilibrium price in LeBaron (2002a).




and we assume they do
this in a simple way, namely, by using the last available dividend realization,
Dj,t 1. In chapter 5, we will consider more advanced alternatives.
The next step is to deﬁne a portfolio adjustment rule for the fundamentalist
traders. Recent literature contains many different ways of deﬁning the exact
behavior of fundamentalist agents. The recurring theme is the fact that funda-
mentalists trade according to the difference between the fundamental price,
Sf,j,t, and the past period price, Sj,t 1. This is often implemented as (translated




(with  the speed of adjustment), cf. for instance
Chiarella et al. (2006a) and He and Li (2007).
The fundamentalists in our model will be based on the same idea and will
adapt their portfolio at each time period t based on the difference between82 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
the price and the (perceived) fundamental price. We require that the portfolio
adjustment rule is ﬂexible enough for calibration purposes of the economy, so
we propose











with i > 0 the adjustment speed, i > 0 the responsiveness to differences
between the fundamental price and the price of the previous period, and
sgn(.) the sign function. If i increases, the portfolio adjustment will increase.






Sf,i,j,t < 1, the portfolio adjustment will
decrease. If the asset is perceived to be underpriced (Sf,i,j,t > Sj,t 1), sgn(.)
will be positive and the agent increases his demand for the asset. If the asset is
perceived to be overpriced (Sf,i,j,t < Sj,t 1), his demand will decrease. The size
of the adjustment depends positively on the difference between the perceived
fundamental price Sf,i,j,t and the previous period price, Sj,t 1 through the
relative price difference. Note that the adjustment is proportional to Sf,i,j,t.
Mean-Variance Investors
The second type of agent in the model is the mean-variance investor. This
investor always buys the perceived4 mean-variance efﬁcient portfolio, found by
solving the following optimal investment problem (which is inspired on Li and















0ui,t+ = Wi,t+,  = 0,1,...,Ti  1,
where Varit(.) denotes the variance operator of agent i using the available
information up to and including time t. it is the possibly time varying risk aver-
sion parameter of agent i. The agent wants the optimal combination (according
to his risk aversion) of expected return and risk (measured by the variance) at
the end of the planning horizon, Ti. The portfolio path u brings him there.
4The agent will model the asset returns himself.
5See also Campbell and Viceira (2002).Section 4.1 Set-up 83
This problem has been solved under the assumption of (perceived) iid
returns by Li et al. (1998) and Li and Ng (2000). This results in the demand
for assets in terms of the numéraire at time t + (for  = 0,1,...,Ti  1, the

































































with k = 0,1,...,Ti  1, which gives the entire optimal portfolio path for each
time between now and the horizon Ti. Notice that u0t denotes the investment
in terms of the numéraire and e ut denotes the investments in the J risky assets.
As we will allow agents to re-evaluate their decisions at every time period,
the demand function that is factually implemented at time period t, is the one



















ui,0,t = Wit  e 
0e uit.






























ui,0,t = Wit  e 
0e uit.
This is the standard Markowitz solution for a mean-variance investment prob-
lem (with Covit(.) denoting the covariance operator of agent i).84 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
The MV agents need to form an idea about expected return and variance of
the returns. For this, many different econometric models could be used. In the
benchmark model, MV agents estimate expected return and variance by the






































Notice that direct estimation of the covariance matrix is a not often applied
concept in MS models, though the concept of learning about the covariance
matrix has already been discussed in, for instance, He (2003) and Chiarella et al.
(2007). These articles use an update mechanism like exponential smoothing
to quantify the covariance matrix at each time period. We will further relax
our assumption about the expected return and covariance matrix estimators in
chapter 5 and allow MV agents to choose between different forecasting rules
for the expected return and the covariance matrix.
4.1.3 Equilibrium Concept and Market Makers
The market makers in this economy take care of equating demand and supply
in their asset market. Many versions of market makers could be thought of and
have also been discussed in the recent literature (see, for instance, LeBaron
(2001a) and Judd and Tesfatsion (2006)). For a long time, the most popular
market maker seemed to be the one that corrects the price in the direction of
excess demand as in










6The current period return is not included as that would introduce price dependent prefer-
ences through the forecast rules. Notice that fundamentalists also only use information up to
time t  1.Section 4.1 Set-up 85
with  the speed of adjustment,
PI
i=1e hit the demand for risky assets (in
numbers) and
PI
i=1e hi,t 1 the supply of risky assets. This design has as main
drawback that asset markets are in disequilibrium most of the time. Further,
results and return dynamics are very sensitive to the choice of , as argued in
LeBaron (2001a) and LeBaron (2006).
An alternative design is one with a temporary Walrasian equilibrium at
every time period. At time t, the total supply of assets is given by
PI
i=1e hi,j,t 1.
The total demand in terms of the numéraire is given by
PI
i=1 e ui,j,t, with e ui,j,t
not depending on current prices Sjt, and hence equilibrium prices in risky asset







We model the market maker such that he proposes this Walrasian temporary
equilibrium price to a regulator (who will be introduced in the next section).
The regulator can take action if the market maker suggests prices that would
make the asset markets too volatile.
Regulators 4.1.4
After period t prices St have been proposed by the market maker, the regulators
that are present in every asset market check these prices and make sure that
these are orderly and will not cause the market to crash or to explode. They
do this by limiting the price difference such that the return that will realize is
within four standard deviations computed over the returns of the 2000 most
recent periods by limiting the price difference between this and the previous
period. When the price difference is limited, the demand of agents is adjusted
too, but not the total supply of assets in the market. The level of four standard
deviations is chosen to still allow for relatively big shocks to assets prices, but
at the same time avoiding crashes.
To give an example, say the price of the previous period is St 1 = 200
and the market maker proposes a price of St = 100 in this time period. The
regulator allows, for instance, a maximum price difference of 20 and hence will
set St = 180. Say there are 400 assets in the market and 200 agents are each86 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
willing to invest 200 monetary units in the asset, compared to 400 monetary
units in the previous period. The regulator does not allow for this situation and
sets the price St = 180, adjusting the demand of each agent in monetary units
to 360 for 2 assets per agent. Hence, each agents gets the number of shares
that would result from the Walrasian equilibrium and the price as proposed by
the market maker, but trade takes place at the regulated price.
Various other formulations for the regulator could be thought of, such as
a regulator that buys himself into the market when a crash is on the verge to
happen. However, as beliefs of MV agents change only marginally in a single
time period, the regulator will have to increase his position in the market once
more, leading either to the case that he owns all the stocks in the market or
him having a very signiﬁcant position during the remainder of the simulation,
meaning that the market is in constant disequilibrium. This is not a preferable
solution, as is also argued in LeBaron (2001a).
Another solution might be to stop trading altogether temporarily in circum-
stances of crashes or explosions as has also been done in real life stock markets
in the past. But this requires modeling the decay of information and news and
picking up new information from external sources as to adjust the beliefs of
agents after a period of no trade. This is beyond the scope of this thesis.
4.1.5 Concluding remarks
In the benchmark economy, the economic agents only observe past data, con-
sisting, for instance, of realized prices, dividend payments, trading volumes,
etcetera. Different economic agents will have different preferences and endow-
ments, but they also will use different trading strategies. Together, this results
in heterogeneity, causing trade, and price ﬂuctuations over time.
Furthermore, we want to emphasize that our economy contains multiple
risky assets whereas most of today’s artiﬁcial ﬁnancial markets simulate only a
single risky asset. Our approach is more realistic allowing interactions between
assets to be studied. The use of microscopic simulations comes in very handy in
this respect. It allows for analyzing very complex economies with relative ease.
The economy is implemented in MATLAB, an environment for mathematical
computations. It is set up in a general and user friendly way and can be
controlled by some settings in an initialization script. The program optimizesSection 4.2 Benchmark Selection 87
memory use and runs a simulation in several samples to avoid memory overload.
Sample statistics and ﬁgures of each sample are produced automatically and
prepared for inclusion in a L ATEX document. The program and other relevant
information is available from the author upon request.
Benchmark Selection 4.2
This section provides insights in the properties of the artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market
model that we proposed in the previous section. It will describe in some
detail the effects of different parameter settings in an economy with only
fundamentalists, an economy with only MV investors, and an economy with
both fundamentalists and MV agents.
There are I = 200 agents in de market, trading J = 3 assets in addition
to the riskfree asset. Agents have a memory length drawn from a uniform
distribution with domain 600 to 800 periods. We follow LeBaron (2002a) in
modeling the dividend processes on a weekly basis. We use cD = 0.02=52 for
the growth rate of log dividends cDj for all assets. We assume that "D,j,t+1,
the noise term of the log dividend process, is iid N(0, 0.062=52) distributed. We
further set the discount factor of fundamentalists, rDj, equal to 0.02=52, the
same as the growth rate of log dividends cD, for all assets. The starting value
of the dividend processes of all risky assets is also set equal to cD. The MV
agents observe that the total wealth on the market is growing due to dividend
payments. Furthermore, due to the trend in dividends, the predictions of the
fundamental price by the fundamentalists will contain an exponential trend.
This will, ignoring other inﬂuences for the moment, in general lead to an
increase of invested money in the risky assets. The MV agents adjust their risk
aversion to keep a similar market share of risky assets as from the start of the





with i1 = 5 and cD the growth rate of dividends. Setting the risk aversion
parameter as above, helps the MV agents keeping up with the fundamentalists
who might otherwise gradually take over the market.88 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
For the benchmark experiments, we ﬁx the seed of the random number
generator to a chosen value (hence leading to the same dividend draws for
every run) to be able to make comparisons over different runs. We run each
simulation for 5000 periods, selecting the last 1000 (which is about 20 years) to
be presented here. The ﬁrst 4000 periods are used to let the economy start up
and wash out the effects of the starting information which was not generated
by the economy.7
4.2.1 Fundamentalists Only Economy
In the ﬁrst economy, we have only fundamentalist agents. The portfolio ad-
justment rule of each agent is based on  = 3.4 and  = 1.3 (see formula
(4.3)).8 The other settings are as described above. To give an idea of the
statistical properties of the return series, a number of summary statistics of
the simulation results can be found in Table 4.1 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The
table lists the sample average and sample covariance matrix of returns in per-
centages. Further, skewness, kurtosis, and the Jarque-Bera statistics provide
a way to test the normality of asset returns. Finally, the correlations between
asset returns are listed in the lower right part of the table. Figure 4.1 shows
the simulated prices and returns of the assets over time. Figure 4.2 shows the
autocorrelations of returns, squared returns, and absolute returns for several
lags. The dashed lines indicate the 5% (pointwise) critical values for testing
whether the autocorrelations are zero.
We observe that asset 1 has an average (excess) return of 0.025% per week,
which is 1.30% on a yearly basis, while asset 3 has an average return of around
6.03% on a yearly basis. Note that due to the fact that the dividend draws will
be equal for each simulation, a similar difference is expected to occur in further
results. The covariance matrix in Table 4.1 is computed from the percentage
returns, hence the volatility of, for instance, the ﬁrst asset on a yearly basis is
equal to
p
52 0.646=10000 = 5.80%.
7We simulate the dividend process and compute prices from the dividends using equation
(4.2) to generate the initial information. The asset returns are computed from the prices and
dividends using equation (4.1), but we add normally distributed noise with standard deviation
0.01. We calibrate the total supply of assets in the ﬁrst period of the simulation to align the
simulation data with the generated initial data.
8These values are calibrated after several simulations, having as objective minimizing the
autocorrelations in returns.Section 4.2 Benchmark Selection 89
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.025 0.646  0.011 0.036
2 0.102  0.011 0.642 0.017
3 0.116 0.036 0.017 0.563
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1  0.077 4.834 141.074 12 =  0.017
2 0.076 3.925 36.637 13 = 0.059
3 0.137 4.341 78.043 23 = 0.028
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the fundamentalists only economy
returns.
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Figure 4.1: Prices and returns (in %) of the fundamentalists only
economy; assets in rows, prices in column 1, returns in
column 2.
The kurtosis is larger than 3 for all assets, indicating excess kurtosis when
compared to the normal distribution. The value of the Jarque-Bera statistic
indeed reﬂects this.9 There is almost no autocorrelation in returns, absolute
returns, or squared returns. We should also notice in particular that the results
for the separate assets are rather different while they have been initialized
with exactly the same settings and dividend process. This is caused partly by
the different realizations of the dividend process but also by the trading of
the agents. Notice however that the 95% conﬁdence interval of the average
9The asymptotic Jarque-Bera critical value for the 5% signiﬁcance level is 5.99.90 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
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Figure 4.2: Autocorrelations of the fundamentalists only economy;
assets in rows, return in column 1, squared returns in
column 2, absolute returns in column 3.
return10 of asset one is ( 0.0248,0.0748).11 The conﬁdence intervals of assets
two and three are (0.0523,0.1517) and (0.0695,0.1625), respectively. These
intervals overlap, indicating that, from a comparison of the means, there is
no statistical evidence that the assets are different. In section 4.2.5, we will
discuss an alternative method to investigate the substitutability of the assets.
When we compare these results with the stylized facts as mentioned in Cont
(2001), we see that we reproduced some of them, but not all. Cont (2001)
mentions, amongst other things, absence of autocorrelations in asset returns
and heavy tails of asset returns. We reproduced these stylized facts in the
fundamentalists only economy. As Cont (2001) also mentions, it is difﬁcult to
ﬁnd a model that captures all stylized facts simultaneously. As we reproduced
already some of the stylized facts, we consider this a good starting point for the
economy and challenge new agents to introduce the stylized facts of, amongst
other things, long memory, volatility clustering, and the leverage effect12 that
we observe in real life ﬁnancial time series.
10Assuming iid returns.
11This is computed by 0.0251.96
p
0.646=1000, with 0.646 the variance of the asset return.
12This is the fact that return and volatility of an asset are negatively correlated.Section 4.2 Benchmark Selection 91
Eﬀects of Changes to the Speed of Adjustment
This section will describe the effects of changes in , the portfolio adjustment
speed, in the adjustment formula (4.3).
We will show two examples in this section. First of all, the setting  = 2.4
(compared to  = 3.4 we had previously) is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The
summary statistics are in Table 4.2.13 In the summary statistics, we observe that
the variances and covariances have decreased substantially and the kurtosis
has decreased slightly, compared to the situation with  = 3.4. The decrease in
the variance is caused by the fact that the smaller value of  leads to smaller
adjustments in prices and hence to smaller shocks in returns.
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Figure 4.3: Autocorrelations of returns for small ; assets in rows,
return in column 1, squared returns in column 2, abso-
lute returns in column 3.
The smaller adjustments will also lead to constantly lagging prices with
respect to fundamental prices as the adjustments will be too small to adjust the
price to the fundamental price in a single time period. This causes signiﬁcant
positive ﬁrst order autocorrelations in asset returns, because the lagging prices
13Because we ﬁxed the seed, the simulated price processes are very similar to the results
shown before. There are differences, as shown by the statistics and the autocorrelation ﬁgures.
However, these differences cannot be seen at the scale of these ﬁgures and, after all, the
statistics and autocorrelation patterns present the information in a clearer fashion. Hence we
leave out the ﬁgures with prices and returns for most of the results to come in this chapter.92 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
generate consecutive periods of positive or negative returns, respectively. The
autocorrelations can be seen in Figure 4.3.
With larger , for instance  = 4.4 (compared to the starting point  = 3.4),
we obtain the summary statistics of Table 4.3 and the autocorrelations of returns
in Figure 4.4. We now observe higher variance and an increase in kurtosis. This
is caused by the fact that the fundamentalists adjust their portfolio very rapidly
now and overshoot the (perceived) fundamental price regularly. This also
causes signiﬁcant negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation in returns, see Figure 4.4.
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.023 0.374  0.000 0.017
2 0.101  0.000 0.363 0.012
3 0.114 0.017 0.012 0.310
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1  0.104 4.402 83.686 12 =  0.001
2 0.013 3.737 22.680 13 = 0.051
3 0.162 4.238 68.252 23 = 0.037
Table 4.2: Summary statistics of returns for small .
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Figure 4.4: Autocorrelations of returns for large ; assets in rows,
return in column 1, squared returns in column 2, abso-
lute returns in column 3.Section 4.2 Benchmark Selection 93
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.027 1.137  0.060 0.074
2 0.104  0.060 1.176 0.025
3 0.118 0.074 0.025 1.044
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.012 5.128 188.675 12 =  0.052
2 0.136 4.307 74.237 13 = 0.068
3  0.086 5.289 219.572 23 = 0.023
Table 4.3: Summary statistics of returns for large .
Eﬀects of Changes to the Responsiveness to Price Deviations
A change in  will produce different results. Keep in mind that the part







Sf,i,j,t, from the adjustment formula (4.3)
will typically be between zero and one. This causes the effect that, when 
is smaller, adjustments will be larger, ceteris paribus, causing overshooting of
the fundamental price by the fundamentalists and hence negative ﬁrst order
autocorrelations in the asset returns, similar to a larger . Note though, that
the effects will not be exactly the same as  has a nonlinear inﬂuence, in which






Sf,i,j,t plays a role, whereas  has
a linear inﬂuence. We present the results for  = 1.2 (compared to  = 1.3
previously) in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.5. Notice that we have set  again to its
original value of 3.4.
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.031 2.038  0.192 0.124
2 0.109  0.192 2.156 0.055
3 0.123 0.124 0.055 1.936
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.114 4.973 164.402 12 =  0.091
2 0.103 4.271 69.096 13 = 0.062
3  0.115 5.403 242.759 23 = 0.027
Table 4.4: Statistics of returns for small .
We observe in Table 4.4 that the variance of asset returns has increased
by much (which is similar to the effect of an increase in ), but also the94 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
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Figure 4.5: Autocorrelations of returns for small ; assets in rows,
return in column 1, squared returns in column 2, abso-
lute returns in column 3.
kurtosis. Figure 4.5 shows that the overshooting has led to alternating neg-
ative and positive returns because of the negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation
in returns. However, we do also observe effects on the autocorrelations of
absolute and squared returns. The ﬁrst few lags now have signiﬁcant positive
autocorrelations. This might be due to the nonlinear inﬂuence of  on portfolio
adjustments, prices, and returns.
The next experiment will show the effects of a large , namely  = 1.4
(compared to  = 1.3 in the starting point). Some of the results are presented
in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.6.
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.023 0.345  0.000 0.016
2 0.101  0.000 0.330 0.012
3 0.114 0.016 0.012 0.280
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1  0.114 4.892 151.276 12 =  0.001
2 0.016 4.191 59.118 13 = 0.051
3 0.210 4.792 141.100 23 = 0.038
Table 4.5: Summary statistics of returns for large .Section 4.2 Benchmark Selection 95
10 20 30 40 50 10 20 30 40 50 10 20 30 40 50
10 20 30 40 50 10 20 30 40 50 10 20 30 40 50




























Figure 4.6: Autocorrelations of returns for large ; assets in rows,
return in column 1, squared returns in column 2, abso-
lute returns in column 3.
Table 4.5 shows that the increase in  has a negative effect on the variance
of asset returns, similar to the effects of an increase in . The kurtosis, however,
has also increased, as for a small . Based on these results, we cannot draw a
general conclusion of the effect of  on the kurtosis.
The effect of the increase in  on autocorrelations is clearer however. The
results in Figure 4.6 resemble those of Figure 4.3. These autocorrelation
patterns are caused by the fact that the price lags the (perceived) fundamental
price due to too small portfolio adjustments and hence consecutive periods of
positive and negative returns occur, generating the positive autocorrelation in
returns.
Relation between  and 
As we have seen in the previous sections, increases in  and  have opposite
effects on the autocorrelations of returns, whereas the kurtosis increases with
. This suggests that there might be a combination of  and  values that
results in no autocorrelation in returns (as observed in real life asset returns,
see Cont (2001)) and where we can calibrate the level of kurtosis.
To derive an approximate relationship between  and , note that the96 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4















Sf,i,j,t by c. To have similar transaction
sizes at this average deviation c of the perceived fundamental price from the
price of the previous period, a strong link between  and  has to hold. In
particular, taking logs in (4.5) gives
log(TS)  log()+ log(c)+log(d)
with d = Sf,i,j,t. With TS constant, this leads to
  a + blog()
for some constants a and b.
From numerous experiments, selecting simulations on the basis of absence
of autocorrelations in asset returns, we have estimated b a = 0.9874 and b b =
0.2570. This result is very helpful as it allows us to control autocorrelation and
kurtosis in future simulations and basically eliminates one parameter in case
we want to calibrate or estimate this speciﬁc model.
4.2.2 Mean-Variance Agents Only Economy
This section discusses the possibilities of an economy with I = 200 mean-
variance agents. These agents use the sample mean and sample covariance
matrix to predict the next period’s return and covariance matrix. The MV
agents determine the expected return and covariance matrix without taking
the current period returns into account. In this sense, the results in this section
are a special case of those in chapter 3. This assumption avoids solving very
complicated and highly nonlinear equations which would, if an equilibrium
exists, slow down simulations dramatically. The remaining settings for this
simulation have already been discussed at the start of this section, with the
exception that we leave the regulator disabled for this speciﬁc simulation.
Figure 4.7 shows some simulation results.Section 4.2 Benchmark Selection 97
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Figure 4.7: Prices and returns (in %) of the MV economy; assets in
rows, prices in column 1, returns in column 2.
The result for this simulation is a steep incline in prices followed by a crash
of asset markets 2 and 3 in this economy. We will ﬁrst explain the reason
behind the steep rise and after that, the cause and evolution of the crash.
The reason for the almost ever increasing asset prices is actually the initial
information that the agents are assumed to use and the fact that they have a
ﬁxed memory length. The initial returns are on average lower than the returns
that the economy produces itself as follows from Figure 4.8. As time progresses,
the expected return increases because on average lower old return observations
drop from the memory and on average higher new returns are added. This
self-fulﬁlling prophecy process increases demand and hence prices. Notice that
this process could also produce ever decreasing prices, depending on the initial
information given to the agents.
To explain the crash that follows after the steep rise of asset prices, it turns
out that this is caused by old returns for assets 2 and 3 that drop from the
memory of a number (about 10) of agents. These are very low whereas the
newly added return is around the mean of the asset returns. This causes the
variance of these assets to decrease by a relatively large amount, leading to
a sudden increase in demand for these assets and hence in prices for these
assets followed by an increase in variance for all agents. During the simulation,98 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
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Figure 4.8: Historical returns (for t < 0) and returns generated by
the model.
also the correlation between assets 2 and 3 has been growing. All this leads
to a change of behavior of all agents, trading assets 2 and 3 for asset 1. The
prices of assets 2 and 3 start to drop and that of asset 1 to rise. This increases
the variance of these assets even further. The decreasing prices also cause the
expected returns to decrease, which ampliﬁes the downward trend in prices.
Notice that Figures 4.7 and 4.8 also show some large returns for asset 1 at
the start of the simulation. The same situation as during the crash is actually
happening here, namely, due to a large negative return that drops from memory
for a number of agents, the expected return increases in a certain period and
hence the demand for the asset and its price. However, due to the larger
returns, also the variance increases and because the assets have a very low
correlation at that moment (this is how the initial information is generated),
the increased variance avoids a crash at that moment.
We illustrate the regulator in this economy. The regulator takes action when
he observes a price shock that would result in a return that is larger than four
times the standard deviation of the returns. In that case, the price shock is
limited and demand in terms of numéraire of the agents is adjusted accordingly.
The result is presented in Figure 4.9.
We observe that the regulator succeeds in preventing an immediate crash of
the market. However, he will not change the “minds” of our MV agents. DuringSection 4.2 Benchmark Selection 99
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Figure 4.9: Prices and returns (in %) of the MV economy with
regulator; assets in rows, prices in column 1, returns in
column 2.
the crash, they observe large negative returns for two of the assets and do not
want these assets anymore. Hence, the crash will eventually be complete.
This experiment suggests that, to create a more realistic simulation of
an asset market, further experiments should include agents that do think
differently about the assets or more agents such that each individual agent has
a smaller impact on the economy. The ﬁrst conclusion implies that the MV
only economy needs more heterogeneity to create stability. Or, alternatively,
the MV agents should have more ﬂexibility, for instance, to use different rules
to predict asset returns and volatility. In particular, a combination with the
fundamentalists might create a more stable economy. We have already seen
that such economic agents create a very stable economy which can generate
predictable results through the observed inﬂuence of  and . The next section
of this chapter will investigate such a model.
Combining Fundamentalists and MV Agents 4.2.3
This section will present the results when we combine both fundamentalists
and mean-variance agents in an economy. Half of the I = 200 agents will be a100 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
fundamentalist, the other half will be MV agents. The fundamentalists have
 = 3.4 and  = 1.3. All other settings remain the same as before. We present
the results in Table 4.6 and Figures 4.10 and 4.11.
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.026 0.726 0.028 0.005
2 0.105 0.028 0.969  0.030
3 0.118 0.005  0.030 0.945
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1  0.251 3.400 17.200 12 = 0.034
2  0.090 3.614 17.055 13 = 0.006
3 0.055 3.618 16.396 23 =  0.032
Table 4.6: Summary statistics of the fundamentalist and MV agents
combined economy.
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Figure 4.10: Prices and returns (in %) of the fundamentalist and
MV agents combined economy; assets in rows, prices
in column 1, returns in column 2.
One thing we notice immediately when comparing the autocorrelation pat-
terns in Figure 4.11 to those of the fundamentalists only economy in Figure 4.2
is that signiﬁcant positive ﬁrst order autocorrelations have appeared in the
returns. This can be explained by the same phenomenon that caused the rise
and crash in the MV only economy (see section 4.2.2). The MV agents tendSection 4.2 Benchmark Selection 101
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Figure 4.11: Autocorrelations of the fundamentalist and MV agents
combined economy; assets in rows, return in column
1, squared returns in column 2, absolute returns in
column 3.
to push prices consistently up (or down), but due to the existence of funda-
mentalists in the market, this process occurs in a more modest fashion. This,
in turn, has an effect on expected return and covariance matrix used by the
MV agents, leading to prices going in the opposite direction as before, until the
fundamentalists take action again. This process of consecutive increasing and
decreasing prices produces the observed autocorrelation pattern in returns.
The Benchmark Model 4.2.4
For the benchmark model, the economy that will be used as a basis for further
experiments, we would like to reduce the autocorrelations in returns as we
have seen that absence of autocorrelations is one of the stylized facts, listed
by Cont (2001), that we can most likely reproduce with the benchmark model,
whereas the other stylized facts do not seem (easily) reproducible with this
simple model. To do this, we choose to increase . However, as that will most
likely also raise the kurtosis, we choose  a little lower. The values used in
the next simulation are  = 4.5 and  = 1.1. These changes in the parameters102 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
together will make (most) autocorrelations in returns disappear again. All
other settings remain the same as before. We present the results in Table 4.7
and Figure 4.12.
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.029 1.738 0.015 0.068
2 0.108 0.015 1.972 0.044
3 0.123 0.068 0.044 1.886
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.034 3.638 17.131 12 = 0.008
2 0.094 3.449 9.883 13 = 0.037
3 0.096 3.295 5.165 23 = 0.023
Table 4.7: Summary statistics of the benchmark economy.
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Figure 4.12: Autocorrelations of the benchmark economy; assets in
rows, return in column 1, squared returns in column
2, absolute returns in column 3.
As we observe in Figure 4.12, the autocorrelations in returns disappeared
almost due to the change in the parameters. A single negative correlation
in returns for lag two actually remains as well as one on lag one for asset 1.
Because this economy is able to reproduce some of the stylized facts mentioned
in Cont (2001), such as excess kurtosis and almost no autocorrelation in returns,
we select this economy to form the benchmark for future extensions.Section 4.2 Benchmark Selection 103
Multiple Runs of the Benchmark Model 4.2.5
The ﬁnal section of this chapter is devoted to describing and discussing the
results of multiple runs of the benchmark model. As we pointed out before,
the assets seem different in the experiments shown so far. However, as all
assets have the same parameters, we expect them to behave the same. One
way to ﬁnd out whether they are really the same is by running the benchmark
economy several times, each time with a different seed for the random number
generator. We ran the benchmark economy of section 4.2.4 1000 times. The
results are presented in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.13.
Statistic Average Std 2.5% 97.5%
Mean 1 0.088 0.026 0.033 0.137
Mean 2 0.088 0.025 0.039 0.141
Mean 3 0.089 0.026 0.037 0.140
2
1 2.167 0.703 1.564 4.169
12 0.006 0.066  0.127 0.141
13 0.000 0.064  0.126 0.122
2
2 2.211 0.850 1.551 4.672
23 0.003 0.063  0.128 0.131
2
3 2.139 0.776 1.543 4.510
Skewness 1 0.075 0.084  0.093 0.245
Skewness 2 0.069 0.090  0.113 0.238
Skewness 3 0.068 0.091  0.099 0.234
Kurtosis 1 3.393 0.217 3.037 3.842
Kurtosis 2 3.382 0.225 3.010 3.828
Kurtosis 3 3.392 0.215 2.983 3.826
Jarque-Bera 1 10.507 9.737 0.537 36.785
Jarque-Bera 2 10.303 10.070 0.327 33.983
Jarque-Bera 3 10.481 9.313 0.537 33.472
12 0.003 0.031  0.063 0.063
13 0.000 0.031  0.061 0.059
23 0.001 0.030  0.059 0.059
Table 4.8: Statistics of the multiple runs of the benchmark econ-
omy. The second column lists the average, the third the
standard deviation, the fourth 2.5% quantile and the
last the 97.5% quantile.
The table lists the average, the standard deviation, the 2.5% quantile and
the 97.5% quantile for each of the sample statistics as we also presented them104 A Benchmark Artiﬁcial Financial Market Model Chapter 4
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Figure 4.13: Autocorrelations of the multiple runs of the bench-
mark economy; assets in rows, return in column 1,
squared returns in column 2, absolute returns in col-
umn 3.
in the tables earlier in this chapter. Note that  is used to denote the covariance
matrix entries.
We notice ﬁrst of all that the results are very comparable across assets.
Further, the assets are uncorrelated and have a signiﬁcant positive return. The
second thing we notice, is that the average return of asset 1 in the benchmark
economy of section 4.2.4, 0.029, may seem outside the 95% conﬁdence interval
as found in this section, suggesting that the experiment presented there was
in the tail of the distribution of returns generated by the benchmark economy.
But as the benchmark economy is a random realization of the model, it is
representative for the model by construction.
The solid curves in Figure 4.13 show the average autocorrelations of returns,
squared returns, and absolute returns, respectively. The dotted curves represent
the pointwise 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles which give an impression of the range
of the autocorrelations over the different runs of the benchmark model. We
notice that the autocorrelations of absolute and squared returns are zero on
average, but that there is a little bit of correlation in the returns, speciﬁcally at
lag 2.Section 4.3 Conclusions 105
Conclusions 4.3
This chapter has introduced an artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market framework that, from
the point of view of the artiﬁcial market literature, contains both more tra-
ditional concepts (such as the fundamentalists) and relatively new concepts
(such as including multiple risky assets in the market). We have shown basic
properties of this ﬁnancial market and the effects of parameter changes. The
effects of changes to the parameters of fundamentalist agents to autocorre-
lations in returns and to the kurtosis of returns, allow us to remove (most
of) the autocorrelations of returns and calibrate the kurtosis. We selected the
economy with 50% fundamentalists and 50% mean-variance agents to serve
as a benchmark ﬁnancial market model as it offers a good starting point for
extensions such as rule switching. This and other extensions will be discussed
in chapter 5.5
Perturbations and Extensions of the
Benchmark Model
In chapter 4, we developed a multi-asset artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market model in
which fundamentalists and MV agents live and trade assets. We studied the
properties of the resulting price and return series and the sensitivity of the
results to some of the parameters of the model, which led to the benchmark
model.
In this chapter, we will extend the benchmark model. As ﬁrst extensions we
will investigate the effects of parameter changes and additional heterogeneity in
the model. In particular, we will study the effects of two forms of heterogeneity
for fundamentalists, namely, along the relation between the speed of adjustment
() and the responsiveness to price deviations () derived in chapter 4, and
orthogonal to that relation. We will also study the effects of short memory MV
agents, and of a longer planning horizon of MV agents. The short memory MV
agents represent investors that want to react to the latest trends in asset prices
and hence consider a shorter past when forecasting the future. MV agents that
use a longer forecast horizon try to optimize their investment decisions over
a longer period of time. However, they will still be allowed to adjust their
portfolio each period.
Furthermore, we will extend the model to allow both the fundamentalists
and the MV agents to select a rule for forecasting the expected return of each
asset, based on the performance of that rule. The rules that the agents use
may be different at each period in time. We will refer to this concept as rule
switching. It is mostly inspired on, for instance, LeBaron (2002a) and LeBaron
(2002b). We will also apply this concept to the forecasting of the covariance108 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
matrix by MV agents. Finally, we will show an economy in which we allow
some agents to choose between being a fundamentalist or an MV agent. We
will refer to this concept as type switching and is inspired on, for instance, Brock
and Hommes (1998). We will also show the long run properties of the economy
in which all the agents can use rule switching and some of the agents also type
switching.
We conclude the chapter by investigating in more detail to what extent the
models in this chapter can replicate well known stylized facts of asset returns,
such as aggregational Gaussianity, volatility clustering and volume/volatility
correlation (see Cont (2001)).
5.1 Eﬀects of Changes to Agent Properties
This section will investigate the effects of introducing heterogeneity in funda-
mentalist agents and changes to memory parameters of the MV agents. We
describe in detail the effects of changes to the properties of the agents. This
analysis helps in determining which features of asset prices and returns are
potentially caused by which parameter settings.
5.1.1 Fundamentalist Heterogeneity in the Benchmark Model
We start by investigating the sensitivity of the benchmark model as developed in
chapter 4 to heterogeneity in  and , the parameters for portfolio adjustments
done by the fundamentalists (see formula (4.3)). In that chapter, we found that
 = 4.5 and  = 1.1 produce excess kurtosis and (almost) no autocorrelations
in asset returns in the benchmark model. The following economy demonstrates
what happens if we introduce heterogeneity into these parameters. The 100
fundamentalists (living in the economy in addition to 100 MV agents) will be
equipped with an i drawn randomly from the uniform distribution over the
interval of 10% around 4.5. The i are generated from the i through the






with "i, a noise term for generating the i, drawn from the normal distributionSection 5.1 Eﬀects of Changes to Agent Properties 109
with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.02 and c chosen such that the average
of the resulting i is equal to 1.1, the value for  used in the homogeneous
benchmark model. This resulted in c =  0.2707.
As in chapter 4, we run each simulation for 5000 periods, selecting the last
1000 to be presented here. The ﬁrst 4000 periods are used to let the economy
start up. Notice again that we ﬁxed the seed over individual simulations to
make them comparable.
We include an overview with some sample statistics in Table 5.1. The tables
in this chapter contain the same statistics as the tables in chapter 4. The table
includes sample means and the covariance matrix of asset returns in percent-
ages. Further, it includes the skewness, kurtosis, and Jarque-Bera statistics.
These are used to judge the normality of the asset return distribution. Finally,
the correlations between asset returns are included in the table. Remember
that the time period is one week.
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.029 1.713 0.008 0.065
2 0.108 0.008 1.949 0.048
3 0.124 0.065 0.048 2.054
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.029 3.705 20.857 12 = 0.005
2 0.086 3.451 9.713 13 = 0.034
3 0.091 3.336 6.079 23 = 0.024
Table 5.1: Summary statistics of the economy with heterogeneous
fundamentalists with positively correlated i and i.
From Table 5.1, we see that the average return of asset 1 is 0.029%, which
is 1.51% annualized. This is low compared to the last asset which has an
annual return of 6.41%. The excess kurtosis suggests a non-normal distribution
of asset returns, which is conﬁrmed by the Jarque-Bera statistic of all assets.
These are greater than 5.99, which is the critical value for the 5% signiﬁcance
level.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the simulated prices, returns, and autocorrelations
of returns, respectively. From the relatively small shocks in returns, it can be
seen that the regulator did not need to come into action in this simulation.
When comparing these results to those in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.12, we
see only small differences in the variance of asset returns and in the kurtosis.110 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
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Figure 5.1: Prices and returns (in %) of the economy with hetero-
geneous fundamentalists with positively correlated i
and i; assets in rows, prices in column 1, returns in
column 2.
This changed the Jarque-Bera statistic also slightly, but asset returns remain
non-normal.
Overall, the economy behaves very much the same as the economy without
heterogeneity in fundamentalists. This is most likely caused by the fact that the
fundamentalists all have an - combination on the line for which we found
that it produces almost no autocorrelation (see section 4.2.1) and from the fact
that the average  and  are the same as in the benchmark model. On the
other hand, one may note that the value of the variance of "i is too low and
hence caused this result. Unfortunately, a slightly larger value leads to market
crashes.
Conversely, these results suggest an identiﬁcation problem. When we would
try to estimate the model by ﬁtting characteristics like mean, variance, and
kurtosis, we would not be able to make a distinction between this model and
the benchmark model. In this case, a normalization of either  or  would be
needed.
The next experiment studies the effects of heterogeneity in  and , but
perpendicular to the line that we found in section 4.2.1. The i will again be
drawn from the uniform distribution over the interval of 10% around 4.5. TheSection 5.1 Eﬀects of Changes to Agent Properties 111
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Figure 5.2: Autocorrelations of the economy with heterogeneous
fundamentalists with positively correlated i and i;
assets in rows, return in column 1, squared returns in
column 2, absolute returns in column 3.









with "i again drawn from the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation 0.02 and with c chosen such that the average of the resulting i is
equal to 1.1. This resulted in c = 5.9518. Summary statistics of this simulation
can be found in Table 5.2 and the autocorrelation patterns in Figure 5.3.
We notice that these settings have caused the variance to increase slightly.
This, in turn, made the kurtosis decrease and the result is that normality of
the assets returns cannot be rejected anymore, judging from the Jarque-Bera
statistic. Hence, this simulation seems to have provided a way to control the
non-normality of asset returns. The increase in the variance is probably due
to bigger shocks introduced by agents with an - combination that is “far
away” from the - relation found in chapter 4. However, due to the nonlinear
inﬂuence of , the exact cause is hard to ﬁnd. Notice ﬁnally, that these results
indicate that in an estimation context, the correlation between  and  is
probably identiﬁable, but, as argued before, not the parameters individually.112 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.032 2.201 0.000 0.085
2 0.109 0.000 2.176 0.040
3 0.125 0.085 0.040 2.206
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.054 3.166 1.649 12 = 0.000
2 0.112 3.098 2.472 13 = 0.039
3 0.066 3.032 0.776 23 = 0.018
Table 5.2: Summary statistics of the economy with heterogeneous
fundamentalists with negatively correlated i and i.
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Figure 5.3: Autocorrelations of the economy with heterogeneous
fundamentalists with negatively correlated i and i;
assets in rows, return in column 1, squared returns in
column 2, absolute returns in column 3.
5.1.2 Short Memory MV Agents
The effect of memory length of agents has been a property of interest, see, for
instance LeBaron (2001c, 2002c), and Chiarella et al. (2006a). Agents with a
shorter memory might represent investors that try to react quickly to the latest
trends in asset prices. As such, they use less and only more recent informationSection 5.1 Eﬀects of Changes to Agent Properties 113
when forming their beliefs over the assets’ expected returns and covariance
matrix.
We will present an experiment with shorter memory MV agents in this
section. We start from the benchmark model with 100 homogeneous funda-
mentalists and 100 MV agents, now with memory lengths varying between
200 and 400 periods (instead of between 600 and 800 as in the benchmark
model). The results can be found in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4. These results
can be compared to the results in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.12.
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.031 2.100 0.033 0.013
2 0.111 0.033 2.581 0.013
3 0.130 0.013 0.013 3.237
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1  0.046 3.278 3.565 12 = 0.014
2 0.121 3.567 15.852 13 = 0.005
3 0.148 3.178 4.991 23 = 0.005
Table 5.3: Summary statistics of the economy with short memory
MV agents.
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Figure 5.4: Autocorrelations of the economy with short memory
MV agents; assets in rows, return in column 1, squared
returns in column 2, absolute returns in column 3.114 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
A noteworthy result is that the variance of asset returns has increased a
lot. This is due to the fact that the MV agents use less information to estimate
the expected return and covariance matrix to compute their optimal portfolio.
This causes more variability between estimates across different time periods.
This translates into bigger price shocks and hence larger absolute returns.
Further, we observe that the autocorrelation patterns changed slightly. Some
autocorrelations of returns on the ﬁrst few lags are signiﬁcantly different from
zero. We can conclude that the memory length of the MV agents might be a
good handle to control the variance of asset returns.
5.1.3 MV Agents with Longer Planning Horizons
This section investigates the effects of a multiple-period planning horizon for
the MV agents. The reason for investors having a longer planning horizon
could be, for instance, longer term commitments. We implement this using the
optimal portfolio solution in equation (4.4) and using constant forecasts for
the expected return and covariance matrix for the entire planning horizon. We
let each agent plan 52 periods (one year) ahead, but still let them reevaluate
their portfolio every period. The summary statistics of the returns from this
simulation are in Table 5.4.
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.029 1.758 0.068 0.149
2 0.108 0.068 2.190 0.259
3 0.124 0.149 0.259 2.027
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.068 3.568 14.198 12 = 0.035
2 0.106 3.320 6.135 13 = 0.079
3 0.095 3.523 12.886 23 = 0.123
Table 5.4: Summary statistics of the economy with MV agents with
longer planning horizon.
When comparing these results to those of the benchmark economy in
Table 4.7, we notice that the volatility has increased a little bit. Also, the asset
returns are more correlated now, especially assets 2 and 3. But one might have
expected more signiﬁcant differences due to the fact that Bi,t+k  1 in equationSection 5.2 Rule Switching 115
(4.4)1 causing asset demand to be increasing in the length of the planning
horizon Ti (assuming constant forecasts). This might lead to more variability
in portfolios and hence in returns due to the fact that the estimated parameter
Bi,t+k has a larger inﬂuence.
The reason for the modest changes is the fact that the simulation is aligned
to the initially generated information by calibrating the total supply at the start
of the simulation.2 Hence, although the level of demand and demand changes
(trading) is higher in absolute terms, the relative changes, which determine
the returns via prices, are of approximately the same magnitude. Notice ﬁnally
that the MV agents do dominate the market at the start of the simulation due
to the increased demand, holding the majority of the assets, but the economy
converges to a more even distribution of assets in a few periods. We conclude
that the initial calibration removes (most of) the effect of the higher level of
demand of MV agents.
Rule Switching 5.2
This section will introduce rule switching in the benchmark model developed
in chapter 4. The idea of rule switching is inspired on the research by, for
instance, LeBaron (2002a,b,c), and LeBaron et al. (1999). In these articles,
there are many rules available and the agents have to choose one of them every
few periods. The rules evolve using genetic algorithms. Hence, some rules
might perform better than others over time and agents will choose the better
performing rule.
Our approach to rule switching is inspired from an econometric point of
view. An econometrician might try some models to see which of them forecasts


























and apply Lemma 1 of Bekker (1986) on page 68 to the latter matrix which is positive semi-














 0, which establishes
the result.
2See footnote 7 of chapter 4 on page 88.116 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
the best and use that model.3 To be able to choose the best rule, the agents
should know how to evaluate the performance of a rule. The performance is
measured in terms of the Exponentially Weighted Mean Squared Prediction
Error (EWMSPE), following LeBaron (2002b). Every period, agent i computes
the performance (v) of each prediction rule l 2 Li, with Li the set of rules




















the return on asset j as
predicted by agent i using rule l at time t  1. For , we choose 1=75 as used in
LeBaron (2002b). As argued by LeBaron, this setting tries to capture the latest
news about the rule performance while still maintaining an accurate estimate
of the forecast performance.
Note that the EWMSPE has an interpretation of costs. If the EWMSPE
is relatively high, this indicates a rule that forecasts badly, possibly leading
to suboptimal investment decisions. Using a rule might have extra costs in
addition to these EWMSPE “costs”. For instance, it is costly to collect data and
do an econometric analysis.4 We implement the rule costs by increasing the
EWMSPE of the rule. The costs of a rule l 2 Li, the set of rules available to













0 representing the constant costs for rule l and l
1 the variable costs
and with "l






always select for each asset j individually the rule with the lowest costs to be
used in the next period, namely argminl V l
,i,j,t. The cost function is ﬂexible
enough to make agents all choose a particular rule or keep them switching over
time between rules.
In the next subsection, we introduce a new rule for fundamentalists in the
benchmark model and allow them to switch between these rules. In the second
subsection, the same will be done for MV agents.
3Note explicitly that the relevant question is not whether the model ﬁts well, but whether it
predicts well.
4Or to hire a ﬁnancial advisor to do the analysis.Section 5.2 Rule Switching 117
Rule Switching for Fundamentalists 5.2.1
We recall from chapter 4 that fundamentalists use an adjustment rule (equation
(4.3)) to determine their demand in this period. They base their decision on a
forecast of the fundamental price, which, in turn, is based on a prediction of
this period’s dividend. In chapter 4 the fundamentalists used the last known
dividend to predict the dividend of this period. However, that may not be a
very good choice because of the trend in dividends. In this chapter, we allow
them to choose a different rule.
We consider rules that are evaluated using the forecasted errors for the
returns. The fundamentalists do not forecast a return, but the fundamental
price. To have a uniform rule switching mechanism, we model the returns that





tion before observing St 1 and Dt 1 would require forecasting the fundamental
price two periods ahead as this also requires Sf,i,j,t, in addition to predicting
Sf,i,j,t 1. We assume that fundamentalists make the return prediction after



























dividend payment in time t according to the model used by agent i. However,
fundamentalists might believe that the fundamental prices will realize in the
long run, not immediately. Hence, they know that these fundamental prices
might imply returns that are very far off the actual realizations. Therefore, they
will not use the implied returns directly for computing the forecast errors and
making rule decisions. Instead, they estimate the following regression for each
asset j
Rj = i0 +i1Rf,i,j, +"f,j,,  = t   Mi,...,t  1,









= 0. After estimation, the forecasted return, which will be used118 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5







= b i0 + b i1Rf,i,j,t.
The forecast error in formula (5.1) hence becomes a perceived forecast error,
namely as observed by the individual fundamentalist. Below is an overview of
the two available rules related to Rf,i,j,t for the fundamentalists.
Last dividend rule





of asset j using the last
known dividend Dj,t 1. This is one of the simplest methods of predicting
the non-stationary dividend process. This is also a special case of
similarity analysis, see, for instance Gilboa et al. (2006).
Dividend trend prediction


























= 0. Fundamentalists using
this rule will estimate cDj using the sample average of ﬁrst order dif-












, where b cDj denotes the estimate of cDj.5 This
is a more advanced method of prediction the non-stationary dividend
process.
We demonstrate the rule switching of fundamentalists in the benchmark model.
For this simulation, we allow each of the 100 fundamentalists to choose be-
tween the two rules that we described above. For the costs in formula (5.2), we
set l
0 = 0, l
1 = 1, and l
 = 0 for each rule l and hence, the rule selection
will be based solely on the forecast performance of the individual rules.
Table 5.5 contains the summary statistics for this simulation and Figure 5.5
contains the autocorrelation patterns. When comparing these results with
5Notice that Sf,i,j,t is also based on this prediction of dividends since no new information





and Sf,i,j,t.Section 5.2 Rule Switching 119
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.029 1.738 0.014 0.067
2 0.108 0.014 1.973 0.044
3 0.123 0.067 0.044 1.885
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.030 3.621 16.211 12 = 0.008
2 0.093 3.445 9.697 13 = 0.037
3 0.096 3.297 5.220 23 = 0.023
Table 5.5: Statistics of the economy with rule switching for funda-
mentalists.
those of the benchmark economy in Tables 4.7 and 4.12, we observe almost
no changes. Only the variance of asset returns has changed very slightly. The
reason is that the different rules will predict dividends that might be very close
to each other because of the low value of the trend parameter cDj. Hence, they
predict more or less the same fundamental prices and also portfolio adjustments.
This can also be seen from Figure 5.6 which shows the perceived forecast error
of the two rules for a particular fundamentalist agent.
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Figure 5.5: Autocorrelations of the economy with rule switching
for fundamentalists; assets in rows, return in column
1, squared returns in column 2, absolute returns in
column 3.120 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
Due to the settings of the cost parameters, these ﬁgures reveal the forecast
error. Figure 5.7 shows the fraction of fundamentalists using the last dividend
rule and hence indicates the differences in costs between the two rules.
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Figure 5.6: Forecast error for the assets for the last dividend rule
(solid curve) and the dividend trend rule (dotted curve)
as perceived by a particular fundamentalist.
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Figure 5.7: Fraction of fundamentalists using the last dividend rule
for each asset.Section 5.2 Rule Switching 121
This ﬁgure shows that from time to time, all fundamentalists are using the
last dividend rule for a particular asset and at other times, all fundamentalists
are using the dividend trend prediction rule. But there are also extended
periods in time where part of the fundamentalists uses one rule, the other part
the other rule. The fact that this rule switching does not produce any features
like increased variance in asset returns, is solely due to the fact that the rules
predict very similar fundamental prices.
Rule Switching for Mean-Variance Agents 5.2.2
The next experiment will focus on the effects of allowing MV agents to switch
rules to forecast the mean return on the assets. We propose two rules.
Average rule
This is the rule used by MV agents in the benchmark model. The






















is predicted using the median of the
observations in the memory of the agent, namely Rt Mi,...,Rt 1. This
might be a better forecast rule for the mean return than the sample
average rule in case there are outliers in the returns.
First, we investigate the effects of the median rule for MV agents in the bench-
mark model by giving them access to only this rule. The sample statistics are
in Table 5.6. This shows results very close to those of the benchmark model.
The only noteworthy difference is the slight increase in variance of the asset
returns. The autocorrelation patterns in Figure 5.8 also show the similarity of
the results with those of the benchmark model.
Next, we allow the agents to switch between using the average and median
rule. For the costs in formula (5.2), we again set l
0 = 0, l
1 = 1, and l
 = 0122 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.031 1.957  0.130 0.094
2 0.110  0.130 2.326 0.068
3 0.126 0.094 0.068 2.485
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.103 3.545 14.142 12 =  0.061
2 0.154 3.468 13.114 13 = 0.043
3 0.039 2.983 0.271 23 = 0.028
Table 5.6: Summary statistics of the economy in which MV agents
use the median rule.
for each rule l. The summary statistics of the last 1000 periods of the resulting
simulation are in Table 5.7.
When comparing these results to those of the benchmark economy in
Table 4.7, the differences are very clear: mean, variance, kurtosis, and Jarque-
Bera statistics all increased by a considerable amount. For instance, the annu-
alized volatility on the third asset now is 20.29%. How this is caused, can be
seen from Figure 5.9 which contains the prices and returns over time of this
simulation.
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Figure 5.8: Autocorrelations of the economy in which MV agents
use the median rule; assets in rows, return in column
1, squared returns in column 2, absolute returns in
column 3.Section 5.2 Rule Switching 123
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.033 2.491  0.119 0.104
2 0.124  0.119 5.197 0.002
3 0.155 0.104 0.002 7.918
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.071 4.494 93.875 12 =  0.033
2 0.147 5.452 254.146 13 = 0.023
3 0.133 6.614 547.054 23 = 0.000
Table 5.7: Summary statistics of the economy with rule switching
for MV agents.
From this ﬁgure, we see that there is volatility clustering within the asset
return, meaning that there are periods of high and periods of low volatility.
This reproduces a stylized fact present in real asset return data as reported
in Cont (2001). Another noteworthy aspect of the results in Figure 5.9 is that
the different assets contain the volatility clustering at different time periods.
The high volatility periods cause the overall sample variance to increase.
The large shocks in turn increase the kurtosis. Non-normality of asset returns
is the consequence, as indicated by the Jarque-Bera statistics. We notice
speciﬁcally that these results are not caused by the regulator as he only had to
take action in less than 10 periods during this simulation.
Figure 5.10 suggests a cause of the observed volatility clustering. The ﬁgure
shows the fraction of MV agents using the average rule to forecast the mean
returns of the assets. When comparing Figures 5.9 and 5.10, we notice that
the periods of high return volatility occur during periods in which many MV
agents switch heavily between using the average rule and using the median
rule. During these times, the forecasted returns might change more rapidly
than at other times due to the fact that the rule that the MV agents are using
switches often. These more volatile forecasted returns induce more volatile
portfolio holdings and hence more volatile prices and returns.
Figure 5.11 depicts the rule costs of the rules for a particular MV agent over
time. Remember that due to the settings of the costs function parameters, these
ﬁgures also reﬂect the forecast errors. The ﬁgures show that during periods in
which many agents keep switching from one rule to the other and back, the
forecast error of the different rules for predicting the mean return of the assets
increases. This implies that it becomes harder to predict the asset return. This124 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
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Figure 5.9: Prices and returns (in %) of the economy with rule
switching for MV agents; assets in rows, prices in col-
umn 1, returns in column 2.
does not seem at all strange when looking at the returns in Figure 5.9. We also
observe (especially for asset 3) that when time progresses, the rules become
better again in predicting the asset return, namely when there is another period
of low return volatility. The fact that the rule costs decline only gradually is
due to the exponential weighting in the forecast error function (see formula
(5.1)).
We conclude this section with Figure 5.12 which shows the autocorrelation
patterns of returns. We notice that many signiﬁcant autocorrelations have been
introduced in returns. This is caused by the high volatility periods in which
both the rules used and the returns generated change rapidly. Nevertheless, it
is interesting to see that the mechanism of rule switching for MV agents can
generate volatility clustering as also appears in real life return data. Notice that
this mechanism of generating volatility clustering differs from the mechanism
in, for instance, Alfarano and Lux (2007), Lux and Marchesi (1999), and
Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007). In these articles, the high volatility periods
are caused by the fact that in those periods, agents that generate higher
volatility, such as noise agents, dominate the market. Our results show that
the different rules for MV agents do not differ very much, and hence that the
switching itself generates the high volatility periods.Section 5.2 Rule Switching 125
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Figure 5.10: Fraction of MV agents using the average rule for each
asset.
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Figure 5.11: Rule costs for the assets of the average rule (solid
curve) and the median rule (dotted curve, underneath
the solid curve) as perceived by an MV agent with
memory length 791 periods.126 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
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Figure 5.12: Autocorrelations of the economy with rule switching
for MV agents; assets in rows, return in column 1,
squared returns in column 2, absolute returns in col-
umn 3.
5.3 Covariance Rule Switching
MV agents’ investment decisions depend on both the mean and the covariance
matrix of the returns. In section 5.2.2 we allowed these agents to use different
rules to estimate the mean returns (as from now on called mean rule switching).
In this section we extend this idea to the modeling of the covariance matrix.
This builds on existing literature. Learning about the covariance matrix of asset
returns is allowed in, for instance, He (2003) and Chiarella et al. (2007). We
already assumed that the MV agents estimate the covariance matrix directly.
They are now allowed to choose between two different rules for estimating the
covariance matrix. They will evaluate these rules at every time period and will
select the best performing rule.
Sample covariance
This is the rule that MV agents have used so far. The covariance matrixSection 5.3 Covariance Rule Switching 127





























This rule models the covariance matrix with an AR(1) process. As
(co)variances of asset returns might not be stable over time, this model
might perform better in forecasting the covariance matrix than the











with  = t   Mi,...,t  1. Then we model i,j,k,t, the covariance matrix
entry for assets j,k = 1,...,J, as
i,j,k, = cA,i,j,k +Aii,j,k, 1 +"
l
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= b cA,i,j,k + b Aii,j,k,t 1
with b cA,i,j,k and b Ai the estimated values for cA,i,j,k and Ai, respectively.
Note explicitly that we assume the AR coefﬁcient to be equal in all equa-
tions formed by the covariance matrix entries, otherwise the predicted
covariance matrix might become singular or even negative deﬁnite.
To be able to choose between the rules, covariance rules are evaluated in
a similar way as the mean rules. The forecasted covariance matrices are
compared to the outer product of forecast errors, it. This matrix is compared
to the forecasted covariance matrix by rule l, Covl
it(Rt+1) by means of the total





















6Notice that both are based on the same information.128 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5












with l 2 Li a covariance rule from the set of rules Li which are available to
the agent and with "l





First, we evaluate again what happens if the MV agents can only use the
new rule. The remaining settings are equal to those in the benchmark model.
The results are presented in Table 5.8 and Figures 5.13 and 5.14.
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.181 31.476  2.955 2.247
2 0.374  2.955 57.074 4.700
3 0.364 2.247 4.700 49.403
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.201 5.487 264.375 12 =  0.070
2 0.553 6.682 616.008 13 = 0.057
3 0.757 9.405 1805.019 23 = 0.089
Table 5.8: Summary statistics of the economy with MV agents using
the ARCH rule.
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Figure 5.13: Prices and returns (in %) of the economy with MV
agents using the ARCH rule; assets in rows, prices in
column 1, returns in column 2.Section 5.3 Covariance Rule Switching 129
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Figure 5.14: Autocorrelations of the economy with with MV agents
using the ARCH rule; assets in rows, return in column
1, squared returns in column 2, absolute returns in
column 3.
The main observation of this experiment is that the use of the ARCH rule
generated a clearly visible volatility clustering in the returns. Further, the big
return shocks have caused the variance to increase by a signiﬁcant amount.
Also, the average return has increased. For instance, the ﬁrst asset now has an
average (excess) return of 9.41% on a yearly basis and a volatility of 40.46%
on a yearly basis.
Next, we allow the MV agents to switch between the covariance rules
on the basis of the performance measure that we deﬁned. For the following
experiment, we set l
0 = 0 for the sample covariance rule and l
0 = 410 6
for the ARCH rule. Further, we set l
1 = 1 and l
 = 1  10 6 for both the
sample covariance rule and the ARCH rule. When inspecting the resulting
ﬁgures and sample statistics of the returns over periods 4000 to 5000, we
noticed a signiﬁcant similarity with the earlier results in this section. Sample
periods 2000 to 3000 reveal the cause. Figure 5.15 depicts the price and return
series of this sample.
These results show a structural break around the middle of the sample
period. We also observe that the regulator is very active from the returns130 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
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Figure 5.15: Prices and returns (in %) of the economy with covari-
ance rule switching; assets in rows, prices in column
1, returns in column 2.
that are limited until the end of the sample period. This can also be seen in
Figure 5.16 which depicts the actions of the regulator. The reasons for the
increasing absolute returns is the fact that there is feedback of information to
the regulator. He allows shocks of at most 4 times the standard deviation of
the past 2000 periods of returns. Large shocks increase this standard deviation,
which, in turn, will let the regulator allow larger shocks in consecutive periods.
The reason for the many actions by the regulator is the fact that all MV
agents switch to using the ARCH rule during that time (see Figure 5.17), which
has a big impact on the economy. The regulator controls the shocks to avoid
crashes and slowly allows bigger returns to realize which has the result that he
does not intervene much anymore at the end of the sample.
This sample shows a state of transition of the economy from an economy
that resembles the benchmark economy, to an economy that is much more like
the economy presented earlier in this section because the MV agents do not
return to using the sample covariance rule anymore. We veriﬁed this by running
this economy for 10000 periods. It turned out that during these periods the
MV agents indeed did not switch back to using the sample covariance rule. The
reason is that the ARCH rule immediately introduces very clear ARCH effects
in the returns as illustrated by Figure 5.13. The obvious result is that the ARCHSection 5.3 Covariance Rule Switching 131
rule will be much better in predicting the covariance matrix than the sample
covariance rule. This can be seen in Figure 5.18 which depicts the costs of the
two covariance rules.
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Figure 5.16: Regulator actions in the economy with covariance
rule switching; 1 indicates limiting a positive shock,
-1 indicates limiting a negative shock, 0 is no action.







Figure 5.17: Fraction of MV agents using the sample covariance
rule.132 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5









Figure 5.18: Rule costs of the sample covariance rule (solid curve)
and the ARCH rule (dashed curve) as perceived by an
MV agent with memory length 640 periods.
Notice that we did not report sample statistics or autocorrelations for this
sample of the simulation. The results for the ﬁrst subsample (before the
structural break) are comparable to those of the benchmark (see section 4.2.4)
as the agents are all using the sample covariance rule during that period of time.
The economy after the structural break is not yet stationary during this sample,
making sample statistics hard to interpret. But as mentioned, the economy will
become stationary in later samples and will then resemble the earlier results in
this section in which the MV agents only used the ARCH rule.
5.4 Type Switching
This section introduces type switching into the economy, which we deﬁne the
possibility for an agent to change from being a fundamentalist to being an
MV agent, or vice versa. Type switching originates from the idea that during
certain periods of time, the market may deviate substantially from (perceived)
fundamental values, due to optimism or pessimism at the asset markets, making
a fundamentalist strategy not the best strategy all the time. The fundamentalists
might hence want to choose to try a different strategy every now and then.Section 5.4 Type Switching 133
This mechanism has been used in many articles, including Brock and Hommes
(1998), Hommes et al. (2005), and Chiarella et al. (2007). Type switching is
referred to as herding behavior in those articles. However, we prefer to call it
type switching in this work to make a clear distinction with rule switching.
Modeling type switching in the benchmark model with rule switching
is a straightforward extension of the mechanisms we already introduced in
section 5.2. We have already deﬁned the way all rules are evaluated. With
type switching, we make it possible for fundamentalists to also try MV rules
and vice versa. In each period, each agent computes each of his rules and the
costs of using that rule. If an MV agent observes that a fundamentalist rule has
better performance, he chooses that rule for the next period.
For this simulation, 50% of the agents is fundamentalist, and 50% is MV
agent. We allow 1⁄3 of the fundamentalists to choose between becoming a
fundamentalist or MV agent each time period. A fundamentalist uses the last
dividend rule and an MV agent uses the average rule. We set l
0 = 0, l
1 = 1,
and l
 = 0.00004 for the average rule and l
0 = 0.00011, l
1 = 1, and
l
 = 0.00004 for the last dividend rule. An economic interpretation could be
that gathering the dividend information and modeling the fundamental price
might cost more (effort) than simply taking the sample average of past returns.
Summary statistics of this run are in Table 5.9. Figure 5.19 contains prices and
returns over time.
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.028 1.425 0.013 0.040
2 0.107 0.013 1.773 0.063
3 0.121 0.040 0.063 1.720
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.004 3.621 16.094 12 = 0.008
2 0.127 3.146 3.597 13 = 0.025
3 0.130 3.584 17.060 23 = 0.036
Table 5.9: Summary statistics of the economy with type switching.
These results show a slight decrease in average return and variance when
compared to the benchmark model. This is caused by the fact that in the
beginning of the sample the market was dominated slightly by MV agents. This
can be seen in Figure 5.20, which shows the fraction of agents being an MV
agent over time. The MV agents have the tendency to generate less volatile134 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
returns. This can be seen in Figure 5.19. Figure 5.21 shows the rule costs of
the last dividend rule (for a fundamentalist) and of the average rule (for an
MV agent). It may be difﬁcult to see from this ﬁgure, but it appeared that
the average rule has slightly lower costs in the beginning of the sample for
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Figure 5.19: Prices and returns (in %) of the economy with type
switching; assets in rows, prices in column 1, returns
in column 2.
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Figure 5.20: Fraction of MV agents for each asset.Section 5.4 Type Switching 135
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Figure 5.21: Rule costs for the assets of the last dividend rule (fun-
damentalist, solid curve) and the average rule (MV ,
dotted curve) as perceived by a particular agent with
memory length 791 periods.
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Figure 5.22: Autocorrelations of the economy with type switching;
assets in rows, return in column 1, squared returns in
column 2, absolute returns in column 3.136 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
all assets, but larger costs at the end of the sample. Hence, the particular
agent for which this ﬁgure was plotted will choose to be an MV agent in the
beginning of the sample, but a fundamentalist later on. Other agents observe
similar performances of the different rules, judging from the slight domination
of MV agents in the beginning of the sample. Finally, Figure 5.22 displays
the autocorrelation patterns, which are very comparable to the patterns in the
benchmark model.
5.5 An Economy with Rule and Type Switching
In this section, we present results for the economy in which all agents are
allowed to use some form of rule switching and some of the agents are allowed
to switch type. The section aims at providing an insight in how the economy
behaves in the long run with all rule and type switching mechanisms engaged.
The setup is comparable to that of section 5.4, meaning that 50% of the
agents is a fundamentalist, 50% is an MV agent, and 1⁄3 of the fundamentalists
can choose between being a fundamentalist or an MV agent. However, in this
experiment, the fundamentalists (who include the agents who are allowed
to switch between being fundamentalist and MV and are fundamentalist at a
particular moment in time) are allowed to choose between different rules as
in section 5.2.1 and the MV agents are allowed to choose between rules as in
section 5.2.2. Hence, the agents that are allowed to switch type evaluate all of
the available rules at each moment in time. Finally, the MV agents are allowed
to switch between rules for forecasting the covariance matrix as in section 5.3.
First, we need to determine the parameter settings with respect to rule
costs. The rules should have approximately the same costs throughout the
simulation as otherwise the comparison of rules is rather unreasonable. The
costs for this simulation have been calibrated by letting the economy ﬁrst run
without allowing the agents to switch to determine the costs of the rules in
the benchmark model. The difference of the average rule costs (over assets)
between rules between periods 1000 and 2000 is then added as constant cost
for the rules with the lowest costs, taking the rule with the highest costs as
benchmark level. This led to l
0 = 1.617  10 4 for the last dividend rule,
l
0 = 1.61610 4 for the dividend trend prediction rule, l
0 = 1.69910 7Section 5.5 An Economy with Rule and Type Switching 137
for the mean rule, and l
0 = 0 for the median rule (which performed the worst
during the sample period). The variable costs l
1 are equal to 1 for all rules
and l
 = 0 for all rules. For the covariance rules, we set l
0 = 4.79410 7 for
the sample covariance rule and l
0 = 0 for the ARCH rule. The variable costs
of the covariance rules are also set to 1 and l
 = 0 for all covariance rules.
Hence, we do not use noise for mean rule switching nor for covariance rule
switching to concentrate attention to the switching patterns that the systematic
components in the economy generate themselves.
We ran the simulation for 50000 periods, which is around 961 years as we
are interested in the long run properties of this economy. Table 5.10 presents
the summary statistics of the last 10000 periods. Figures 5.23 and 5.24 show the
prices and returns generated by the model, and the autocorrelations patterns.7
Asset Mean (%) Covariance matrix (%)
1 0.185 22.225 0.438 0.514
2 0.110 0.438 6.451 0.336
3 0.250 0.514 0.336 34.143
Asset Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Correlations
1 0.194 5.335 2333.565 12 = 0.037
2 0.028 4.100 505.218 13 = 0.019
3 0.286 5.592 2935.295 23 = 0.023
Table 5.10: Summary statistics of the economy with rule and type
switching.
We see that this model generated returns that have signiﬁcantly higher
volatility and excess kurtosis. Also, we observe volatility clustering in asset
returns and a strong rejection of normality of the asset returns.
It is interesting to see how the agents behave in this economy. We have
included Figures 5.25 and 5.26, which display the use of the different rules by
the agents over time. We observe that over time, both MV and fundamentalist
agents keep switching between their available rules. There is no structurally
better rule for each type and the agents adapt themselves to the situation,
selecting the best model for the job.
However, we also observe from these ﬁgures that there is no type switching,
meaning that no fundamentalist chooses to become an MV agent or the other
7Notice that we could reduce the amount of autocorrelation in returns by recalibrating the
fundamentalists to this economy.138 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
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Figure 5.23: Prices and returns (in %) of the economy with rule
and type switching; assets in rows, prices in column
1, returns in column 2.
way around. This can be seen from the dotted curves which display the
fraction of MV agents and the fraction of fundamentalists in the economy,
respectively. The reason for this is that the rules available to fundamentalists
perform better throughout the simulation. We also ran this economy while
initializing the agents that are allowed to switch type as MV agents instead
of as fundamentalists. The results were exactly the same with respect to type
switching: the agents choose to become a fundamentalist and do not switch
back anymore. We investigated the effects of raising the constant costs for the
fundamentalist rules to make these rules more comparable with the rules for
MV agents. However, once raised sufﬁciently such that fundamentalists indeed
switched to being an MV agent, this also changed the entire simulation, such
that the agents would never switch back again. There did not seem to be a
stable setting which would produce continuous switching as we observe among
fundamentalists and MV agents separately.8 Finally, as also found in section 5.3,
only the ARCH rule is used by the MV agents during this sample.
8Notice that we could use noise on the rule costs to induce type switching as in section 5.4,
but, as mentioned, this would also obfuscate the structures in rule switching generated purely
by the systematic components of the model.Section 5.5 An Economy with Rule and Type Switching 139
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Figure 5.24: Autocorrelations of the economy with rule and type
switching; assets in rows, return in column 1, squared
returns in column 2, absolute returns in column 3.
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Figure 5.25: Fraction of agents using the average rule for each asset
(solid curve) and the fraction of MV agents (dashed
curve).140 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
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Figure 5.26: Fraction of agents using the last dividend rule for each
asset (solid curve) and the fraction of fundamentalists
(dashed curve).
5.6 Stylized Facts
This section presents results with respect to reproducing stylized facts (see
Cont (2001)) using the artiﬁcial ﬁnancial model. When discussing the results
of the different economies, we covered mostly absence of autocorrelations,
heavy tails, volatility clustering, and slow decay of autocorrelations in absolute
returns. This section will summarize these results and also discuss the results
with respect to gain/loss asymmetry, aggregational Gaussianity, the leverage
effect (most measures of volatility of an asset are negatively correlated with its
returns), and volume/volatility correlation (trading volume is correlated with
all measures of volatility).9
The following list describes in detail which statistics have been used to test
the presence of stylized facts in the benchmark economy and economies using
9We do not investigate the stylized facts intermittency, asymmetry in time scales and
conditional heavy tails. Intermittency will probably always be present, whether we call one
period a day, a week, et cetera (though the dividend process should be adapted for a different
frequency). To study asymmetry in time scales, we would also need to have a model at a daily
basis. Investigating conditional heavy tails depends strongly on the somewhat arbitrary choice
of the GARCH model.Section 5.6 Stylized Facts 141
the rule and type switching extensions to the benchmark model, and how to
interpret them. The signiﬁcance level of 5% is used for all test. We investigate
the properties of the benchmark economy (economy 1, section 4.2.4), the
economy with rule switching for fundamentalists (economy 2, section 5.2.1),
the economy with rule switching for MV agents (economy 3, section 5.2.2), the
economy with MV agents using the ARCH rule (economy 4, section 5.3), the
economy with type switching (economy 5, section 5.4), and the economy with
both rule and type switching (economy 6, section 5.5). The resulting numbers
for all J = 3 assets are included in Table 5.12 in the appendix and summarized
in Table 5.11. The latter table lists a plus sign if the majority of the assets’
returns exhibit the speciﬁc stylized fact and a minus sign otherwise.10
Absence of autocorrelations
We report here the maximum absolute signiﬁcant autocorrelation of
asset returns, where we apply the Bonferroni correction (see Bonferroni
(1936)) to take the multiple tests into account. Using this correction, the
critical value for testing absence of autocorrelations becomes 0.10 for
sample size 1000 and 0.03 for sample size 10000. The autocorrelations
of returns are often empirically found to be small or even insigniﬁcant.
Hence, the statistic should be small. A value of zero would indicate
no signiﬁcant autocorrelations in returns at all. Rejections of absence
of autocorrelation will be marked with a star in Table 5.12. Notice
that this statistic is sensitive to outliers and hence an inspection of
the autocorrelation patterns reported in this chapter might give more
insight.
Heavy tails
The presence of heavy tails (or excess kurtosis) is judged using the
kurtosis. This should be signiﬁcantly larger then 3 (the kurtosis of the
normal distribution) for the presence of heavy tails. These cases are
marked with a star in Table 5.12. Notice that the kurtosis statistics
were also already included in the tables with sample statistics for each
economy individually.
10Notice that we computed these numbers using the returns including dividends. However,
due to relatively small dividends, the results for price returns differed only slightly numerically
and never lead to different conclusions with respect to replicating stylized facts or not.142 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
Gain/loss asymmetry
We computed here the average gain, that is, the average of the positive
returns, and the average loss, which is the absolute value of the average
of the negative returns. Cont (2001) mentions that the negative returns
are on average larger (in absolute value) than the positive returns.11
In Table 5.12 signiﬁcantly larger losses than gains are marked with a
star in both the row of average gains as well as losses, and signiﬁcantly
larger gains than losses with a minus sign.
Aggregational Gaussianity
This stylized fact means that if we increase the period over which the
returns are computed, the distribution of returns becomes more and
more like the normal distribution. In Table 5.12, we report the Jarque-
Bera statistic for returns computed over the period of 1 week (reported
also earlier), 4 weeks (approximately a month), and 12 weeks (approx-
imately a quarter of a year). The Jarque-Bera statistic should decrease
with increasing period. The 5% asymptotic critical value for rejecting the
null hypothesis of a normal distribution is 5.99. These cases are marked
with a star. Table 5.11 contains a plus sign if the majority of the assets
show decreasing Jarque-Bera statistics and a minus sign otherwise.
Volatility clustering
We follow He and Li (2007) by reporting the value of the statistic of
Engle’s ARCH test (see also Engle (1982)), which indicates whether
ARCH effects are present. We used 1 lag in the ARCH equation. Under
the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects, the test statistic has a chi-square
distribution with 1 degree of freedom, making the 5% critical value
3.84. Rejections of the null hypothesis are marked with a star.
Slow decay of autocorrelations in absolute returns (long memory)
For this stylized fact, we estimate the Chung (1999) speciﬁcation of
the FIGARCH(1,d,1) model as in He and Li (2007)12 and report the
long memory parameter d which indicates if long-range dependence is
present in the volatility. If d is signiﬁcantly different from 0 and 1, this
11However, this seems to be present predominantly in the ﬁnancial market index, but not in
the individual returns series, see LeBaron (2008).
12We thank Youwei Li for providing the code to estimate the model.Section 5.6 Stylized Facts 143
indicates long-range dependence in volatility (or long memory) and a
slow decay of the absolute and squared returns. These cases are marked
with a star.
Leverage eﬀect
The leverage effect is the fact that most measures of volatility are neg-
atively correlated with returns. We compute volatility using rolling
windows with sample length 100 periods. The correlation with returns
is in Table 5.12. The 5% critical values for testing whether these cor-
relations are signiﬁcantly positive or negative are 0.055 and 0.017 (in
absolute value) for sample sizes 900 and 9900, respectively. Signiﬁ-
cantly negative correlations are marked with a star and signiﬁcantly
positive correlations with a minus sign.
Volume/volatility correlation
In real asset data, trading volume and volatility are correlated. Volatility
is again computed using rolling windows. The trading volume is com-
puted from the consecutive portfolios of the agents. The critical values
are the same as for testing the leverage effect. Signiﬁcantly positive
correlations are marked with a star.
We will discuss the results listed in Table 5.11. First of all, we should notice
that these results are subject to a selection bias as we did not include economies
with crashes. Crashes would have a positive effect on reproducing gain/loss
asymmetry and the leverage effect in particular. Our economy, however, does
not have a means to overcome a crash.
From Table 5.11, we observe that all of the economies have autocorrelations
in returns to a certain extent. Further, all of the listed economies produce
heavy tails in the return distribution. In general, the gains and losses are
very comparable (also across economies, except for economies 4 and 6), with
gains sometimes a little larger than losses (see Table 5.12). In this respect,
the economies do not seem able to reproduce the stylized facts that losses are
larger than gains. However, as mentioned, this is subject to a selection bias.
So far, the results have been very consistent over different economies. But
when comparing the results for aggregational Gaussianity, we observe large
differences. Economy 1 shows decreasing values for the Jarque-Bera statistic144 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
Economies
1 2 3 4 5 6
Absence of autocorrelations            
Heavy tails + + + + + +
Gain/loss asymmetry            
Aggregational Gaussianity     +     +
Volatility clustering + + + + + +
Slow decay of autocorrelations
in absolute returns
+ + + +   +
Leverage effect            
Volume/volatility correlation + + + + + +
Table 5.11: Reproduction of stylized facts, “+” indicating “yes”, “ ”
indicating “no”. Economies: 1 – the benchmark econ-
omy (4.2.4), 2 – rule switching for fundamentalists
(5.2.1), 3 – rule switching for MV agents (5.2.2), 4 –
MV agents using ARCH rule (5.3), 5 – type switching
(5.4), and 6 – rule and type switching (5.5).
when going from a 1 week to a 4 weeks interval for computing the returns,
indicating aggregational Gaussianity. For that length of the period, normality of
asset returns cannot be rejected. But when increasing the period to 12 weeks,
the value of the Jarque-Bera statistic increases again, for some assets even lead-
ing to rejecting normality of the returns again. Hence, this economy does not
exhibit aggregational Gaussianity. Economies 2 and 5 show a similar pattern.
Economies 3 and 6 (except for asset 2), however, show decreasing values for
the Jarque-Bera statistic, indicating aggregational Gaussianity. Economy 4 only
shows decreasing values for the Jarque-Bera statistic for asset 1.
The next result, the ARCH test for volatility clustering is again very consis-
tent over the different models. All of the models listed in the table have strong
ARCH effects in the asset returns. Notice that we have also computed this test
statistic using up to 50 lags in the ARCH equation. This showed similar results
as listed in Table A6 in He and Li (2007), namely, that the value of the test
statistic increases with the number of lags included, ensuring rejection of the
null hypothesis of no ARCH effects.
The estimates of the long memory parameter show a very consistent long-
range dependence in volatility.13 Furthermore, this also indicates slow decay
13Except for one asset from model 3 which shows no integration in the volatility process
and two assets from model 5 which show a unit root in the conditional volatility process. We
should note that the estimation procedure probably reached the boundary in these cases.Section 5.7 Conclusions 145
of autocorrelations of absolute and squared returns. We should note that this
may not always be visible as these autocorrelations are rather small in some of
these models.
The ﬁnal two stylized facts that we investigated for the economies are again
very consistent across economies. The model appears only in a few cases to be
able to replicate the leverage effect, speciﬁcally in economy 4. But, again, these
results are subject to a selection bias. On the other hand, the volume/volatility
correlation is replicated by all of the investigated economies.
We conclude this section by concluding that, not surprisingly, not a single
model of those studied in this chapter can replicate all of the stylized facts,
but we reproduced a considerable number of them. The models that are
the most promising with respect to reproducing stylized facts are models 3
and 6, the model with rule switching for MV agents (section 5.2.2), and the
model with rule and type switching (section 5.5), respectively. But also the
model in which MV agents use the ARCH rule for forecasting the covariance
matrix (section 5.3) produces appealing results. Future research could focus
on improving these models to replicate even more stylized facts, for instance
by modeling the behavior of agents during crashes explicitly such that the
economy can overcome these crashes.
Conclusions 5.7
In this chapter, we investigated changes to a number of parameters in the
benchmark model that was developed in chapter 4. Furthermore, we investi-
gated the effects of additional heterogeneity in the properties of the economic
agents. These changes have shown several handles for controlling properties
of asset returns, for instance, kurtosis and normality by the method drawing
the speed of adjustment (i) and the responsiveness to price deviations (i),
and variance by changing the memory length of the MV agents. These handles
allow for a calibration of these asset return properties to actual return data,
which, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter.
We have also extended the benchmark model with rule and type switching.
The experiment with rule switching for fundamentalists did not result in very
large changes compared to the benchmark model, but the simulation with rule146 Perturbations and Extensions of the Benchmark Model Chapter 5
switching for MV agents, on the other hand, has shown a new mechanism for
generating volatility clustering with high volatility periods when agents switch a
lot between the rules and low volatility otherwise. Simulations with covariance
rule switching have demonstrated the superior forecast qualities of the ARCH
rule in this model and that it can generate volatility clustering. Furthermore,
the type switching experiment demonstrated the effects of allowing some
agents to choose between being a fundamentalist or being an MV agent, in
particular, lower volatility during times in which MV agents dominated the
market. Further, we studied an economy in which rule and type switching are
both enabled. We found that agents did switch forecasting rules heavily, but
did not choose to switch to another type.
This chapter concluded with analyzing the capabilities of replicating styl-
ized facts for some of the economies of this chapter. This analysis for the
stylized facts has shown that some results are very consistent over the different
economies (such as volatility clustering or ARCH effects) and other results are
very particular for the speciﬁc economy (such as aggregational Gaussianity).
When the goal would be to calibrate an artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market model as
presented in this thesis to actual return data, these results suggest to start with
a model in which MV agents are allowed to switch between several rules for
forecasting the expected return. The results could then be ﬁne-tuned by using
the handles such as heterogeneity in fundamentalists and the memory length
of MV agents. Further, modeling agent behavior during crashes explicitly might
help the economy surviving such crashes and help replicating, for instance,
gain/loss asymmetry and the leverage effect. This will be a possible subject of
future research.Section 5.A Appendix 147
Appendix 5.A
Economies
1 2 3 4 5 6
Absence of
autocorrelations
0.212 0.211 0.289 0.803 0.256 0.787
0.344 0.342 0.556 0.838 0.366 0.711
0.434 0.433 0.684 0.818 0.472 0.794
Heavy tails 3.638 3.621 4.494 5.487 3.621 5.335
3.449 3.445 5.452 6.682 3.146 4.100




1.031 1.029 1.177 3.845 0.929 3.416 
1.143  1.146  1.703  5.175  1.130  1.939 




1.025 1.028 1.215 3.949 0.940 3.250 
1.032  1.031  1.546  4.684  0.971  1.880 




17.131 16.211 93.875 264.375 16.094 2333.565
9.883 9.697 254.146 616.008 3.597 505.218




0.986 1.002 5.860 92.073 1.557 571.541
0.512 0.542 31.988 1188.231 2.810 46.455




1.680 1.656 3.337 37.480 1.502 290.717
10.781 10.836 14.070 397.306 14.185 74.694
5.884 5.992 5.278 588.338 5.618 900.115
Volatility
clustering
280.960 282.297 318.518 356.368 279.410 3193.616
300.772 301.114 360.252 338.171 317.219 3222.905




0.436 0.436 0.507 0.458 1.000 0.477
0.269 0.269 0.379 0.478 1.000 0.325
0.225 0.433 0.000 0.510 0.256 0.443
Leverage effect  0.024  0.024 0.018 0.011  0.029 0.015
0.036 0.036 0.011 0.034 0.036 0.014
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.033  0.001 0.019 
Volume/volatility
correlation
0.005 0.002 0.154 0.179 0.192 0.152
0.077 0.078 0.403 0.270 0.066 0.091
0.069 0.070 0.320 0.240 0.007 0.142
Table 5.12: Sample statistics for stylized facts. Economies: 1 –
the benchmark economy (4.2.4), 2 – rule switching
for fundamentalists (5.2.1), 3 – rule switching for MV
agents (5.2.2), 4 – MV agents using ARCH rule (5.3), 5
– type switching (5.4), and 6 – rule and type switching
(5.5). Star: signiﬁcant at 5%. Minus: signiﬁcantly
different sign than found by Cont (2001).6
Discussion
In this thesis we discussed several topics in asset pricing. Chapter 2 investi-
gated asset markets, when the maintained hypothesis is absence of arbitrage
opportunities while there may be limits to rational expectations. This allows for
a natural explanation of anomalies found in ﬁnance. We showed evidence in
favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of rational expectations. This further leads
to concluding that markets might be efﬁcient, but only from a short horizon
point of view. In chapter 3 we developed a CAPM model with endogenous
beliefs which provides a solution to theoretical criticism on the original CAPM,
for instance, by Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982), Jarrow and Madan (1997), and
Levy (2007). We also developed and applied a new testing procedure for this
model which showed that the Endogenous Beliefs CAPM (EBCAPM) performs
very well. Further, we showed that there is a trade-off between model consis-
tency of fully empirically based beliefs and violations of the hypothesis of no
potential arbitrage of such beliefs in case of factor models. We showed that the
traditional more-than-one-factor models violate the hypothesis of no potential
arbitrage opportunities, which makes us prefer the EBCAPM. Chapter 4 devel-
oped a benchmark artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market model in which fundamentalists
and mean-variance agents trade assets and generate asset prices and returns.
Chapter 5 extended this model with concepts such as rule and type switching
and showed that the resulting economies are able to reproduce a considerable
amount of stylized facts of asset returns (see Cont (2001)). In general, this
thesis contributes in a further understanding of anomalies and stylized facts
found in asset price and return data.150 Discussion Chapter 6
We conclude this thesis with a discussion about how the chapters relate
to each other and we provide a general conclusion. First, chapter 2 explicitly
discusses as example the excess volatility anomaly, but we did not investigate
this in chapters 4 and 5. The anomaly is that stock prices usually show more
variability than their underlying fundamental values, while standard theory
predicts the opposite. According to Shiller (2003) this is the most basic anomaly.
Shiller (2003) shows that this anomaly is present in the S&P500 data. Under
the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations, this suggests limits to
arbitrage according to behavioral ﬁnance. However, under our maintained
hypothesis of no arbitrage opportunities, we motivated that agents might have
to restrict their planning horizon to achieve well-performing beliefs, which, in
turn, leads to frequent revisions of the portfolio, generating excess volatility so
that it is not really an anomaly. In the economies discussed in chapters 4 and 5
the economic agents do employ a short term horizon with frequent revisions
of their portfolio. So, these models provide a natural test for the claim in
chapter 2.
Figure 6.1 depicts an arbitrary sample of prices of asset 1 in the benchmark
model (see section 4.2.4) together with the fundamental price as perceived by
a fundamentalist. It shows that there is indeed excess volatility of the price over
the fundamental price. Most of the models in chapter 5 exhibit larger volatility
in returns than in the benchmark model. Due to the fact that the dividend
process is the same in all models and hence also the volatility of the perceived
fundamental prices, this indicates that in these models the excess volatility
feature will be even more pronounced than in the benchmark model. Further,
as discussed in chapter 2, this also implies a rejection of the combination of
no arbitrage and the rational expectations hypothesis. Below, we will motivate
that the hypothesis of no arbitrage does not seem to be violated.
Next, we investigate the properties of the beliefs of the agents in the
economies in chapters 4 and 5 from the point of view of chapters 2 and 3. In
particular, we might investigate whether beliefs are rational, whether they are
well-performing, and whether they allow for potential arbitrage opportunities.
Rational beliefs are beliefs that cannot be rejected by misspeciﬁcation tests. In
the economies of chapters 4 and 5, the beliefs are determined exogenously and
the equilibrium prices are determined from these beliefs. Then, by construction,
the beliefs are rational. Further, we observe that the economies studied in151











Figure 6.1: Excess volatility in the benchmark model: the funda-
mental price of asset 1 as perceived by a fundamentalist
(solid curve) and the price of asset 1 (dashed curve).
chapters 4 and 5 do not contain unforeseen contingencies because agents
have a one period planning horizon.1,2 The lack of unforeseen contingencies
makes the economies strongly immutable (see chapter 2) and because the
forecasting rules that the agents use do not put support restrictions on the
predicted probability distribution of payoffs, it will very likely be possible
to ﬁnd a probability distribution for a fundamentalist agent such that the
outcome space is large enough to generate well-performance of beliefs. Well-
performance of beliefs is less obvious in case of mean-variance agents. As
the beliefs of the agents are exogenous, the mean-variance agents are not
necessarily non-satiated (see, for instance, Jarrow and Madan (1997)) and
hence, absence of arbitrage opportunities is not guaranteed, especially not in
an economy with only MV agents. Using the test developed in chapter 3, which
actually includes testing well-performance of beliefs, and using the special
mean-variance preferences deﬁned there, we can test whether the beliefs do
1In section 5.1.3, the agents also have an effective one period horizon as they are allowed
to revise their portfolio every period.
2Note that a crash might be an unforeseen contingency for economic agents, but as the
economy cannot recover from a crash, we did not study these economies (except for the
MV-only economy in section 4.2.2).152 Discussion Chapter 6
not allow for potential arbitrage opportunities. We tested the hypothesis of
no potential arbitrage opportunities for arbitrary mean-variance agents in
the economies discussed in section 5.6 (except for the economy with type
switching) using the excess return on their portfolio and a sample length of
50 weeks.3 We found that we could not reject the hypothesis of no potential
arbitrage opportunities a single time in most economies, except for the economy
with rule and type switching (see section 5.5),4 in which we found 89 rejections
for most MV agents during the 10000 period sample.
From these ﬁndings, we can conclude that the artiﬁcial economies studied
in chapters 4 and 5 are closely related to chapters 2 and 3: beliefs in the
artiﬁcial economies are rational and can be chosen such that they do not
allow for potential arbitrage opportunities, which supports our maintained
assumption in chapter 2 of absence of arbitrage opportunities. Further, this also
supports the ﬁndings in chapter 3 that the CAPM cannot be rejected. Moreover,
considering that the models in chapters 4 and 5 can reproduce a considerable
amount of stylized facts of asset returns, this in turn provides more evidence
that the maintained hypothesis of absence of arbitrage opportunities is to
be preferred above the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations. We
conclude that this thesis has provided a theoretical, empirical, and practical
environment for analyzing and understanding anomalies and stylized facts of
asset returns.
Finally, we would like to mention a few topics for future research. In chap-
ter 2 we focused particularly on effective single-period beliefs. This guaranteed
immutability of the economic system, making derivations of, for instance, a
modiﬁed ﬁrst fundamental theorem of asset pricing under ambiguity possible.
However, under special circumstances, such as options together with their
underlying, the effects of transmutability might be limited and hence this might
make no arbitrage under well-performing beliefs with longer planning horizons
more plausible. It would be worth extending our analysis to such situations.
Such a multi-period extension could also be worthwhile for the analysis of
chapter 3. There, we assumed that investors have a single-period planning
3To determine a reasonable sample length, we also performed the same test as in chapter 3
on weekly data with sample lengths 40, 50, and 60 weeks. We observed that there was only a
single rejection in case of the CAPM model for sample length 50.
4Recall that the agents did not switch type in that economy although they were allowed to
do so.153
horizon to derive testable restrictions with respect to potential arbitrage op-
portunities. We assumed no potential single-period arbitrage opportunities
for the EBCAPM equilibrium. It would be interesting to extend the analysis
by weakening this assumption such that there are no multi-period potential
arbitrage opportunities according to the beliefs of the agents over their plan-
ning horizons. Another interesting aspect for further research is the conclusion
of chapter 2 that ﬁnancial markets might not be allocationally efﬁcient in the
long run. Usually, an argument of efﬁciency plays an important role in the
discussion whether and to what extent asset markets should be regulated (see,
for instance, Stiglitz (2000) and Bekaert et al. (2005)). It would be interesting
to study the policy implications of our ﬁndings and whether this implies, for
instance, that interventions might be useful for ﬁnancial markets. This might
also provide an argument for the regulator used in chapters 4 and 5. For
chapters 4 and 5, we already mentioned that we do not model crashes or
the behavior of agents during crashes explicitly. This requires some way of
modeling recovering from crashes. Doing so might help in explaining stylized
facts such as gain/loss asymmetry and the leverage effect. Further, it would
be very interesting to adapt the artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market model such that the
agents have endogenous beliefs (see, for instance, LeBaron (2002a)). This
would link the model closer to chapter 3 and the effects of exogenous versus
endogenous beliefs could be studied more closely. However, as mentioned
in chapter 4, in the current model, this will lead to solving highly non-linear
equations numerically as the price will also enter via the forecasting rules used
by the agents.Bibliography
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Economische agenten zijn in de praktijk genoodzaakt hun investeringsbeslis-
singen te baseren op de actuele koersen en beschikbare historische gegevens
over aandelenprijzen en -rendementen. In dit proefschrift worden de gevol-
gen van dit haast triviale feit onderzocht. Het behandelt in twee delen drie
onderwerpen binnen de ﬁnancieringsliteratuur. Het eerste deel wordt gevormd
door hoofdstukken 2 en 3, en is meer analytisch van aard. Dit deel behandelt
enerzijds het effect van ambiguïteit op ﬁnanciële markten en anderzijds een al-
ternatief voor het bekritiseerde Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), een model
dat gebruikt kan worden voor het voorspellen van de prijs van een aandeel. Het
tweede deel, gevormd door hoofdstukken 4 en 5, is meer kwantitatief van aard
en behandelt kunstmatige ﬁnanciële markten waarin heterogene economische
agenten handelen en prijs- en rendementsontwikkelingen bepalen.
Het eerste deel begint met het behandelen van de vraag welke invloed
ambiguïteit (onzekerheid over kansverdelingen) en transmutabiliteit (het on-
bekend zijn van de beschikbare ﬁnanciële producten in toekomstige perioden)
met betrekking tot toekomstige uitbetalingen van aandelen hebben op inves-
teringsbeslissingen van heterogene economische agenten. We laten zien dat
als deze agenten de transmutabiliteit meenemen in hun beslissingen, ze hun
beleggingshorizon tot één periode zullen beperken om op die manier een goede
mening over de relevante toekomstige uitbetalingen te vormen. Ze kunnen
uiteraard verder vooruit plannen, maar doen er goed aan de beslissingen iedere
periode te bezien. Vervolgens tonen we aan dat we het Eerste Fundamentele
Theorema van het Prijzen van Activa kunnen vertalen naar onze context met166 Nederlandse samenvatting
ambiguïteit. Dit betekent dat ook in onze context aandelenprijzen worden
gegeven door de verwachting van de toekomstige uitbetaling onder een alter-
natieve, equivalente maar risiconeutrale kansverdeling, dan en slechts dan als
er geen arbitragemogelijkheden zijn. Kort verwoord zijn dit mogelijkheden om
geld te verdienen met aandelen zonder risico te lopen.
Aangezien iedere economische agent anders kan denken over de toekomst,
is het niet handig op voorhand bepaalde denkbeelden (zoals niet-rationele
verwachtingen) uit te sluiten. Dit is ook niet nodig om resultaten af te leiden
gezien ons alternatieve Eerste Fundamentele Theorema van het Prijzen van
Activa. In plaats daarvan kunnen we aannemen dat aandelenprijzen geen
arbitragemogelijkheden vertonen. We kunnen vervolgens toetsen of de ver-
wachtingen van de economische agenten rationeel zijn, dat wil zeggen, dat ze
correct rekening houden met alles wat in de toekomst kan gebeuren. Als dat
zo is, dan bereiken we hetzelfde resultaat als de traditionele ﬁnancieringslite-
ratuur. Echter, een aantal bekende anomalieën laten zien dat de combinatie
van geen arbitragemogelijkheden en rationele verwachtingen verworpen dient
te worden. Behavioral ﬁnance concludeert hieruit dat er grenzen zijn aan
de mogelijkheden van arbitragemogelijkheden om aandelenprijzen gelijk te
maken aan de fundamentele waarden van die aandelen. Echter, in onze context
concluderen we dat er juist grenzen zijn aan de mogelijkheden van ratione-
le verwachtingen en zijn de anomalieën juist mogelijke uitkomsten van het
model.
Het eerste deel gaat verder met een alternatief op het CAPM, een stan-
daardmodel in de ﬁnanciële literatuur. Het CAPM model gaat uit van exogeen
gegeven homogene verwachtingen omtrent rendement en risico op aandelen.
Eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat er zowel theoretische als empirische
bezwaren zijn tegen dit model. We stellen een alternatief voor waarin we
de eis van exogene homogene verwachtingen laten vallen. Dit zorgt voor
meer ﬂexibiliteit in het model. We leiden ook een toets af voor het model en
laten zien dat het alternatieve model goed presteert. Het geeft namelijk niet
of nauwelijks mogelijke arbitragemogelijkheden. Dit in tegenstelling tot een
andere klasse van modellen, de factormodellen. We laten zien dat hoe meer
factoren er opgenomen worden in het model, hoe groter de kans op mogelijke
arbitragemogelijkheden. Daarom geven we de voorkeur aan ons alternatieve
model met slechts één factor, in combinatie met endogene verwachtingen.167
Het tweede deel van het proefschrift staat volledig in het teken van het
simuleren van aandelenmarkten. Allereerst wordt een model geïntroduceerd
waarin verschillende typen (econometrische) agenten verschillende aandelen
op de markt verhandelen. Het model bevat agenten die een fundamentele
analyse doen (de fundamentalisten) en hun beleggingsportefeuille iedere peri-
ode op het resultaat aanpassen. Ook bevat het agenten die een zogenaamde
“mean-variance”-analyse uitvoeren (de “mean-variance” agenten) om zo hun
optimale portefeuille te bepalen. Deze agenten laten we samen handelen en zo
genereren zij aandelenprijzen en -rendementen. We laten gestructureerd zien
welke invloed bepaalde parameters in het model hebben op de uitkomsten en
leggen een uitgangsmodel vast. Dit model reproduceert een aantal van de be-
kende feiten van aandelenrendementen, bijvoorbeeld dat extreme uitkomsten
relatief vaak voorkomen als we dat vergelijken met de normale verdeling.
In het vervolg van het tweede deel breiden we het uitgangsmodel uit en
geven we de agenten bijvoorbeeld de mogelijkheid om iedere periode andere
voorspelregels te gebruiken voor grootheden die voor hen van belang zijn. Voor
fundamentalisten is dit de fundamentele prijs van een aandeel (de “onder-
liggende” waarde) en voor “mean-variance” agenten zijn dit de gemiddelden
en de covariantiematrix van de aandelenrendementen. Ook laten we toe dat
agenten van type kunnen wisselen als ze zien dat de markt beter beschreven
kan worden door een analyse van het andere type. We laten zien dat bepaal-
de bekende feiten van aandelenrendementen in een dergelijke kunstmatige
markt kunnen worden gereproduceerd, zoals het feit dat doorgaans volatiele
perioden volgen op volatiele en rustige perioden volgen op rustige, maar ook
dat handelsvolume en volatiliteit gecorreleerd zijn. Dit model geeft dus een
mogelijke verklaring van deze feiten.